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Articles
THE LEASE OF MONEY IN BANKRUPTCY:
TIME FOR CONSISTENCY?
Laura B. Bartell*
Money answereth all things
- Ecclesiastes 10:19
Bankruptcy is about money-the allocation of the limited
resources of the bankrupt estate to the claims against the estate
made by prepetition creditors. But in the case of one class of
creditors, the lenders, not only is the claim against the estate one for
money, but the commodity involved in the original prepetition
transaction is also money.'
* Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. My thanks to my
colleague and friendJohn Dolan for his comments on this Article.
1 "Money" is defined narrowly in the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) as "a
medium of exchange authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government .....
U.C.C. § 1-201(24) (1995) (except as otherwise indicated, all references herein to the U.C.C.
will be to the 1995 Official Text, which does not reflect the proposed revisions approved by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in July, 1998). This view
of money as legal tender has its critics, who see money in a more functional role as the
purpose of payments. To the extent physical currency is replaced by bank credits, money
transfers become a system of novation of bank liabilities, which represent a contract right to a
judgment for money. SeeJoseph H. Sommer, Where is a Bank Account?, 57 MD. L. REV. 1, 7, 11-
12 (1998).
Although I tend to lean toward what Mr. Sommer would characterize as "currency
fundamentalism" (i.e., the belief that a claim to "real" money underlies the intangible bank
money with which most commercial transactions are made), see id. at 12, in this Article, I use
the term in its narrow sense. When appropriate, I discuss how a more functional definition
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The Bankruptcy Code2 has apparently accepted as an article of
faith that the nature of this prepetition commodity justifies
treatment of the relationship between lender and debtor in a way
that differs from that afforded any other creditor who provides a
commodity to the lender for a set period, receives interim payments
in respect thereof, and expects to receive that commodity back at
the end of the term (i.e., a lessor). This Article begins by looking at
the differing statutory treatment of personal property leases and
money leases (more commonly known as loans) under the
Bankruptcy Code. The great disparity between the provisions
applicable to the two types of lending transactions can be traced, I
argue, to the state law linkage between physical possession of
currency and ownership of the value represented thereby.
Having found the modem source of the distinction, I then
examine potential justifications for the differing treatment, ranging
from history to the demands of a mercantile economy dependent
on the free transferability of a medium of exchange. I conclude
that none of these purported justifications warrant treating a
lending transaction involving money in such a dramatically different
fashion from a lending transaction involving other personal
property.
After looking at how a lending transaction would be
characterized if the common law linkage between possession of
funds and ownership were severed, I look at how such a
recharacterized transaction-a true lease of money-would be treated
in a bankruptcy case. Finally, I propose that this approach, which
treats all personal property lessors uniformly, better balances the
competing goals of bankruptcy-equitable treatment of creditors and
rehabilitation for debtors-than the current vestigial bifurcation
between lessors of money and those of other personal property.
would modify my analysis.
The Bankruptcy Code (the "Code") is codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998). In this Article, all section references are to sections of the Code unless
otherwise specified.
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I. STATUTORY TREATMENT
A. Personal Property Leases
The statutory provisions dealing with leases are some of the
Code's most elaborate. When a petition for protection is filed
under the Code, an "estate" is created, which comprises of, among
other things, "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
property as of the commencement of the case."3 If the debtor is a
lessee under an unexpired lease,4 the interest of the debtor in the
underlying property subject to the lease is limited to a leasehold
interest, that is, the right to possession and use of the property for
the lease term, subject to the terms of the lease.! Courts have
consistently recognized that leasehold interests are included in the
6bankrupt estate.
The lessor (like all other "entities") is subject to the automatic
stay described in § 362. A lessor is precluded from, among other
things, commencing or continuing any action or proceeding against
the debtor, enforcing any judgment, or acting to obtain possession
of property from the estate (including the leased property) without
obtaining relief from the stay.7 The lessor may seek relief from the
I U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).
If the lease is one of nonresidential real property and has terminated at the
conclusion of its stated term prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case, the Code
explicitly excludes it from the scope of property of the estate. See id. § 541 (b) (2). However,
even in the absence of an explicit exclusion, if a lease has expired, as a result of which the
debtor/lessee no longer has a leasehold interest cognizable as a matter of state property law,
there is no "legal or equitable interest[]" of the debtor to include in the estate under
§ 541 (a) (1).
Cf. U.C.C. § 2A-103(1) (n) (defining "lessee" as "a person who acquires the right to
possession and use of goods under a lease"). A "lease" means "a transfer of the right to
possession and use of goods for a term in return for consideration, but a sale, including a sale
on approval or a sale or return, or retention or creation of a security interest is not a lease."
Id. § 2A-103(1)(j). "Leasehold interest" is defined as "the interest of the.., lessee under a
lease contract." Id. § 2A-103(1) (m).
6 See, e.g., Bell v. Alden Owners, Inc., 199 B.R. 451,462 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); In reWyatt, 173
B.RL 698, 702 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1994); In re Ayre, 158 B.R. 123, 124 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1993);
Tel-A-Communications Consultants, Inc. v. Auto-Use (In re Tel-A-Communications
Consultants, Inc.), 50 B.R. 250, 252 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1985); In reTidus, 4 F.2d 558, 559 (D.
Del. 1925).
See, e.g., In reJ.T. Rapps, Inc., 225 B.R. 257, 263 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998); Wyat 173
B.R. at 703; In re Chautauqua Capital Corp., 135 B.R 779, 782 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992); In re
Dieckhaus Stationers of King of Prussia, Inc., 73 B.R. 969,973 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
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stay under § 362(d) , but will be successful only if the debtor cannot
adequately protect the lessor's interest in the leased property or if
the debtor has no equity in the leasehold interest and the property
is not necessary to an effective reorganization. 9
Generally, as discussed infra, the bankruptcy trustee (or debtor-
in-possession exercising the powers of the trustee under § 1107(a))
is given the right under § 365 to assume or reject any unexpired
lease of the debtor, subject to certain limitations and exceptions.
Until a decision is made with respect to assumption or rejection, the
trustee may continue to use the leased property in the ordinary
course of business, 0 subject to the right of the lessor to request that
such use be conditioned on the provision of adequate protection of
the lessor's interest in the property." Adequate protection may take
' For property of the estate that is not single asset real estate, § 362(d) provides two
bases for lifting the stay. The first is "for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of
an interest in property" of the party seeking relief. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). The second
requires the moving party to demonstrate that "(A) the debtor does not have an equity in
such property; and (B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization." Id.
§ 362(d) (2).
Compare Noonan v.Jones (In reJones), 176 B.R. 645, 648-49 (D.N.H. 1994), dismissed,
53 F.3d 327 (1st Cir. 1995) (unpublished); In re Knight Jewelry, 168 B.R. 199, 203 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1994); In re Peters Millwork, Inc., 151 B.R. 440, 444 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993), and
Westport v. Inn at Longshore, Inc. (In re Inn at Longshore, Inc.), 32 B.R. 942, 946 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1983) (relief from stay granted lessor), with Wyatt, 173 B.R. 698, 703 (Bankr. D. Idaho
1994); In re Braniff, Inc., 118 B.R. 819, 844 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989); In re Reice, 88 B.R. 676,
685-86 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Nexus Communications, Inc., 55 B.R. 596, 599 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. 1985); In re Dabney, 45 B.R. 312, 314 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985), and City Stores Co. v.
A.L.S., Inc. (In reA.L.S., Inc.), 3 B.R. 107, 108 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980) (relief denied lessor).
But see IFG Leasing Co. v. Christensen Hatch Farms, Inc., 56 B.R 237, 239 (D. Minn. 1985); In
re O-Jay Foods, Inc., 110 B.R. 895, 897 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989); In re Caf6
Partners/Washington 1983, 81 B.R. 175, 180 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1988); Harris Int'l
Telecommunications, Inc. v. Three Star Telecast, Inc. (In reThree Star Telecast, Inc.), 73 B.R.
270, 274 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1987); In reWheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 54 B.R. 385, 390 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1985); In re Sweetwater, 40 B.R. 733, 745 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984), affd, 57 B.R. 743
(D. Utah 1985) (holding that lessors may not seek relief from stay and that rights are limited
to those in § 365).
" See 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1) (1994) (permitting use of "property of the estate in the
ordinary course of business without notice or a hearing" unless the court orders otherwise).
" See id. § 363(e). Section 363(e) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, at any time, on request of an
entity that has an interest in property used, sold, or leased, or proposed to be used,
sold, or leased, by the trustee, the court, with or without a hearing, shall prohibit or
condition such use, sale, or lease as is necessary to provide adequate protection of
such interest. This subsection also applies to property that is subject to any
unexpired lease of personal property....
See also, e.g., In re Ernst Home Ctr., Inc. 209 B.R 955, 965-66 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1997); In re
Elder-Beerman Stores Corp., 201 B.R. 759,763 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1996).
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the form of a one-time cash payment, periodic cash payments, or
any other relief that will result in the realization by the lessor of "the
indubitable equivalent" of its interest in the property.12
Until the debtor makes its decision on assumption or rejection,
the lease presumably remains enforceable against the lessor. 3 Thus,
the lessor must continue to provide the leased property to the
debtor and must provide any additional services or supplies
specified in the lease, but the lessor cannot take any action to
enforce the lessee's obligations against the debtor. 4
Certain lessors are provided statutory protection against
prolonged periods of limbo while the debtor reaches a decision on
assumption. Pursuant to § 365(d) (1), a trustee in a case under
chapter 7 of the Code must generally assume or reject an unexpired
lease of residential real property or personal property of a debtor
within sixty days after the order for relief or the lease is deemed
rejected. 5  The same rule applies to unexpired leases of
nonresidential real property under which the debtor is the lessee in
" 11 U.S.C. § 361; see also, e.g., Wyatt, 173 B.R at 703 (monthly lease payments and
adequate insurance); In re Pavco Enters., Inc., 172 B.R. 114, 118-19 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994)
(curing arrearages and making monthly rent payments), In re Borbidge, 66 B.R 998, 1004
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (payment of all postpetiion rent); Nexus Communications, 55 B.R at
599 (payment of monthly rent); Dabney, 45 B.R. at 314 (compliance with provisions of lease);
A.L.S., 3 B.R at 109 (payment of all rent and charges and security deposit of three months
rent).
'3 In NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, the Supreme Court, dealing with a collective bargaining
agreement which the NLRB sought to enforce against the debtor in possession, stated
emphatically that "from the filing of a petition in bankruptcy until formal acceptance, the
collective-bargaining agreement is not an enforceable contract." 465 U.S. 513, 532 (1984)
This conclusion was mandated by the need to provide a debtor adequate breathing space to
ascertain whether assumption or rejection of the contract under § 365 was in its best interests.
However, even if the contract is unenforceable against the debtor, there is nothing in the Code
that purports to relieve the nondebtor of its legal obligations. SeeDouglas W. Bordewieck, The
Postpetition, Pre-Rejection, Pre-Assumption Status of an Executory Contract; 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 197,
200 (1985).
" When a nondebtor lessor provides supplies or services prior to assumption or
rejection of an unexpired lease, the lessor is entitled to compensation pursuant to the lease
terms. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b) (4). In all other cases, the nondebtor party to an executory
contract or lease during the limbo period between filing and assumption or rejection is
entitled only to an administrative expense priority under § 503(a) at the end of the case for
the reasonable value of the benefits conferred on the estate during the case. See Bildisco, 465
U.S. at 531.
5 The bankruptcy judge may grant additional time "for cause." See 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(d) (1); see also, e.g., In re Telemark Management Co., 51 B.R. 623 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.
1984).
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a case under any chapter of the Code." By contrast, the trustee is
given until the confirmation of a plan in any case under chapter 9,
11, 12, or 13 to assume or reject any unexpired lease of residential
real property or of personal property of the debtor.17 Even in those
cases, however, the lessor may move for a court order providing a
shorter specified period in which the trustee must act."
For leases of nonresidential real property, the trustee must
timely perform all obligations of the debtor until assumption or
rejection." The trustee must also timely perform all obligations of
the debtor under leases of personal property (other than consumer
leases) arising from and after sixty days after the order for relief in a
chapter 11 case until the lease is assumed or rejected, unless the
court orders otherwise based on the equities of the case."
Section 365 provides the trustee three explicit options with
respect to an unexpired lease: assumption, assumption and
assignment, or rejection.' In order to assume such a lease, the
trustee must meet three conditions set forth in § 365 (b). First, the
" See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4); see also, e.g., In re Channel Home Ctrs., Inc., 989 F.2d 682
(3d Cir. 1993); In re American Healthcare Management, Inc., 900 F.2d 827, 830 (5th Cir.
1990); In reCasual Male Corp., 120 B.R. 256, 263 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990); In re Perfectlite Co.,
116 B.R. 84, 86 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990).
" See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2); see also, e.g., General American Transp. Corp. v. Martin (In
reMid Region Petroleum, Inc.), 1 F.3d 1130, 1132 (10th Cir. 1993). The Supreme Court has
explained this distinction as reflecting "the considered judgment of Congress that a debtor-in-
possession seeking to reorganize should be granted more latitude in deciding whether to
reject a contract than should a trustee in liquidation." Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 529.
's See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d) (2) (providing that "the court, on the request of any party to
such ... lease, may order the trustee to determine within a specified period of time whether
to assume or reject such.., lease"). In these circumstances, the court is not likely to shorten
the period for decision-making absent a showing of hardship to the lessor outweighing the
risks to the estate of an improvident decision. See, e.g., In reDunes Casino Hotel, 63 B.R. 939,
949 (D.N.J. 1986); Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co. v. Holly's, Inc. (In re Holly's, Inc.), 140 B.R.
643, 682 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992); In re Monroe Well Serv., Inc., 83 B.R. 317, 323 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1988) (denying motion to shorten period); cf. Theatre Holding Corp. v. Mauro, 681
F.2d 102, 106 (2d Cir. 1982) (suggesting that the bankruptcy court abused discretion by
shortening the period to assume or reject the lease to 30 days, but affirming the decision
because debtor had shown no evidence of developing a plan during the following year).
'9 See 11 U.S.C, § 365(d) (3). There is no comparable provision applicable to unexpired
leases of personal property or other executory contracts.
Seeid.§365(d)(10).
21 See id. § 365(a) (providing that "the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may
assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor). If the trustee
assumes the lease in accordance with § 365(a), the trustee is then empowered to assign such
lease pursuant to § 365(f) (2).
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trustee must cure, or provide "adequate assurance" 22 that the trustee
will promptly2s cure, any default in the lease. 4 Second, the trustee
must compensate, or provide adequate assurance that the trustee
will promptly compensate, any nondebtor party to such lease for any
actual pecuniary loss attributable to such default.25  Third, the
trustee must provide adequate assurance of future performance
under such lease.26
If the trustee meets the requirements for assumption, elects to
assume, and the court approves that election, the estate becomes a
The concept of "adequate assurance" is borrowed from Article 2 - Sales of the U.C.C.
With respect to a contract of sale, when reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to
the performance of one party, the other party may demand in writing "adequate assurance of
due performance" and may suspend his or her own performance until receiving such
assurance. U.C.C. § 2-609(1) (1995). The concept of "adequate assurance" was intended to
be determined "according to commercial standards" rather than legal norms. See id. § 2-
609(2) & cmt.3; see also, e.g., In re Luce Indus., Inc., 14 B.R. 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Alipat,
Inc., 36 B.R. 274 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1984); Allied Technology, Inc. v. R.B. Brunemann & Sons,
Inc., 25 B.R. 484 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).
' Courts differ widely in their opinions on how long the debtor may take to cure a
default without running afoul of the statutory requirement that such cure be made
"promptly." Compare In re R/P Int'l Techs., Inc., 57 B.R. 869 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985) (60
months is not "promptly") with In reR.H. Neil, Inc., 58 B.R. 969 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (three
months is "promptly").
2 Certain defaults are excepted from the cure requirement. Under the Code, the
debtor need not cure a default relating to:
(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any time before the closing
of the case;
(B) the commencement of a case under this title;
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under this title or
a custodian before such commencement; or
(D) the satisfaction of any penalty rate or provision relating to a default arising from
any failure by the debtor to perform nonmonetary obligations under the executory
contract or unexpired lease.
11 U.S.C. § 365(b) (2).
See id. § 365(b) (1) (B). The statute does not provide an independent basis for the
assessment of such losses, but permits the collection of compensation for losses otherwise
allocable to the debtor-for example by the terms of the contract or lease being assumed. See
also, e.g.,J.W. Fortune, Inc. v. McLean Square Assoc., G.P. (In reJ.W. Fortune, Inc.), No. 98-
1115, 1999 WL 95529, at *2 (4th Cir. Feb. 17, 1999); Three Sisters Partners, L.L.C. v. Harden
(In re Shangra-La, Inc.), 167 F.3d 843, 849 (4th Cir. 1999); In re Chateaugay Corp., 1992-93
Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) § 75,302, at 81,224 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Lacey v. Westside Print Works,
Inc. (In re Westside Print Works, Inc.), 180 B.R 557, 564 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995); In re Ryan's
Subs, Inc., 165 B.R. 465, 468 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994); In re Child World, Inc., 161 B.R. 349,
353 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993).
"' The Code includes special rules dealing with adequate assurance of future
performance of a lease of real property in a shopping center. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b) (3).
Although the Code recognizes the possibility of deemed rejection without court
20001
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party to the lease to the same extent as the debtor was a party prior
to bankruptcy. The lease thereby becomes enforceable against the
estate, and the obligations of the estate (both prepetition
obligations assumed by the trustee and postpetition obligations
incurred directly by the estate) are transformed into administrative
expenses entitled to first priority under § 507 (a) (1).28
If the estate does not wish to shoulder the liability associated
with an unexpired lease, but instead wishes to realize the value
inherent in its provisions, the trustee may assume the lease29 and
then assign the lease to a third party who is willing to take on the
obligations thereunders The assignee must provide adequate
assurance of future performance of the lease, even if there has been
no default on the lease." Upon any assignment, the trustee and the
estate are relieved from any liability for any breach of the lease
occurring after the assignment.3
2
When neither assumption nor assumption and assignment are
beneficial to the estate, the trustee may opt to reject the unexpired
approval merely by trustee inaction prior to the date by which a decision with respect to
assumption must be made, see id § 365(d)(1), (4), § 365(a) does not permit an implicit
assumption of an executory contract or unexpired lease, even when the trustee knowingly
performs the contract during the case and accepts the benefits thereof, or stipulates to his
intent to assume, see, e.g., In re Fuzzy Thurston's Eau Claire Left Guard, Inc., 33 B.R. 579
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983); In re Kelly Lyn Franchise Co., 26 B.R. 441, 444 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
1983).
See, e.g., In re Klein Sleep Prods., Inc., 78 F.3d 18, 25-26 (2d Cir. 1996); In re Baker, No.
98-03364-8-JAL, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 1597, at *17 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Nov. 24, 1998); In re
Sporting Way, Inc., 126 B.R. 110 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991); In re Pearson, 90 B.R. 638, 642
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1988); In reNorwegian Health Spa, Inc., 79 B.R. 507, 509 (N.D. Ga. 1987); In re
World Wines, Ltd., 77 B.R. 653, 656 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987); In re Multech Corp., 47 B.R. 747,
750-51 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985).
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(2)(A) (providing that the assumption of the lease in
accordance with the other provisions of § 365 is a prerequisite to valid assignment).
See id. § 365(f) (1). Moreover, the Code renders unenforceable contractual provisions
that preclude assignment. Section 365(f) (1) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section [dealing with nonassumable
and nonassignable contracts and leases], notwithstanding a provision in an
executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, or in applicable law, that
prohibits, restricts, or conditions the assignment of such contract or lease, the
trustee may assign such contract or lease under paragraph (2) of this
subsection; ....
Id. § 365(f)(1).
" See id. § 365 (f) (2) (B). If the assignee is replacing the debtor as lessee under the lease,
such assurance may take the form of a deposit or other security for performance of future
obligations under the lease. See id § 365(b.
2 Seeid§365(k).
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lease, or in certain cases may be deemed to have made such an
election.33 Some consequences of rejection are clear: § 365(g)(1)
provides that such rejection of an unexpired lease which has not
previously been assumed constitutes a "breach" of the lease
immediately before the date of the filing of the petition.' The
claim arising from such breach is treated as is any other claim
arising prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition; that is, it is
considered a prepetition claim subject to discharge.5 If the claim
results from termination of a lease of real property, there are
statutory limits imposed on the amount of an allowable claim. 6
Less clear, however, is what happens to the leased property
once the lease has been rejected. If the debtor is the lessor of real
property, the Code gives the nondebtor lessee a right to terminate a
rejected lease (if rejection creates a breach that would entitle the
lessee to terminate the lease under nonbankruptcy law) or,
alternatively, to retain its rights under the lease that are
"appurtenant to the real property" for the balance of the lease
term. Thus, possession of leased real property may remain
unaffected by a lessor's rejection of the lease. Congress has adopted
comparable provisions in § 365 to (1) protect the rights of
nondebtor timeshare interest purchasers when a debtor who is a
timeshare interest seller rejects a timeshare interest under a
timeshare plan;38  (2) protect the interests of purchasers in
possession of real property under a rejected executory contract for
See id. § 365(g) (1). In a chapter 7 case, if the trustee does not assume or reject an
unexpired lease of residential real property or of personal property of the debtor within 60
days after the order for relief (or within such additional time as the court provides), the lease
is deemed rejected. See id. § 365(d) (1). In a case under any chapter, if the debtor is a lessee
of nonresidential real property and the trustee does not assume or reject the unexpired lease
within 60 days after the order for relief (or within such additional time as the court fixes),
such lease is deemed rejected. See id. § 365(d) (4).
If the rejected lease had previously been assumed, the breach is deemed to occur at
the time of the rejection (so long as the case had not previously been converted to a chapter
7 case), meaning that the damages occasioned by the breach will be entitled to administrative
expense priority. See id. § 3 6 5(g) (2).
Seeid.§502(g).
See id. § 502(b)(6) (providing for disallowance of a rejection claim in respect of a
lease of real property to the extent that it exceeds the sum of the rent payable for the greater
of one year or 15% of the remaining term of the lease, but not to exceed three years, plus
unpaid rent).
', Seeid. § 365(h)(1)(A).
Seeid.§365(h)(2)(A).
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the sale of real property, or of a timeshare interest by the debtor; 9
and (3) protect licensees of rights to intellectual property from the
debtor under a rejected executory contract of license." No statutory
guidance is provided with respect to personal property subject to an
unexpired lease on which the debtor is the lessor; thus, the impact
of rejection on possession of that property is unclear."
On the other hand, if the debtor is a lessee of nonresidential
real property and the unexpired lease is deemed rejected by the
failure of the trustee to assume or reject it on a timely basis," the
trustee is directed to "immediately surrender such nonresidential
real property to the lessor."" Although the Code does not so
provide, courts have assumed that immediate surrender of the
property must occur whenever the debtor-lessee rejects an
unexpired lease of nonresidential real property, even if the
rejection is completely volitional." The Code gives no mandate to
lessees of property other than nonresidential real property.
However, because the statutory obligation of the trustee to perform
the lease obligations pending the decision on assumption or
rejection terminates when the decision is made,5 Congress must
Seeid.§365(i)(1).
,o Seeid. § 365(n)(1).
Compare Laura B. Bartell, Revisiting Rejection: Secured Party Interests in Leases and
Executory Contracts, 103 DIcK. L. REV. 497 (1999) (arguing that rejection of the lease
terminates property rights created thereby) with Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts
Revisited. A Reply to Professor Westbrook, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 17 (1991), andJay Lawrence
Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executoy Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REv. 227, 239 (1989), and
Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding"Rejection", 59 U. COLO. L.
REv. 845, 884 (1988) (suggesting that termination of property rights in bankruptcy can be
accomplished only through the avoiding powers of the trustee and not through rejection).
After the time the lease is rejected, the interest of the debtor/lessee thereunder is no longer
property of the estate. See, e.g., In reUnited States Fax, Inc., 114 B.R. 70, 71 (E.D. Pa. 1990); In
re Damianopoulos, 93 B.R. 3, 6 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Dial-A-Tire, Inc., 78 B.R. 13, 16
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1987).
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(k) (1994).
4, See id. § 365 (d) (4).
See, e.g., Ansel Properties, Inc. v. Nutri/System of Florida Assoc. (In re Nutri/System of
Florida Assoc.), 178 B.R. 645, 656 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Inland's Monthly Income Fund, L.P. v.
Duckwall-Alco Stores, Inc. (In re Duckwall-Alco Stores, Inc.), 150 B.R. 965, 971 (D. Kan. 1993);
Keaty & Keaty v. Loyola.Assoc. (In reStalter & Co., Ltd.), 99 B.R. 327, 330 (E.D. La. 1989); In
re Gatea, 227 B.R. 695, 697 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1997) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 365(d) (4) for the
proposition that a debtor/lessee must immediately vacate the premises after rejection in cases
when rejection was by motion).
4, Under the Code, the trustee must "timely perform all the obligations of the debtor...
under any unexpired lease of nonresidential real property, until such lease is assumed or reected."
11 U.S.C. § 365(d) (3) (emphasis added). Similarly, the trustee must "timely perform all of
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have assumed that rejection of the lease would result in immediate
surrender of the leased property, thereby terminating any
administrative expense liability for rent.
46
To summarize, if the debtor is the lessee of personal property
under an unexpired lease, then pursuant to § 365 the trustee may
make one of three elections. First, the trustee may elect to assume
the lease, thereby making the estate liable under the lease and
retaining the benefit of the property for the lease term. Second, the
trustee may elect to assume the lease and assign it to another,
thereby capturing the economic benefit of the lease without
incurring the long-term liability associated therewith. Finally, the
trustee may elect to reject the lease, thereby creating a breach of the
lease, which is treated as a prepetition claim, and relinquish the
property to the lessor.
B. Leases of Money
When the contractual arrangement between debtor and
nondebtor involves the lending of money rather than another type
of personal property, the Code treats the relationship very
differently. First, as discussed in Part II of this Article, the Code
does not view the money provided by a lender to a borrower as
"belonging" to the lender. Therefore, the lender may not seek
adequate protection of its interest in the money by reason of the
debtor's continued use or disposition of the money as could the
owner of other personal property.47 Moreover, the continued use of
the obligations of the debtor... first arising from or after 60 days after the order for relief in
a case under chapter 11 of this title under an unexpired lease of personal property (other
than personal property leased to an individual primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes), until such lease is assumed or rejected." Id. § 365 (d) (10) (emphasis added).
5 Indeed, in many cases of rejection, the debtor/lessee has already vacated the premises
prior to making the motion, and the court may allow retroactive rejection at least to the date
the debtor files its motion in order to avoid administrative expense priority for increased rents
owed by the debtor between the date the motion is filed and the date the court approves the
rejection. See, e.g., In re Amber's Stores, Inc., 193 B.R. 819 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996); In re
Joseph C. Spiess Co., 145 B.RP 597, 606 (Bankr. N.D. 11. 1992).
' Section 363(e) of the Code reads as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, at any time, on request of an
entity that has an interest in property used, sold, or leased, or proposed to be used,
sold, or leased, by the trustee, the court, with or without a hearing, shall prohibit or
condition such use, sale, or lease as is necessary to provide adequate protection of
such interest. This subsection also applies to property that is subject to any
unexpired lease of personal property (to the exclusion of such property being
2772000]
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that money during a bankruptcy case does not give rise to an
administrative expense claim, as does use of other personal property
belonging to a creditor, 8 nor does the debtor have to comply with
the terms of the loan contract until it is assumed or rejected.49
Second, a contract "to make a loan, or extend other debt
financing or financial accommodations, to or for the benefit of the
debtor" is not subject to assumption or assignment."0 With respect
to such contracts, the only choice left to the debtor is to reject.
Therefore, the debtor is unable to reap the financial benefits
inherent in such a contract, even with the consent of the lender,"'
subject to an order to grant relief from the stay under section 362).
The final sentence of§ 363(e) was added by Congress as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994. See Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994). At the same time Congress added
§ 365(d) (10), which requires the debtor/lessee to begin timely performance of all obligations
(including payment of rents) under a personal property lease (other than one of consumer
goods to a consumer) within 60 days after the order for relief in a chapter 11 case. See supra
note 45. The new sentence in § 363(e) provides a remedy to a lessor who does not receive
such payment even if the lessor cannot show that use of the leased property benefited the
estate, which is the requirement necessary to establish an administrative expense claim under
§ 503(b) (1) (A). See generally In re Ernst Home Ctr., Inc., 209 BR. 955, 965 (Bankr. W.D.
Wash. 1997); In reElder-Beerman Stores Corp., 201 B.R. 759, 762-63 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1996).
See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1) (A) (providing that an administrative expense claim for "the
actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate"). These administrative expense
claims include those owing by reason of the debtor's use of personal property belonging to
another in a way that is beneficial to the estate. See, e.g., In re Raymond Cossette Trucking,
Inc., 231 B.R. 80, 85 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1999); In re Baldwin Rental Ctrs., Inc., 228 B.R. 504, 513-
14 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1998); In re Bridgeport Plumbing Prod., Inc., 178 B.R. 563, 565-66 (Bankr.
M.D. Ga. 1994); In reLease-A-Fleet, Inc., 140 B.R. 840, 845-46 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992); In re ICS
Cybernetics, Inc., 111 B.R. 32, 40-41 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989); In reThayn Farms, Inc., 117 B.R.
510, 514 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1988); cf In re Cardinal Indus., Inc., 151 B.R. 838, 841 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1992) (denying administrative expense claim when debtor never used leased equipment
postpetition).
" Cf 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(10) (requiring the trustee to timely perform all of the
obligations of the debtor arising from and after 60 days after the order for relief in a chapter
11 case under an unexpired lease of nonconsumer personal property until the lease is
assumed or rejected).
See id. § 365(c) (2). Congress apparently believed that a nondebtor should not be
compelled to lend money to a debtor, even if loans incurred during the case would be
entitled to administrative expense priority. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 348 (1977), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C-A.N. 5963, 6304 ("The purpose of this subsection ... is to prevent the trustee
from requiring new advances of money or other property."). These financial accommodations
were distinguished from "ordinary leases or contracts to provide goods or services with
payments to be made over time." 124 Cong. Rec. H 11089 (Sept. 28, 1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6447 (statement of Rep. Edwards); see also In rePlacid Oil Co., 72 B.R. 135,
139 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987). Instead, Congress provided a statutory mechanism for the
incurrence of credit after the filing of a petition, either in the ordinary course of business or
otherwise. See 11 U.S.C. § 364.
5' See Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Citibank, NA. (In re Sun Runner Marine,
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and is precluded from substituting for itself as borrower under the
unexpired lease (loan agreement) a more creditworthy customer
who would be willing to pay the debtor to receive money from the
lender on the terms provided therein.
However, upon rejection of such a contract, the debtor is not
expected to return the underlying property (the money) previously
lent. Instead, the rejection is deemed a prepetition breach of the
contract under § 365(g), and the lender is given a claim for
damages occasioned by the breach under § 502(g), which will be
equal to the value of the property retained, that is, the principal
amount of the loan, plus the unpaid rental for such property
(interest) for the period before the filing of the petition. Unlike
postpetition rent (which is an administrative expense claim with
respect to leased personal property), postpetition interest is not
even an allowable claim unless the claim is secured and the property
securing the claim has a value greater than the amount of the
claim." Therefore, the lender of money, unlike the lender of other
personal property, often receives no compensation for use of the
underlying property during the bankruptcy case, and instead of
getting back his property to redeploy with another party, receives a
claim against the bankrupt estate that will likely result in his
receiving a small percentage of the value of the property lent.
Inc.), 945 F.2d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1991). But see In re Crummie, 194 B.R. 230, 235 n.6
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1996); In reTS Indus., Inc., 117 B.R. 682, 687 (Bankr. D. Utah 1990); In re
Prime, Inc., 15 B.R. 216, 218 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981); Government Nat'l Mortgage Corp. v.
Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (In reAdana Mortgage Bankers, Inc.), 12 B.R. 977, 987 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1980). See generally Derek N. Pew, The Need for Speed and Common Sense: Rewriting
§ 365(c)(2) to Recognize the Practice of Prepetition Agreements for § 364 Debtor-in-Possession Financing,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 2471, 2489-90 (1992).
" See 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(b) (allowing postpetition interest, fees, costs and charges
provided for under the agreement to the oversecured creditor), 502(b) (2) (disallowing other
claims for unmatured interest).
13 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy,
47 DuKE LJ. 425,455 & n.130 ("perhaps 5 to 20 cents on the dollar"); Lucian Arye Bebchuk &
Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857,
862 & n.18 (1996) ("only a few cents on the dollar"); Lynn M. LoPucki &'William C. Whitford,
Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies,
139 U. PA. L. REv. 125, 142 (1990) (showing recoveries of 0.5% to 81.6% among 30 large
publicly-traded companies that were insolvent and filed for bankruptcy after October 1, 1979
and had plans confirmed by March 31, 1988).
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II. STATE LAW AND THE TREATMENT OF MONEY TRANSFERS
A. The Signflcance of State Law-Property of the Estate
When a debtor becomes the subject of a bankruptcy case, either
by a voluntary filing 4 or by the commencement of an involuntary
case, 5 an "estate" is created, which includes, among other things,
"all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case." 6 Whether something constitutes
"property" within the meaning of the Code is a matter of federal
law.57 However, the Supreme Court has noted, "l[p] roperty interests
are created and defined by state law. Unless some federal interest
requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests
should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is
involved in a bankruptcy proceeding."s Therefore, the
determination of whether the debtor has a "legal or equitable
interest" in the federally-defined property is a matter of state law. 9
The filing of a petition under the applicable chapter of the Code by an eligible debtor
initiates a voluntary bankruptcy case. See 11 U.S.C. § 301.
See id. § 303 (contemplating involuntary cases only under chapters 7 and 11 of the
Code, and only against certain types of eligible debtors).
See id. § 541 (a) (I).
17 See, e.g., Board of Trade v.Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1924) (finding that the debtor's
seat on the Chicago Board of Trade constituted 'property' in bankruptcy, even if it was not
'property' under Illinois law). Congress intended the term to be read broadly. Section 541
"includes all kinds of property, including tangible or intangible property, causes of action,
and all other forms of property currently specified in Section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act."
H.P REP. NO. 595, at 367 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. 5963, 6323. Section 70a of
the Bankruptcy Act vested in the trustee title to the following:
(1) documents relating to [the debtor's] property; (2) interests in patents, patent
rights, copyrights, and trade-marks, and in applications therefore... ; (3) powers
which [the debtor] might have exercised solely for some other person; (4) property
transferred by [the debtor] in fraud of his creditors; (5) property, including rights
of action, which prior to the filing of the petition [the debtor] could by any means
have transferred or which might have been levied upon and sold under judicial
process against him, or otherwise seized, impounded or sequestered... ; (6) rights
of action arising upon contracts, or usury, or the unlawful taking or detention of or
injury to [the debtor's] property; (7) contingent remainders, executory devises and
limitations, rights of entry for condition broken, rights or possibilities of reverted,
and like interests in real property... ; and (8) property held by an assignee for the
benefit of creditors appointed under an assignment which constituted an act of
bankruptcy ....
11 U.S.C. § 70a (1976) (repealed 1978).
Butnerv. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).
See, e.g., Nobelman v. American Say. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 329 (1993) (citing Butner,
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Without question, money (cash, currency, funds in hand)
constitutes "property" within the meaning of the Code."° When
there is a unity of possession and ownership of money in the debtor,
the inclusion of the funds in the estate is self-evident. Bankruptcy
courts have been troubled, however, when ownership of money has
allegedly been separated from possession thereof.
For example, if the debtor physically holds funds that are
claimed by another, courts have looked to § 541 (d)s' and tried to
interpret whether under state law a party other than the debtor has
an "equitable interest" in the funds so held. 2 Conversely, if a party
440 U.S. 48); Demczyk v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (In re Graham Square, Inc.), 126 F.3d 823, 827
(6th Cir. 1997); Foothill Capital Corp. v. Clare's Food Market, Inc. (In re Coupon Clearing
Serv., Inc.), 113 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 1997); Sosne v. Reinert & Duree, P.C. (In reJust
Brakes Corp. Sys., Inc.), 108 F.3d 881, 884 n.2 (8th Cir. 1997); Marrs-Winn Co. v. Giberson
Elec., Inc. (In re Marrs-Winn Co.), 103 F.3d 584, 591 (7th Cir. 1996); Affiliated Computer Sys.,
Inc. v. Sherman (In reKemp), 52 F.3d 546, 551, 551 n.10 (5th Cir. 1995); Stat-Tech Int'l Corp.
v. Delutes (In re Stat-Tech Int'l Corp.), 47 F.3d 1054, 1057 (10th Cir. 1995); City of Farrell v.
Sharon Steel Corp., 41 F.3d 92, 95 n.3 (3d Cir. 1994); Southtrust Bank, NA. v. Thomas (In re
Thomas), 883 F.2d 991, 995 (l1th Cir. 1989); Harry Brainum, Jr., Inc. v. Shore Air
Conditioning & Refrigeration, Inc. (In re Shore Air Conditioning & Refrigeration, Inc.), 18
B.R. 643, 646 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1982).
'o See, e.g., United States v. Gleave, 786 F. Supp. 258, 272 (W.D.N.Y. 1992); Official
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc. (In re Shapiro), 124 B.R. 974,
980-81 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991).
c' Section 541(d) provides as follows:
(d) Property in which the debtor holds, as of the commencement of the case, only
legal title and not an equitable interest, ... , becomes property of the estate under
subsection (a) (1) or (2) of this section only to the extent of the debtor's legal titie
to such property, but not to the extent of any equitable interest in such property
that the debtor does not hold.
11 U.S.C. § 541 (d).
See, e.g., Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. Tyler (In re Dameron), 155 F.3d 718, 722
(4th Cir. 1998) (funds received from mortgage lender by debtor to be held in escrow pending
closing instructions); Foothill Capita4 113 F.3d at 1099 (proceeds of coupons redeemed by
debtor for retailers); Marrs-Winn, 103 F.3d at 589 (progress payment and payroll monies
deposited in debtor/subcontractor's account); Sharon Stee4 41 F.3d at 95-96 (municipal
income taxes withheld by debtor from employees' wages); N.S. Garrott & Sons v. Union
Planters Nat'l Bank (In re N.S. Garrott & Sons), 772 F.2d 462, 466-67 (8th Cir. 1985) (escrow
fund established at bank by debtor to pay off first mortgages); Selby v. Ford Motor Co., 590
F.2d 642, 647 (6th Cir. 1979) (funds held by debtor/contractor under Michigan builders trust
fund statute for benefit of subcontractors); Kitchen v. Boyd (In re Newpower), 229 B.R. 691,
705 (W.D. Mich. 1999) (funds transmitted to debtor by business partner intended to be
loaned to not-yet-created corporation); Dickerson v. Central Florida Radiation Oncology
Group, 225 B.R. 241, 245 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (funds deposited by debtor pre-petition in escrow
account); Aimar Communications, Ltd. v. Telesphere Communications, Inc. (In reTelesphere
Communications, Inc.), 205 B.R. 535, 541 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (money paid by local telephone
companies to debtors to be transmitted to providers of 900 telephone number programs);
Cushman & Wakefie"l 124 B.R. at 980-81 (funds deposited by debtor and held in escrow in
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other than the debtor holds funds to which the debtor makes a
claim, the court must decide whether, under state law, the debtor's
rights to those funds rise to the level of an equitable interest." Most
of these cases turn on whether state law would find an express
escrow,6 express or constructive trust, 1 or agency relationship66
allowing the court to conclude that the possessor of funds did not
possess the funds in its own capacity but instead acted as possessor
for the benefit of another, thereby creating a unity of ownership
and possession once again.
These questions are difficult in bankruptcy only because of the
way state law treats title to money, for only money, which under state
law in some sense belongs to the debtor, will become part of the
connection with real estate transaction); In re Summit Airlines, Inc., 94 B.R. 367, 370-371
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988), affd, 102 B.R. 32 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (funds deposited in escrow for
proposed purchase of aircraft from debtor).
6' See, e.g., Demczyk, 126 F.3d at 827 (a refundable commitment fee paid to a lender);
Sherman, 52 F.3d at 550-51 (commissions earned by debtor but retained by employer pending
resolution of law suit brought by third party); First Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Modular Structures,
Inc. (In re Modular Structures, Inc.), 27 F.3d 72, 76-77 (3d Cir. 1994) (funds retained by
project owner until performance completed by debtor/contractor); In re Braniff Int'l Airlines,
Inc., 164 B.R. 820, 825-27 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994), af'd, 101 F.3d 686 (2d Cir. 1996)
(unpublished) (unearned prepaid premiums and refunds owed bankrupt airline); O'Neil v.
Shipman (In re Pratt & Whitney Co., Inc.), 143 B.R- 19, 21-22 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1992) (funds
transferred by debtor to attorney to be held in escrow for defense of claims against debtor's
officers, directors, employees, and agents); Weissing v. Gerring (In re G & R Builders, Inc.),
123 B.R. 654, 658-59 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (funds withheld by owners from final payment to
contractor/debtor to satisfy subcontractor claims).
" Compare Carlson v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Newcomb), 744 F.2d 621, 627 (8th
Cir. 1984); Dickerson, 225 B.R. at 244-45; Anderson County Bank v. Newton (In reAll Chemical
Isotope Enrichment, Inc.), 127 B.R. 829, 836-38 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1991); Cedar Rapids
Meats, Inc. v. Hager (In re Cedar Rapids Meats, Inc.), 121 B.R. 562, 567-69 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
1990); Dolphin Titan Int'l, Inc. v. Gray & Co. (In reDolphin Titan Int'l, Inc.), 93 B.R. 508, 512
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988), and In re Palm Beach Heights Dev. & Sales Corp., 52 B.R. 181, 183
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (finding valid escrow in which debtor had no interest), with Sherman,
52 F.3d at 550-51 (finding no escrow and concluding that funds were property of the estate).
Compare Tyler, 155 F.3d at 722; Mam-Winn, 103 F.3d at 591-92; Garrott &Sons, 772 F.2d
at 467; Kitchen, 229 B.R. at 704-05, andYonkers Bd. of Educ. v. Richmond Children's Ctr., Inc.,
58 B.R. 980, 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding express or constructive trust), with Foothill Capita
113 F.3d at 1100-02; Emerson v. Maples (In reMark Benskin & Co., Inc.), 59 F.3d 170 (6th Cir.
1995) (unpublished); In re Morales Travel Agency, 667 F.2d 1069, 1071-73 (1st Cir. 1981);
Braniff 164 B.R. at 825-27, and Security Say. & Loan Assoc. v. Kay Homes, Inc. (In re Kay
Homes, Inc.), 57 B.R. 967, 969-70 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986) (finding no trust created).
Compare Kitchen, 229 B.R. at 706 (finding debtor to be mere agent), and Almar
Communications, 205 B.R. at 542-44 (finding genuine issue of fact as to whether debtor was
agent), with Foothill Capita 113 F.3d at 1099, and Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Shulman
Transport Enters., Inc. (In re Shulman Transport Enters., Inc.), 744 F.2d 293, 295-96 (2d Cir.
1984) (finding no agency relationship).
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bankrupt estate and be administered in accordance with the Code.
As discussed infra, under state law, money is treated like other
personal property only until possession of it passes to someone else.
B. Ownership and Money at State Law
Establishing title to personal property of any kind is always
problematic. With the exception of motor vehicles, for which state
67laws provide a system of titling by certificate, personal property is
generally not covered by a deed or certificate of the sort that
provides evidence of ownership of real property.ss Even if one can
establish that one purchased personal property from a seller by
saving the sales slip, there is no public registry of subsequent
transfers of ownership.6
"' See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 32-8-30 et seq. (1999); ALASKA STAT. § 28.10.201 et seq. (Michie
1998); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-2051 et seq. (West 1998 & Supp. 1999); ARm. CODE ANN.
§ 27-14-701 et seq. (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1999); CAL VEH. CODE § 4000 et seq. (West 1987 &
Supp. 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-6-101 et seq. (West 1997 & Supp. 1999); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 14-171 et seq. (West 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 319.20 et seq. (West 1990 & Supp.
2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-3-21 et seq. (Harrison 1998 & Supp. 1999); IDAHO CODE § 49-501
et seq. (1994 & Supp. 1999); 625 ILL. COUP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-100 et seq. (West 1993 & Supp.
1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-17-2-1 et seq. (West 1992 & Supp. 1999); IOWA CODEANN. § 321.20
et seq. (West 1997 & Supp. 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-135 et seq. (1991 & Supp. 1999); MD.
CODE ANN., TRANSP. II § 1-501 et seq. (1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90D, § 1 et seq. (Law.
Co-op. 1994 & Supp. 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.233 et seq. (West 1990 & Supp.
1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-102 et seq. (1998 & Supp. 1999); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 2101 et
seq. (McKinney 1996 & Supp. 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-50 et seq. (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 39-05-01 et seq. (1997 & Supp. 1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4505.01 et seq. (Banks-
Baldwin 1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 1105 et seq. (West 2000); RI. GEN. LAWS § 31-3.1-1
et seq. (1995 & Supp. 1999); TENN. CODEANN. § 55-3-101 et seq. (1998); TEX. TRANSP. CODE
ANN. § 501.021 et seq. (West 1999 & Supp. 2000); UTAH CODEANN. § 41-la-501 et seq. (1998);
VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-600 et seq. (Michie 1998 & Supp. 1999); W. VA. CODE § 17A-3-1 et seq.
(1996 & Supp. 1999); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 342.01 et seq. (West 1999 & Supp. 1999); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 31-2-201 et seq. (Michie 1999).
With respect to real property, a deed to a person is prima facie evidence of that
person's ownership of the property, see, e.g., Zieben v. Krakower, 346 S.W.2d 401, 405 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1961); Wunderlich v. Cates, 212 S.W.2d 556, 559 (Ark. 1948), and, under the best
evidence rule, the deed itself must be produced to establish ownership unless there is
sufficient justification for its absence, see, e.g., Olsen v. Olsen (In re Estate of Olsen), 579
N.W.2d 529, 531-32 (Neb. 1998); Viccaro v. Fort Wayne, 449 N.E.2d 1161, 1164 (Ind. CL App.
1983). See generally 29AAI.JUR. 2D Evidence § 1077 (1994).
' The U.C.C., in Article 9, provides for a public filing to perfect transfers of security
interests in most types of personal property, but not transfers of ownership of any personal
property other than accounts or chattel paper. See U.C.C. § 9-102 (1995) (stating that Article
9 applies to any transaction "which is intended to create a security interest in personal
property or fixtures" or "to any sale of accounts or chattel paper").
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To provide some guidance in determining ownership rights to
personal property, the common law created the presumption that
the possessor of personal property was the owner thereof7 As a
corollary to that presumption, the transfer of possession of personal
property is presumed to transfer ownership to the recipient.7 Of
course, one can rebut the presumption by showing that the transfer
of possession was not intended to transfer title.72 If the loss of
possession has been nonconsensual, as by theft, the thief acquires
no ownership interest in the property7' and cannot transfer good
title to another.74 Intent of the parties is the touchstone of property
rights.
See Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. Lewis, 162 U.S. 366, 372 (1896) ("possession is prima
facie evidence of some kind of rightful ownership or title"); see also, e.g., In re Little, 225 B.R
593, 594 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1997); Kondik v. Ebner (In re Standard Foundry Prod., Inc.), 208 B.R.
164, 167 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1997); Almar Communications, Ltd. v. Telesphere
Communications, Inc. (In re Telesphere Communications, Inc.), 167 B.R. 495, 502 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 205 B.R 535 (N.D. Ill. 1997); In re Hunt's Pier Assoc.,
143 B.R 36, 42-43 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992); Hinkle v. Perry, 752 S.W.2d 267, 269 (Ark. 1988);
Hattaway v. Keefe, 381 S.E.2d 569, 572 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); Fehrman v. Pfetzing, 917 S.W.2d
600, 603 (Mo. CL App. 1996); Farmers State Bank v. Imperial Cattle Co., 708 P.2d 223, 227
(Mont. 1985); Rogers v. Scottsbluff Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Severns), 352 N.W.2d 865,
870 (Neb. 1984); Spagnuolo v. Bonnet, 109 A.2d 623, 627 (N.J. 1954); Blackwell v. Epperson
(In re Estate of Steen), 909 P.2d 63, 68 (Okla. CL App. 1992), amended on other grounds, 909
P.2d 62 (Okla. 1995). See generally 29 AM.JUR. 2D Evidence § 289 (1994).
71 See, e.g., Blount v. Bainbridge, 53 S.E.2d 122, 125 (Ga. C. App. 1949) (delivery of
automobile at auction sale in exchange for bad check); Howard v. Brown, 206 A.2d 854, 856
(Me. 1965) (truck, compressor, and roller delivered voluntarily by mortgagor to mortgagee to
satisfy debt).
See, e.g., Kondik 208 B.R. at 167 (equipment owned by another that the debtor had
permission to use in his business); Hunt's Pier, 143 B.R. at 43 (amusement rides owned by
partnership and operated by corporation formed to run amusement park); Hinkle, 752 S.W.2d
at 269 (Ark. 1988) (automobile in possession of prospective purchaser); Greene v.
Carmichael, 140 P. 45, 46 (Cal. C. App. 1914) (automobile of which proposed purchaser had
possession under conditional sale contract); Aircraft Acceptance Corp. v. Jolly, 230 N.E.2d
446, 449 (Ind. C. App. 1967) (aircraft delivered to dealer for sale).
See, e.g., Padgett v. State, 223 So.2d 597, 600 (Ala. C. App. 1969);Jolly, 230 N.E.2d at
450; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Estes, 345 So.2d 265 (Miss. 1977); Howard v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 496 N.W.2d 862, 866 (Neb. 1993). See generally REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 229 cmr. d (1965).
" See, e.g., Gay v. Huguley, 34 So.2d 712, 714 (Ala. Cr. App. 1948); Naftzger v. American
Numismatic Soc'y, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784, 788 (Cal. C. App. 1996); Alamo Rent-a-Car, Inc. v.
Williamson Cadillac Co., 613 So.2d 517, 518 (Fla. Dist. Cr. App. 1993); Estes, 345 So.2d 265;
International Harvester Co. v. Tyler Warehouse Co., 253 S.W. 400, 402 (Mo. Cr. App. 1923);
Howard, 496 N.W.2d at 866; Pate v. Elliott, 400 N.E.2d 910, 912 (Ohio Cr. App. 1978); Butler v.
Buick Motor Co., 813 S.W.2d 454,458 (Tenn. Cr. App. 1991).
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As a matter of state law, money is one type of personal
property.75 As is the case for other types of personal property,
possession of money creates a presumption of ownership in the
possessor.6 Yet the sort of showings that suffice to rebut the
presumption and compel turnover of other types of personal
property by the possessor to the true owner (e.g., that the property
was leased or loaned rather than delivered with intent to transfer
title,77 that the property was converted,78 or that the property was
See generally 53A AMi. JUR. 2D Money § 19 (1994) ("Money in any form is generally
regarded and treated as personal property."). Indeed, state statutes defining "personal
property" often list money as one specified type of such property. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 1-1-
1(8) (1999); ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.060(a)(9) (Michie 1998); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-
215(28) (West Supp. 1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-102(a) (13) (Michie 1987); CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 481.225 (West Supp. 2000); CAL. EVID. CODE § 180 (West 1995); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 12, § 1198(10) (Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 198.01(10) (West 1999); GA. CODE
ANN. § 48-1-2(13) (Harrison 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-1-3 (West 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§77-201(Ninth) (1997); MINN. STAT. ANN § 514.971(6) (West 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 1.020(12) (West 2000); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 472.010(25) (West 1992); MONT. CODEANN. § 1-1-
205(1) (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-105 (1996); NEV. REV. STAT. § 10.045 (1998); NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 1:1-2 (West 1992); N.Y. GEN. CONSTE. LAW § 39 (McKinney 1951); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 1-01-49(9) (Supp. 1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 103 (West 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 2-14-2(19) (Michie Supp. 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 1-3-105(18) (Supp. 1999); TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 3(z) (West Supp. 2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-12(2) (p) (Supp. 1999); V.I.
CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 41 (1995); WASH. REV. CODEANN. § 63.35.010(3) (West 1994); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 990.01(27) (West 1998); see also, e.g., Tri-Lakes S.S. Co. v. Commissioner, 146 F.2d 970,
972 (6th Cir. 1945); Raihl v. United States (In re Raihl), 152 B.R. 615, 617 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1993); First Nat'l Bank v. American Sur. Co., 185 So. 365, 367 (Ala. 1938); Bromberg v.
McArdle, 55 So. 805 (Ala. 1911); Button v. Drake, 195 S.W.2d 66, 69 (Ky. 1946); Watson v.
Caffery, 109 So.2d 862, 866 (Miss. 1959); Health Servs. Med. Corp. v. Chassin, 668 N.Y.S.2d
1006, 1012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998); Middlemas v. Strutz. 299 N.W. 589, 591 (N.D. 1941); State v.
McCray, 177 P. 127, 128 (Okla. Crim. App. 1919).
See, e.g., United States v. Estep, 760 F.2d 1060, 1064 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Wright, 610 F.2d 930, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Almar Communications, Ltd. v. Telesphere
Communications, Inc. (In re Telesphere Communications, Inc.), 167 B.R. 495, 502 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1994), reo'd on other grounds, 205 B.R. 535 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Spagnuolo v. Bonnet, 109
A.2d 623, 627 (N.J. 1954); Cook v. Kern, 277 S.W.2d 946, 947 (Tex. Ct App. 1955), afj'd, 287
S.W.2d 174 (Tex. 1956).
" See, e.g., In re Wyatt, 174 B.R. 124 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1994); Culbreath v. Patton, 37
S.E.2d 719 (Ga. Ct. App. 1946); In re Marriage of Lamers, No. C7-94-958, 1995 WL 295980, at
*3 (Minn. Ct. App. May 16, 1995); Hoffman Management Corp. v. S.L.C. of North America,
Inc., 800 S.W.2d 755 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Touch of Class Leasing v. Mercedes-Benz Credit,
Inc., 591 A.2d 661 (N.J. Super. 1991); State v. Brownson, 568 N.W.2d 786, 1997 WL 342160
(Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (unpublished) (finding transaction to be a lease rather than a sale).
See, e.g., Textile Supplies, Inc. v. Garrett, 687 F.2d 123, 127-28 (5th Cir. 1982); Ryan v.
Patterson & Son Motors, 726 So.2d 667, 669 (Ala. Ct. App. 1998); Inmi-Etti v. Aluisi, 492 A.2d
917,923-924 (Md. App. 1985); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Stan Cross Buick, Inc., 180 N.E.2d
88, 92 (Mass. 1962); Bay Springs Forest Prod., Inc. v. Wade, 435 So.2d 690, 694-95 (Miss.
1983); Whitlock v. Hogrefe, 565 P.2d 1092, 1094 (Or. 1977); Underhill Coal Mining Co. v.
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stolen79) are generally insufficient to establish ownership in one who
does not possess money.
1. Loans
When personal property is transferred ostensibly pursuant to a
lease, whether the transaction truly involved a leasing of property by
the owner to the possessor/lessee or was instead a secured sale in
which possession and ownership are united may be important as a
matter of tax law ° or the law of secured transactions or bankruptcy."'
However, when the personal property consists of money, the issue
never presents itself for a very simple reason. As a matter of long-
standing state law, when money is loaned by a creditor to a debtor,82
Hixon, 652 A.2d 343, 34547 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (finding third party acquiring converted
property liable for conversion).
See, e.g., Garrett 687 F.2d at 127; Gay, 34 So.2d at 714; Padgett v. State, 223 So.2d 597,
600 (Ala. Ct. App. 1969); Nafsger, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 788; Suburban Motors, Inc. v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 268 Cal. Rptr. 16, 18-19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Touch of Class, 591 A.2d at
667; Pate v. Elliott, 400 N.E.2d 910, 912 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978) (party obtaining property
through chain of title originating in thief required to return property or its value to original
owner).
If property is leased, the lessor/owner of the property may depreciate the property for
tax purposes, see I.R.C. § 167 (1994), and the lessee may deduct the lease payments as
ordinary business expenses, see id. § 162(a) (3). If the transaction is really a sale disguised as a
lease, the 'lessee' is the owner entitled to claim depreciation for tax purposes, and the 'rental'
payments will be deemed either installment purchase price payments or amortization of a
loan made to enable the lessee to purchase the property. See generally Frank Lyon Co. v.
United States, 435 U.S. 561, 574 (1978); M & W Gear Co. v. Commissioner, 446 F.2d 841 (7th
Cir. 1971); Transamerica Corp. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 420, 436-43 (1988), afj'd, 902 F.2d
1540 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
", The definition of "security interest" in § 1-201(37) of the U.C.C. was amended in 1987
at the time Article 2A was promulgated as an amendment to the U.C.C. The revisions to the
definition were intended to codify the factors that had developed to distinguish between a
lease and a security interest. As stated in the Official Comment to the conforming
amendments to § 1-201(37), "[i]f a transaction creates a lease and not a security interest, the
lessee's interest in the goods is limited to its leasehold estate; the residual interest in the goods
belongs to the lessor. This has significant implications to the lessee's creditors." Compare In re
Owen, 221 B.R 56, 60-64 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1998); In re Yarbrough, 211 B.R. 654, 656-59
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1997), and In re Larson, 128 B.R. 257, 260-61 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1990)
(finding transaction a true lease), with In reKim, 232 B.R. 324, 328-32 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1999);
HPSC, Inc. v. Wakefield (In re Wakefield), 217 B.R. 967, 970-71 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1998);
Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Applewhite (In re 20th Century Enters., Inc.), 152 B.R. 119, 122
(Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1992); Banda Negra Int'l, Inc. v. Circle Business Credit, Inc. (In re Flores
de New Mexico, Inc.), 134 B.R 433, 436 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1991), and In re Village Import
Enters., Inc., 126 B.R. 307, 308 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1991) (finding transaction a secured sale).
' A "loan" of money has been defined as "a contract by which one delivers a sum of
money to another and the latter agrees to return at a future time a sum equivalent to that
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the actual intent of the parties is never considered. Instead, title to
the money passes to the debtor, and the creditor has nothing more
than a claim against the debtor-a chose in action-for an amount
equal to the amount lent.
83
One could argue that, even if the intent of the parties is never
examined, when a lender extends credit to a borrower the intent to
transfer ownership of the funds is dear. Indeed, the purpose of
such a loan is, in most cases, to enable the borrower to use the
money as the borrower's own funds, to purchase goods or services,
to pay employees, or to repay other debt, for example. Once
physical possession of funds is transferred to the borrower or to a
third party on the borrower's behalf, ownership transfers with it.
Although commercial loans from a bank to a borrower may
reflect a unity between ownership of funds and possession thereof
because the parties to the loan so intend, in the case of the most
common form of loan in our society-the loan that occurs when a
person takes funds and deposits them in a bank-the intent of the
parties is not so dear, but the consequences of the physical transfer
of funds is the same. As a matter of state law, when a customer of a
bank deposits funds into an account at the bank, the bank is
generally not deemed a bailee or custodian of the deposited funds,84
but instead becomes indebted to the depositor for an equal
amount.85 The funds themselves no longer belong to the depositor,
which he borrows." Calcasieu-Marine Nat'l Bank v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 533 F.2d
290, 296 (5th Cir. 1976) (citing In re Grand Union Co., 219 F. 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1914)). It is
"[a] sum of money let out or rented by a lender to a borrower." GLENN G. MUNN ET AL.,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING & FINANCE 629 (9th ed. 1991).
" See, e.g., In re Grand Union Co., 219 F. 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1914); IBM Poughkeepsie
Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 769, 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1984);
Johnson v. State, 304 N.E.2d 555, 560 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973); Hargis v. Spencer, 71 S.W.2d 666,
670 (Ky. 1934); Pearl Assurance Co. v. National Ins. Agency, Inc., 30 A.2d 333, 337 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1943).
' See, e.g., United States v. Monostra, 125 F.3d 183, 187-88 (3d Cir. 1997); Geler v.
National Westminster Bank USA, 770 F. Supp. 210, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); O'Neil v. Shipman
(In re Pratt & Whitney Co., Inc.), 143 B.R 19, 21-22 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1992).
" See Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 21 (1995) (a bank account
"consists of nothing more or less than a promise to pay, from the bank to the depositor"
rather than "money belonging to the depositor and held by the bank"); see also Barnhill v.
Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 398 (1992); Bank of Manin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 101 (1966); Marine
Bank v. Fulton Bank, 69 U.S. (1 Wall.) 252, 256 (1864); In re Bakersfield Westar Ambulance,
Inc., 123 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1997); Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank Int'l Corp., 540 F.2d 548,
560 (2d Cir. 1976); Great Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Banco Obrero de Ahorro y
Prestamos de Puerto Rico, 535 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. BCCI Holdings
(Luxembourg), S.A., 980 F. Supp. 2, 8 (D.D.C. 1997); United States v. All Funds on Deposit
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but become property of the bank and available to the bank for use
in its business.s6
As a result, if the bank wrongfully declines to pay a depositor an
amount equal to the deposited funds, the bank is not guilty of
conversion, which requires unlawful interference with the
ownership rights of another in personalty, but instead mere breach
of contract.87  Similarly, in some jurisdictions the right of the
on or Before Nov. 8, 1994, 955 F. Supp. 23, 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Swan Brewery Co. v. United
States Trust Co., 832 F. Supp. 714, 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); United States v. All Funds Presently
on Deposit or Attempted to be Deposited in Any Accounts Maintained at Am. Express Bank,
832 F. Supp. 542, 549 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Morse v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 190 Cal. Rptr. 839,
842 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Mancuso v. United Bank of Pueblo, 818 P.2d 732, 736 (Colo. 1991)
(en banc); Keller v. Fredericktown Say. Inst., 66 A.2d 924,925 (Md. 1949); Reynolds v. St. Paul
Trust Co., 53 N.W. 457, 458 (Minn. 1892); Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. B.N. Simrall & Son,
Inc., 524 So.2d 295, 299 (Miss. 1987); All Am. Auto Salvage v. Camp's Auto Wreckers, 679
A.2d 627, 631 (NJ. 1996); Owens v. Andrews Bank & Trust Co., 220 S.E.2d 116, 119 (S.C.
1975); Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. Spur Sec. Bank, 705 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. 1986); Peters v.
Peters, 443 S.E.2d 213, 219 (W.Va. 1994). See generally 3 MICHIE ON BANKs & BANKING ch. 6,
§ 184 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1974) [hereinafter MICHIE ON BANKS]; WALTER B. RAUSHENBUSH,
THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 10.5 at 230 (3d ed. 1975).
Banks do take deposits that do not have the attribute of a transfer of ownership (i.e.,
that are not loans from the depositor to the bank); if the deposit is a "special account" (as
opposed to a "general account"), the bank is deemed to be the bailee for the depositor and
the depositor retains ownership of the funds on deposit. See, e.g., Peoples Westchester Say.
Bank v. FDIC, 961 F.2d 327, 330 (2d Cir. 1992); Miller, 540 F.2d at 561; Swan Brwery, 832 F.
Supp. at 717; United States v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), SA., 814 F. Supp. 106, 109
(D.D.C. 1993); Mancuso, 818 P.2d at 736; Van Wagoner v. Buckley, 133 N.Y.S. 599, 601 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1912); Texas Bank & Trust, 705 S.W.2d at 352. See generally Marine Bank, 69 U.S. (1
Wall.) at 256. In this situation, the bank is treated in the same way as if a purse full of money
were handed by the owner to the bank with the expectation that the precise same purse would
be returned after temporary storage. However, when an account is opened, it is presumed
that the parties intended to establish a general account rather than a special account. See, e.g.,
Peoples, 961 F.2d at 330; Alexander & Jones v. Sovran Bank. N.A. (In re Nat Warren
Contracting Co.), 905 F.2d at 718 (4th Cir. 1990); BCCI Holdings, 980 F. Supp. 8 ; BCCI
Holdings, 814 F. Supp. at 109-10.
" See, e.g., Marine Bank, 69 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 256; Monostra, 125 F.3d at 187; All Funds, 955
F. Supp. at 26; United States v. $3,000 in Cash, 906 F. Supp. 1061, 1066 (E.D. Va. 1995); Morse,
190 Cal. Rptr. at 842. See generally 5A MICHIE ON BANKS ch. 9, § 1, at 15 ("The money
deposited becomes part of the general fund of the bank, to be dealt with by it as other
moneys, to be lent to customers, and parted with at the will of the bank."); § 4b, at 46-50
("The legal title to the money passes to the bank which has the right to mix it with its own
funds and invest and use it as it pleases, for its own benefit in its usual financing operations.").
' See, e.g., Fundacion Museo de Arte Contemporaneo de Caracas-Sofia Imber v. CBI-
TDB Union Bancaire Privee, 160 F.3d 146, 148 (2d Cir. 1998); Crocker-Citizens Nat'l Bank v.
Control Metals Corp., 566 F.2d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 1977); Great Commonwealth, 535 F.2d 331;
Geler v. National Westminster Bank USA, 770 F. Supp. 210, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Town of
Hammondville v. Chadwick, 178 So.2d 646, 648-49 (Ala. App. 1965); Morse, 190 Cal. Rptr. at
842; Upper Valley Aviation, Inc. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 656 S.W.2d 952, 955 (Tex. Ct. App.
1983); cf Marine Bank, 69 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 254 (noting that, if the bank deposit were the
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depositor with respect to the account generally cannot be reached
by a creditor through execution and levy (as could the depositor's
interest in tangible personal property); a creditor must employ
garnishment or supplemental proceedings that enable the creditor
to reach chooses in action8 The depositor also cannot trace the
funds paid out from the account into the hands of another," or
object to the seizure of the account by the government.9" Possession
becomes ownership because the law deems that to be the intent of
the parties.
However well-settled this characterization, there is nothing self-
evident about it. Any ordinary depositor, when asked about "his" or
"her" bank account, would undoubtedly describe it as "his" or "her"
money being held in the bank." If that depositor were informed
that he or she had made a loan to the bank and held simply a chose
in action, that is, a claim against the bank, the response would
probably be a blank stare. Even if the ordinary depositor is not so
naive as to believe that there is a little cubicle in the bank's vault
with the depositor's name on it in which reposes a stack of dollar
bills and coins, but realizes that the deposited funds are
commingled with all other bank deposits made by other customers,
the depositor probably assumes that he or she owns (in the true
depositor's money, held by the defendant bank as the depositor's agent, "then the use of it by
defendant would seem to be a conversion"); Owens v. Andrews Bank & Trust Co., 220 S.E.2d
116 (S.C. 1975) (holding that action for conversion would not lie if funds had been on
general deposit, but account had been closed and bank issued check for balance, which it
then refused to deliver to depositor, constituting conversion).
See, e.g., In re Frazier, 136 B.R. 199, 202 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1991); Wash v. Hendrick,
136 S.W. 883 (Ky. 1911); Summerfield v. Goldstein, 112 N.Y.S. 357 (N.Y. City Ct. 1908);
Johnson v. Service Management, Inc., 459 S.E.2d 900, 902 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995), affd, 478
S.E.2d 63 (S.C. 1996); McManus v. Bank of Greenwood, 171 S.E. 473,474 (S.C. 1933).
' See, e.g., Holly v. Domestic & Foreign Missionary Soc'y, 180 U.S. 284, 293 (1901);
United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154, 1158 (2d Cir. 1986); Hatch v. Fourth
Nat'l Bank, 41 N.E. 403, 404 (N.Y. 1895); Stephens v. Board of Educ., 79 N.Y. 183 (1879).
' See, e.g., Aspinall v. United States, 984 F.2d 355, 358 (10th Cir. 1993) (no standing
under 26 U.S.C. § 7426 for wrongful levy); BCCI Holdings, 814 F. Supp. at 110 (no standing
under 18 U.S.C. § 1963 to challenge forfeiture).
" Even courts make this understandable error. For example, the Eleventh Circuit court
stated that the only way under the U.C.C. "to obtain a perfected security interest in the bank
account funds [of a debtor) was to take possession of them." Henry Lee Co. v. To, 157 F.3d
1290, 1292 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing U.C.C. § 9-304(1), which applies, among other things, to
perfection of a security interest in "money"). In fact, not only is a bank account not the
debtor's "money," but in most states security interests in "deposit accounts," see U.C.C. § 9-
105(1) (1995), are excluded from the scope of Article 9 of the U.C.C. except with respect to
proceeds, see id. U.C.C. § 9-104(1).
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property sense) a proportionate share of the funds held by the bank
based on the ratio of his or her deposit to the total deposits of all
customers.92
The presumption that the depositor intended to transfer
ownership of the funds and receive, instead, a claim against the
bank is thus, in most cases, a legal fiction. And unlike the
presumption of ownership that arises from possession of other
personal property, the true "owner" of the deposited cash cannot
rebut the presumption. State law views the possession of loaned
money and the ownership thereof as indissolubly linked.95
' Indeed, this argument was made to the Supreme Court in Marine Bank, 69 U.S. (I
Wall.) 252. Between the time Fulton Bank had made a deposit with Marine Bank and the
time it requested withdrawal of the funds, the value of Illinois currency had declined by 50
percent. Marine argued that it acted merely as the "agent" for Fulton in accepting the funds
for deposit, and that Fulton and the other depositors "had an interest in common in the
entire fund, in proportion to their respective shares." Id, at 254. The Court rejected this
contention, noting that Marine had placed the funds with its other money, and used it in its
business as its own, and could not now contend that it belonged to Fulton. "It being
understood between the parties that, when the money was received, it was to be held as an
ordinary bank deposit, it became by virtue of that understanding the money of the defendant
the moment it was received." Id. at 256. Marine was ordered to pay Fulton the value of the
money at the time it was deposited.
One commentator, in criticizing this proportionate property interest approach as it
previously applied to purchasers of an interest in a fungible bulk of securities under the 1987
version of Article 8 of the U.C.C., suggested that no one would "support a law to the effect
that bank account depositors have a property interest in money or other property of a bank."
Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond Negotiability: A New Model for Transfer and Pledge of Interests in
Securities Controlled by Intermediaries, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 305, 350 (1990). Professor Mooney
did not explain why he considered this approach to deposits so untenable, other than to
suggest later that application of tracing principles to resolve the rights of bank depositors
among themselves would be unmanageable. See id. at 403; see also U.C.C. § 8-503(b) and the
Official Comment thereto.
" As a practical matter, modem commercial banking involves very little physical money
capable of possession at all. Generally depositors do not arrive at a bank with a sack of cash.
Instead, they receive a check in payment for their goods or services and deposit that check
with their own bank. That check represents merely a claim against the bank on which it is
drawn once it is accepted, see U.C.C. § 3-408, and a secondary claim against the drawer of the
check, see id. § 3-414(b). Once the check is deposited, the depositor's bank gives the
depositor a (provisional) claim against it instead. Although the depositor may request
satisfaction of all or part of this claim in the form of cash, in many cases the depositor simply
writes his or her own check on the account to which the deposit was made, thereby
substituting as claimant against the depositor's bank the payee once the check is accepted by
the depositor's bank.
Similarly, bank loans are no longer made by turning over a suitcase full of crisp, new
bills or even in most cases by delivering a check payable to the borrower. Instead, the bank
provides the borrower or a third party "which may be another bank at which the borrower has
an account," a claim against the bank for the amount of the loan. See id § 4A-104 (1) & cmt. 1.
Such loans are then repaid by crediting against them the assigned benefit of claims against
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2. Conversion
Conversion lies when a defendant has wrongfully exercised
dominion over a plaintiffs personalty. 94 The roots of this modern
tort rest in the ancient common law form of action for trover, a
remedy afforded an owner of lost goods against the finder thereof
who refused to return them.' Because only specifically identifiable
goods could be the subject of an action for trover,96 courts have
consistently required that the personalty subject to conversion be
specifically identifiable. 7
When applied to money, this principle severely limits the
availability of conversion to remedy the unauthorized appropriation
of a plaintiffs funds.s Essentially, an original owner of money may
others under deposited checks or wire transfers.
The increasing obsolescence of "real" money makes the presumption linking possession
and ownership of money all the less relevant and should result in its abandonment in law.
Commentators have criticized the use of simplistic property concepts that link possession with
ownership as applied to a monetary system in which money is no longer reified (in the form
of physical currency) but is instead transferred by transfer of bank credits. See, e.g., James
Steven Rogers, The Irrelevance of Negotiable Instruments Concepts in the Law of the Check-Based
Payment System, 65 TEx. L. REv. 929,934 (1987).
" See, e.g., Baram v. Farugia, 606 F.2d 42, 43 (3d Cir. 1979); Resource Ventures, Inc. v.
Resources Management Int'l, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 423, 439 (D. Del. 1999); Maryland Casualty
Ins. Co. v. Welchel, 356 S.E.2d 877, 880 (Ga. 1987); Fawcett v. Heimbach, 591 N.W.2d 516,
519-20 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999); Manzer v. Sanchez, 985 S.W.2d 936, 940 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999);
In re Martin, 970 P.2d 638, 642 (Ore. 1998); DeChristofaro v. Machala, 685 A.2D 258, 262 (R.I.
1996). See generally 18 AM.JUR. 2d Conversion § 2 (1994); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS
§ 222A (1965).
"' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 242 cmt. d (1965); see also, e.g., Limbaugh v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 732 F.2d 859, 862 (lth Cir. 1984); General
Motors Corp. v. Douglass, 565 N.E.2d 93, 96 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
' See, e.g., Kerwin v. Balhatchett, 147 Ill. App. 561, 565-67 (1909). The appropriate
cause of action was an action in assumpsit for money had and received. See id. at 567; see also
Shahood v. Cavin, 316 P.2d 700, 702 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957); Mid-America Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
v. Middleton, 468 N.E.2d 1335, 1338-39 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Western Casualty & Sur. Co. v.
First State Bank, 390 S.W.2d 913, 922 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965); Larson v. Dawson, 53 A. 93, 94
(R.I. 1902).
' See, e.g., Manzer, 985 S.W.2d at 940 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999); Dwyer v. Unit Power, Inc., 965
S.W.2d 301, 305-06 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). But see U.S. Metal & Coin Co. v. Burlock, 652 F.
Supp. 37, 39 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (rejecting assertion that conversion will not lie for gold and
silver combined with like metals of other customers because "[t]his result... impl[ies] that
two conversions may be better than one").
See generally 53A AMJUR. Money § 21 (1996) ("An action may lie for the conversion of
money, where there is an obligation to keep intact or deliver the specific money in question,
and where such money can be identified or described."); H.D. Warren, Annotation, Nature of
Property or Rights other than Tangible Chattels which may be Subject of Conversion, 44 A.L.R.2d 927,
938 (1955) ("Money can be the subject of conversion and a conversion action only when it
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rebut the presumption that title passed to the possessing converter
only if the funds were segregated from the converter's other money
and are thus identifiable. Yet the fact patterns of cases in which
claims of conversion are raised with respect to money demonstrate
the confusion that the "identifiable" requirement engenders.
First, a plaintiff may have given the defendant property that was
not cash, with the expectation that, through some action on
defendant's part, it would turn into cash for the plaintiffs account.
When the defendant does not turn over the resulting cash, the
plaintiff sues for conversion. In this case, neither the original
property (as it was voluntarily entrusted to the defendant) nor the
resulting cash could be converted, unless it was placed in a separate
account by the defendant (making it identifiable) and only
thereafter misappropriated. When examining these cases, courts
focus specifically on identifiability of the cash at the time of
conversion, when it is in the hands of the defendant."
Second, assume the same situation as in the first case, but the
original noncash property of the plaintiff is taken by the defendant
without plaintiffs consent and then transformed into cash. In this
case, the defendant has not converted the cash but rather the
original identifiable property and is liable to return it or its value
(the cash, although not identifiable). Therefore, identifiability
should not be an issue because it is not the cash that is converted
but the original noncash property.' ° Yet plaintiffs fail to distinguish
can be described, identified, or segregated in the manner that a specific chattel can be, and
an obligation to treat it in a specific manner is established.").
See, e.g., Eggert v. Weisz, 839 F.2d 1261, 1265 (7th Cir. 1988) (proceeds from sale of a
consigned stamp collection deposited in general corporate account); In re Littleton, 106 B.R.
632, 636 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.1989), aff'd, 942 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1991) (proceeds of sale of
inventory in which secured creditor had security interest); Estate of Jackson v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 676 F. Supp. 1142, 1146 (S.D. Ala. 1987) (proceeds from sale of plaintiff's
share of unit production of oil and gas held in escrow by purchaser and converted by
defendant); De Kalb Bank v. Purdy, 562 N.E.2d 1223, 1232-33 (Il1. App. Ct. 1990) (bank
authorized sale of cattle by defendants, and proceeds were not segregated); cf. Pearl
Assurance Co. v. National Ins. Agency, Inc., 30 A.2d 333, 338 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1943)
(concluding that common law rule on identifiability was modified by statute with respect to
fraudulent conversion of property or its proceeds).
" See, e.g., Dayton Constr. Co. v. Meinhardt, 882 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Mo. CL App. 1994)
(affirming judgment for conversion of checks wrongfully deposited in defendant's account);
Kansas City Casualty Co. v. Westport Ave. Bank, 177 S.W. 1092, 1094 (Mo. Ct. App. 1915)
(affirming award of damages for conversion of checks); Davin v. Dowling, 262 P. 123, 125
(Wash. 1927) (holding bank that received payment on loan from party who converted
plaintiff's crop did not convert plaintiffs money).
[Vol. 16292
2000] The Lease of Money in Bankruptcy
between the original converted property and the cash it has become
and mistakenly allege conversion of the retained cash, leading
courts to dismiss their complaints because the cash is not
identifiable. 1
In the third case, the original property voluntarily given by the
plaintiff to the defendant is itself cash, and defendant refuses to
return it or misuses it. As in the first case, unless the cash in the
defendant's possession has been placed in a separate, segregated
account (or is otherwise identifiable in defendant's hands) at the
time the defendant refuses to return it, a cause of action for
conversion will not lie.0 2  Here the focus is appropriately on the
ability of the plaintiff to identify the cash at the moment of
conversion, when it is in the defendant's hands. The identifiability
of the original property in plaintiffs hands is not an issue, because it
was not converted by the defendant.
10 See, e.g., Kubin v. Miller, 801 F. Supp. 1101, 1118 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (dismissing
conversion claim with respect to net income received by defendant who converted plaintiff's
stock because no allegation that funds were identifiable); Hutton v. Klabal, 726 F. Supp. 67, 72
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (dismissing conversion count relating to purchase price of etchings, with
leave to replead to allege conversion of etchings themselves); United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co. v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 153 S.W.2d 752, 756 (Mo. Ct. App. 1941) (finding no cause
of action for conversion of money collected on misappropriated checks); Anderson Elec. Car
Co. v. Savings Trust Co., 212 S.W. 60 (Mo. Ct. App. 1919) (dismissing complaint for
conversion of money collected on checks by improper endorsement); cf. Bel-Bel Int'l Corp. v.
Community Bank of Homestead, 162 F.3d 1101, 1108-09 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding cash
received upon collection of converted accounts receivable constituted "specific fund" and
conversion could be established).
"' See, e.g., The High View Fund, L.P v. Hall, 27 F. Supp. 2d 420, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(finding no conversion of $1 million investment in corporation to manage golf properties
misappropriated by defendant from corporate accounts); Horbach v. Kaczmarek, 934 F. Supp.
981, 986 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (finding no conversion of advance payment for equipment made by
plaintiff to defendant which was not identifiable); Massive Paper Mills v. Two-Ten Corp., 669
F. Supp. 94, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding no conversion of prepayment for paper shipment
wired into commingled account); United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc. v. Sanders, 508 So. 2d 689,
692 (Ala. 1987) (finding no conversion of erroneous double payment of invoice deposited in
general corporate account); Johnson v. Life Ins. Co., 581 So. 2d 438, 44243 (Ala. 1991)
(finding no conversion of money paid to insurance company for purchase of policies which
was not segregated); General Motors Corp. v. Douglass, 565 N.E.2d 93, 100 (Ill. 1990)
(finding no conversion of amount overpaid by car manufacturer to dealer and not segregated
by dealer); DeChristofmro v. Machala, 685 A.2d 258, 263 (I. 1996) (finding no conversion of
money paid contractor used for his own purposes rather than to build plaintiffs' house);
Larson v. Dawson, 53 A. 93, 94 (R.I. 1902) (finding no conversion of money entrusted to
defendant, which defendant mingled with own funds and refused to return); cf. Walker v.
Hanke, 992 8.W.2d 925 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (finding proceeds of settlement deposited in
joint account with plaintiff's daughter sufficiently identifiable).
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Finally, if the original property is cash and is misappropriated
by the defendant from the plaintiff, no cause of action for
conversion lies unless the cash was segregated and identifiable at the
time of the misappropriation. This requirement is not difficult to
satisfy if the cash was originally in the possession of the plaintiff and
was wrongfully taken by the defendant from the plaintiffs
possession.' °' However, if the cash comes into the defendant's
hands from a third party, allegedly for the account of the plaintiff,
conversion can seldom be established because the defendant is not
likely to segregate the funds he intends to convert, and unless he
does so, the plaintiff's portion will not be identifiable. '""
Even if the owner of the money is able to establish a cause of
action for conversion against the party who took his funds in the
first instance, he is likely to lose his cause of action if the miscreant
has disposed of the funds to a third party. This is not generally true
of converted personal property. As is true for holders of stolen
goods, the acquirer of goods that have been converted obtains no
3 See, e.g., Limbaugh v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 732 F.2d 859, 862
(l1th Cir. 1984) (holding funds transferred from mutual fund account without owner's
consent were identifiable); Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 657 So. 2d 821, 823-824 (Ala. 1994)
(finding conversion when insurance agent forged insureds' names onto premium refund
checks and loan applications against cash value of whole life insurance policies, thereby
converting identifiable cash); Greene County Bd. of Educ. v. Bailey, 586 So. 2d 893, 899-900
(Ala. 1991) (holding funds originally in special account were converted by scheme of sending
fUse invoices that were paid by plaintiff and funds were then diverted by defendant); Carter v.
Hornsby, 23 S.E.2d 95, 97 (Ga. 1942) (holding package of money delivered to defendant by
party to whom plaintiff entrusted it and held separate from all other funds of defendant was
converted); cf Lewis v. Fowler, 479 So. 2d 725, 726 (Ala. 1985) (finding no conversion when
funds were legally garnished, but were not segregated although never paid by employer to
garnishing creditor before employer went bankrupt).
'" See, e.g., Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Samson Resources Co., 80 F.3d 976, 984 (5th Cir.
1996) (no conversion for failure to turn over gas royalties owed under a lease for gas sold);
Shaffer & Max, Inc. v. JM Eng'g, Inc., Civ. A. No. 93-518P, 1994 WL 774682 (D.R.I. Oct. 18,
1994) (commissions owing to sales agent could not be converted when sale proceeds received
from purchasers were deposited in seller's general account); cf Carpenters' Pension Trust
Fund Detroit & Vicinity v. Laminate Creations, 803 F.2d 718 (6th Cir 1986) (table) (vacation
pay trust fund payments never placed into trust by employer were not converted because
there was no identifiable fund). But see Lopresti v. Terwilliger, 126 F.3d 34, 42 (2d Cir. 1997)
(union dues withheld from workers' paychecks and never turned over to union held
sufficiently identifiable although deposited in general corporate account); Weiss v. Marcus,
124 Cal. Rptr. 297, 303 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (when plaintiff specified portion of settlement
payment that was subject to his lien, allegation sufficiently identified fund); Bank of India v.
Weg & Myers, P.C., 691 N.Y.S.2d 439, 445 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (law firm converted insurance
proceeds covered by bank's security interest when it deducted its fee and paid remainder to
debtor; fund was identifiable).
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better tile to the goods than his transferor, and the true owner may
reclaim the goods even from the hands of a good faith purchaser for
value."5 But if the subject of the conversion is money or negotiable
instruments, a bona fide purchaser or holder in due course cannot
be held liable.' Again, "possession... is ten-tenths of the law."0 7
3. Theft
The development of the criminal law of theft is also replete
with examples of distinctions between stolen goods and stolen
money stemming from the linkage between possession and
ownership of money. The early law of theft required, as a condition
to guilt, a showing that the defendant had engaged in trespass-that
is, a showing that the defendant had wrongfully removed a chattel
from the possession of another.08  This created theoretical
difficulties when the party engaging in the allegedly wrongful
conduct had obtained possession of the property in a voluntary
transaction with the owner before treating it in a way not
contemplated by the parties (as by converting goods bailed with the
wrongdoer). The earliest solution to this conceptual quandary was
to deem the act of breaking open the bailed containers in order to
sell the goods ("breaking bulk") as terminating the bailment, so that
possession reverted to the original bailor as a matter of law.'09 This
' See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 229 (1965) ("One who receives
possession of a chattel from another with the intent to acquire for himself or for a third
person a proprietary interest in the chattel which the other has not the power to transfer is
subject to liability for conversion to a third person then entitled to the immediate possession
of the chattel.").
"' See, e.g., Federal Ins. Co. v. Banco de Ponce, 751 F.2d 38, 41 (1st Cir. 1984); Hinkle v.
Cornvell Quality Tool Co., 532 N.E.2d 772, 777 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); Story v. Palmer, 284
S.W. 331 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926). Nor can the true owner recover the funds under the
equitable doctrine of money had and received because equity will not force disgorgement
from a good faith purchaser without notice of the conversion. See, e.g., Burtch v. Hydraquip,
Inc. (In re Mushroom Transp. Co.), 227 B.R. 244, 258 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998); Solomon v.
Gibson, 615 A.2d 367,369 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
'0' Rogers, supra note 93, at 932.
'' SeeJEROME HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY 5-6 (2d ed. 1952). Thus, as stated in 2
POLLACK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 498 (2d ed. 1898), "The crime involves
a violation of possession; it is an offence against a possessor and therefore can never be
committed by a possessor." See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433,438 (4th Cir. 1961);
United States v. Posner, 408 F. Supp. 1145, 1150-51 (D. Md. 1976), affd, 551 F.2d 310 (4th
Cir. 1977) (table).
'0 See Hall, supra note 108, at 4-10 (discussing Carrier's Case, Y. B. 13 Edw. IV. F. 9 pl.5).
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solution merely redefined as "possession" by the owner against
whom the bailee had trespassed what to the casual observer might
seem to be actual possession by the bailee.
The concept of "possession" was also central to cases in which
the wrongdoer obtained possession of the goods through fraud.
The earliest case involved a man, Pear, who was accused of stealing a
horse he had hired. The jury concluded that Pear's intent at the
time he hired the horse was to sell it for his own account. On
appeal, the court concluded that this sufficed for larceny, because
"the parting with the property [i.e., the hire of the horse by Pear]
had not changed the nature of the possession, but that it remained
unaltered in the [owner] at the time of the conversion."". This case
was the basis of the crime of larceny by trick, which required the
parting of possession without an intent to part with title to
property."'
If the intent of the owner was to transfer to another party not
merely custody of the goods, but also title to the property, even if
the property was obtained through fraud, larceny could not be
charged because there was no trespass against the owner's
possession. Indeed, only in very limited circumstances was such an
act criminal at all. The justification for denying criminal sanctions
was that the injured party had suffered loss merely because he relied
on a lie, and simple prudence would have prevented the wrong."'
The earliest statute criminalizing the obtaining of property by
fraudulent means required the use of a "counterfeit letter or privy
token to receive money or goods in other names" as the instrument
of the fraud to be actionable." The cause of action was expanded
to delete the requirement of the seal or letter,"4 yet the statute was
not broadly interpreted, perhaps because the significance of the
change from prior law was not appreciated. However, in 1789, four
..0 Pear's Case, 168 Eng. Rep. 209 (1779).
I See, e-g., People v. Churchill, 390 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (N.Y. 1979); People v. Miller, 62
N.E. 418, 422-24 (N.Y. 1902).
. As stated in the Queen v. Jones, Salk. 379, 91 Eng. Rep. 330 (1704), "we are not to
indict one man for making a fool of another."
"' Statute of 33 Hen. VIII, c. 1 (1541).
... 30 Geo. II, ch. 24 (1757). The statute provided that "all persons who knowingly and
designedly, by false pretence or pretences, shall obtain from any person or persons, money,
goods, wares, or merchandizes, with intent to cheat or defraud any person or persons of the
same... shall be deemed offenders."
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judges of the King's Bench unanimously concluded that the statute
should be read literally and found that several defendants, who had
falsely stated that a certain race was to be run on which they had
themselves placed bets and thereby induced the complainant to give
them money to place his own bet, were properly prosecuted under
its terms.15 After 1789, the crime of obtaining property by false
pretenses provided an available basis for criminal prosecution when
trespass against possession, necessary for larceny, could not be
shown.1I
Even these two species of theft failed to cover the situation in
which possession of the misappropriated goods or funds was
obtained not by fraud but by legitimate and honest means with the
wrongful act occurring thereafter. In 1799, a bank teller, Joseph
Bazeley, was prosecuted for larceny on the theory that he took for
his own use a note for one hundred pounds deposited by a
customer with the bank.17 The court concluded that Bazeley had
not trespassed against the bank's possession of the note because the
bank never obtained possession of the note (Bazeley had pocketed
the note rather than delivered it to the bank). Furthermore, the
court declined to attribute Bazeley's own possession of the note to
his employer under these circumstances. Thus, it was concluded,
Bazeley had to be discharged from prosecution.
In response to the Bazeley case, the first general embezzlement
statute was passed in 1799.11' The statute criminalized the Bazeley
facts, by making liable for a felony:
any servant or clerk.., to any person... [who] by virtue of such
employment, receive[s] or take[s] into his possession any money,
goods, bond, bill, note, banker's draft or other valuable security, or
effects, for or in the name or on the account of his master or masters,
"' SeeYoung v. King, 3 Durn. &East 98, 100 Eng. Rep. 475 (1789).
. See, e.g., People v. Ashley, 267 P.2d 271, 279 (Cal. 1954); People v. Niver, 152 N.W.2d
714, 716-17 (Mich. Ct App. 1967); Kellogg v. Ohio, 26 Ohio St. 15, 18-19 (1874). The
common law crime required a false representation with respect to fact, and a mere promise to
do something that the promisor had no intention to do was insufficient. See, e.g., State v.
Robington, 75 A.2d 394,396 (Conn. 1950); Churchil, 390 N.E.2d at 1149.
117 SeeKing v. Bazeley, 2 East, P.C. 571, 168 Eng. Rep. 517 (1799).
"' 39 Geo. III, c. 85.
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or employer or employers, and... fraudulently embezzle [s] ... the
same.
In essence, it expanded the common law of larceny to create a
trespass against deemed possession, even when actual possession
had never been obtained.
The importance of possession (or deemed possession) for
larceny or embezzlement2 ° prosecution has particular significance
when the property involved is money. If one party has possession of
money and it is physically taken from him, as by highway robbery,
that constitutes larceny under all state statutes to the same extent as
would the theft of his gold watch because both involve trespass
against personalty of another.' However, if the money and the
gold watch were voluntarily placed in the possession of another by
reason of fraud, and that person then converted them to his own
use, larceny by trick would surely lie for theft of the watch but would
be more difficult to establish for the money. Why the distinction?
Possession (in the sense of ownership) of the gold watch is not
deemed to transfer when physical possession is given to the other,
but title to money is presumed to transfer with its delivery. Larceny
by trick is of little use in connection with money transfers, even
when money is obtained by trick or device, unless the transfer of
money was intended to be for a specified and limited purpose
rather than for the unrestricted use of the transferee, thus
rendering the transferee the functional equivalent of a bailee and
rebutting the presumption that title transferred. 2
19 Id.
"' Some modem statutes consolidate the various common law forms of theft into a
single offense. See, e.g., Ashley, 267 P.2d at 279; State v. Smith, 642 A.2d 978, 981 (NJ. 1994);
Commonwealth v. Lewis, 445 A.2d 798, 800 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982). See generally MODEL PENAL
CODE § 223.1 (1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
121 See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 36 So. 2d 242, 243 (Ala. CL App. 1948); Ex parte Prince, 9
So. 659, 660-61 (Fla. 1891); McVey v. Commonwealth, 272 S.W.2d 33, 34-35 (Ky. 1954);
Cousins v. State, 224 S.W.2d 260, 261 (Tex. Grim. App. 1949); State v. Shonka, 279 P.2d 711,
713 (Utah 1955).
"' Cf Dennis v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 563, 568 (E.D. Va. 1974) (finding property
acquired by criminal with funds given him by plaintiff to transmit to a non-existent charity
belonged to plalntiff and was not subject to levy by IRS). Compare United States v. Posner, 408
F. Supp. 1145, 1151 (D. Md. 1976), aftd, 551 F.2d 310 (4th Cir.) (table); Latham v, State, 320
So.2d 747, 754 (Ala. Crim. App. 1975), aflfd, 320 So. 2d 760 (Ala. 1975), and People v. Curtin,
27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 369, 370 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (finding no larceny by trick when title to money
was intended to pass), with People v. Lafka, 344 P.2d 619, 621 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959); People v.
Otterman, 316 P.2d 85, 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957), and People v. Miller, 62 N.E. 418, 423 (N.Y.
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If neither larceny nor larceny by trick can be established
because the presumption that title to money passes with its
possession cannot be rebutted, then the only criminal actions
available against the recipient of money are embezzlement (if the
recipient received the funds in a fiduciary capacity for a third party,
and then only because the deemed possession of the third party was
violated) 123 or obtaining property by false pretenses."'
Quite apart from the difficulties inherent in establishing a case
of theft for money that is not physically and involuntarily taken from
the owner, the remedies for the owner once theft is established are
far more limited in the case of money than for other stolen personal
property. In the case of most personal property, a thief acquires no
title and therefore has no power to transfer good title to a third
party, even if that party is a good faith purchaser for value. 5 As a
result, the owner of stolen goods can always obtain their return,
even from the hands of an innocent third party.
1902) (upholding conviction when money transferred for specific purpose).
'2 See, e.g., Kitchen v. Boyd (In re Newpower), 229 B.R. 691, 700 (W.D. Mich. 1999);
Otterman, 316 P.2d at 92.
224 Even these might not be available, depending on the statutory language of the
criminal code. A stark example of this paradox is the Oregon case of State v. Tauscher, 360
P.2d 764 (Ore. 1961). Ms. Tauscher was the executive secretary of the Douglas County
Tuberculosis & Health Association. In that capacity, she was authorized to draw checks on the
Association's bank account by instrument signed jointly by her and by a Mrs. Petrequin. Mrs.
Petroquin had an unfortunate practice of signing several checks in blank and turning them
over to Ms. Tauscher for completion of the payment information and for her signature. Over
a long period of time Ms. Tauscher used some of these checks to pay her private electric bills.
Ms. Tauscher was charged with embezzlement, but the trial court sustained a demurrer to the
indictment on the grounds that the indictment failed to allege that Ms. Tauscher embezzled
or fraudulently converted property. The supreme court affirmed, noting that the Oregon
statute on embezzlement required that the embezzled money or property 'come into his
possession or is under his care', and that the funds on which Ms. Tauscher drew never came
into her possession or her care, but were transmitted directly by the bank to the electric
company. The court further concluded that the acts committed by Ms. Tauscher did not fall
within the statutory definition of larceny or false pretenses, because the property affected was
not tangible but rather an intangible chose in action and the statute did not list 'credits' as
property subject to larceny.
"2 See, e.g., Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman
Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1398 (S.D. Ind. 1989), affd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990);
Naftzger v. American Numismatic Soc'y, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784, 788 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996);
Suburban Motors, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 268 Cal. Rptr. 16, 18-19 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990); Alamo Rent-a-Car, Inc. v. Mendenhall, 937 P.2d 69, 73 (Nev. 1997); Weaver v.
Casey (In re 1973John Deere 4030 Tractor), 816 P.2d 1126, 1134 (Okla. 1991).
32 See, e.g., Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1399; Naftzger, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 788; Weaver,
816 P.2d at 1134.
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However, once money is transferred by a thief to a third party
who gives value and takes possession without knowledge of the theft,
the third party takes title to the money free and clear of any claim of
the original victim of the crime.2 7 The linkage between possession
and ownership becomes nonseverable, even if the crime victim can
specifically trace his funds into the hands of the current possessor.'
III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR POSSESSION/OWNERSHIP LINK
The consistent alignment between possession of money and
ownership of that commodity in state law is clear. Thus, the Code,
which incorporates state concepts of an "interest in property" in the
definition of the estate in Section 541, reflects that connection. Less
clear is the rationale for this seemingly inextricable linkage. This
Part suggests some possible justifications for the link between
possession and ownership of money and demonstrates that none of
the justifications either does, or should, lead to the conclusion that
money in the possession of another cannot belong to the original
owner.
A. Historical Treatment
At least as early as Roman times, the transaction in which one
party provided another with money for the other's use, with the
expectation that an equivalent sum would be returned, was
recognized as a discrete form of contract. Mutuum, or loan for
consumption, was applicable not only to loans of money, but also to
loans of any res quae mutua vicefunguntur, readily interchangeable or
'2 See, e.g., State Nat'l Bank v. United States, 114 U.S. 401 (1885); Research-Planning,
Inc. v. Segal (In re First Capital Mortgage Loan Corp.), 917 F.2d 424, 427 (10th Cir. 1990);
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 297 F.2d 265, 266 (7th Cir. 1962); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Long,
318 F. Supp. 156, 160 (W.D. Pa. 1970); Burtch v. Hydraquip, Inc. (In re Mushroom Transp.
Co.), 227 B.R. 244,258 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998); Ragsdale v. South Fulton Machine Works, Inc.
(In re Whiteacre Sunbelt, Inc.), 211 B.R. 411, 417 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1997); Kelley Kar Co. v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 298 P.2d 590, 592 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956); Tanner v. Lee, 49 S.E. 592, 593
(Ga. 1904); Stephens v. Board of Educ., 79 N.Y. 183, 186 (1879); Hinkle v. Cornwell Quality
Tool Co., 532 N.E.2d 772, 777 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); Portland v. Berry, 739 P.2d 1041, 1044
(Or. Ct. App. 1987); Solomon v. Gibson, 615 A.2d 367, 370 (Penn. Super. Ct. 1992). See
generally 53A AM.JuR. 2D Money § 23 (1996).
" See, e.g., Hatch v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 41 N.E. 403, 404 (N.Y. 1895); Portland, 739 P.2d
at 104344; cf Burtch, 227 B.R. at 256 (holding that chapter 7 trustee could not trace funds
misappropriated from estate through commingled bank account into hands of third parties).
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fimgible goods '2 The delivery of the res to the recipient created
the binding obligation to return the amount, and the lender could
bring an action-a condictio or (in the case of money) an actio certae
pecuniae creditae-to recover it.'0 Indeed, the development of mutuum
can be seen as a more formal recognition of the general equitable
principle that one who receives property from another with the
understanding that it was not a gift has been unjustly enriched and
must return the amount of such enrichment.3' Thus, the identical
remedy ("condictid') was available for return of money wrongfully
entrusted to another or provided for a limited purpose that was not
accomplished, and similar cases in which the money was not
"consumed" by the recipient.13
Mutuum was always gratuitous.'33 The contract gave rise to a
single remedy: the condictio for return of an equal sum (or
equivalent kind, quantity, and quality in the case of other goods)."a
It was originally intended to be a transaction between friends or
neighbors, rather than a commercial transaction.' If the lender
wished to receive recompense for the loan in the form of interest, 6
the parties would have to supplement the loan (the mutuum) with a
stipulatio, a formal, oral agreement made with certain legal
formalities.'37 The stipulatio was defined by its form, not its
'See W.W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TOJUSTINIAN 462-
63 (3d ed. 1963) [hereinafter BUCKLAND, TEXT-BOOK]. Such fungible goods included grain,
wine, oil, bronze, silver, and gold, or "any things commonly dealt with by number, weight or
measure." Id at 463. See also REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 153 (1990);
W. H. BUCKLER, THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF CONTRACT IN ROMiAN LAw DOwN TO THE END OF
THE REPUBLICAN PERIOD 180 (1983). It is unclear whether mutuum applied originally to
money and was later extended to cover other commodities, or whether always applied to all
fungible things. See generally David Locke Hall & F. Douglas Raymond, Economic Analysis of
Legal Institutions: Explaining an 'Inexplicable'Rule of Roman Law, 61 IND. Lj. 401,406 (1986).
"' See H.F. JOLOWICz & BARRY NICHOLAS, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
ROMAiAN LAW 284 (3d ed. 1972); see also BUCKLAND, TEXT-BOOK, supra note 129, at 463;
BUCKLER, supra note 129, at 182.
"' SeeJOLOWICZ & NICHOLAS, supra note 130, at 284; see also W.W. BUCKLAND, A MANUAL
OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 272 (2d ed. 1957) [hereinafter BUCKLAND, PRIVATE LAW].
'= SeeJOLOwICZ & NICHOLAS, supra note 130, at 285.
' See BUCKLAND, TEXT-BOOK, supra note 129, at 464; RUDOLPH SOHM, THE INSTITUTES
375 (3d ed. 1907).
13 See ZIMMEPMANN, supra note 129, at 153.
"' See ALAN WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW 10 (1985); ZIMMERMANN, supra note 129,
at 156; BUCKLER, supra note 129, at 180.
'3 When interest was charged, the transaction was sometimes called a fenus. See
BUCKLAND, PRIVATE LAW, supra note 131, at 273.
"' This verbal agreement arose from the use of certain words, in the form of question by
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contents;a the parties were free to impose on the party to be bound
whatever obligations they wished, as long as they did so with the
requisite formality.
In order to have a mutuum, ownership of the money or other
thing provided by lender to borrower had to transfer.19 However, if
ownership of the property could not be transferred (because, for
example, the lender did not own the property or did not have the
authority to alienate it), although there was no mutuum, the true
owner could recover the property itself from the recipient by
vindicatio, or if it had been consumed or alienated in good faith, the
owner could recover its equivalent by condictio.
140
The loan of an object for use, accomplished by a contract
denominated "commodatum," did not transfer ownership of the
subject matter of the loan but only temporary p' A 4subjct attr    mpoarypossession. s fora
mutuum, the contract was gratuitous,'42 created by the handing over
of the object to be loaned. 43 At the end of the loan the res itself had
to be returned to the lender in specie.14 Failure to return the res
would give rise to an actio commodati.'4-5 The key distinction between
mutuum and commodatum was that for the latter the actual object lent
had to be returned. However, the object itself might be fungible, as
when a sum of money was lent to serve as security (via pledge) to a
third party by the borrower thereof, or to be spread out on a
the creditor and answer by the debtor. For example, if the stipulatio was for the payment of
interest, the creditor would ask the debtor, "do you solemnly promise (spondesne) to pay me
interest at such-and-such a rate every month?" and the debtor would response, "I solemnly
promise (spondeo)," thereby creating the binding stipulatio. SOHM, supra note 133, at 382-83;
see also BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 159 (1962); WATSON, supra note
135, at 8.
's, See Hall & Raymond, supra note 129, at 404; WATSON, supra note 135, at 7-8.
1 See, e.g., BUCKLAND, PRIvATE LAW, supra note 131, at 273; BUCKLAND, TEXT-BOOK,
supra note 129, at 463-64; PATRICK MAC CHOMBAICH DE COLQUHOUN, A SUMMARY OF THE
ROMAN CIVIL LAW, Vol. II, § 1537, at 469 (1988); SOHM, supra note 133, at 375; ZIMMERMANN,
supra note 129, at 158.
"' See BuCKLAND, TEXT-BOOK, supra note 129, at 464; DE COLQUHOUN, supra note 139,
§ 1539, at 471.
... See DE COLQUHOUN, supra note 139, § 1554, at 480; ZIMMERMAN, supra note 129, at
190.
"4 See DE COLQUHOUN, supra note 139, § 1551, at 479; BUCKLAND, PRIVATE LAW, supra
note 131, at 276; SOHM, supra note 133, at 376; WATSON, supra note 135, at 17.
See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 129, at 188.
SeeDE COLQUHOUN, supra note 139, § 1551, at 479.
See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 129, at 189; SOHM, supra note 133, at 376.
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moneylender's table for show. Such a loan of money would be a
commodatum despite the "fungible" nature of the subject matter."'
Fungible goods, including money, '47 could be handed over to a
third party without an intent to transfer ownership pursuant to a
depositum.'48 The depositee received the subject of the deposit, the
res, without compensation, to care for it until the res was handed
back to the depositor or to a third party.'4 9 Failure to do so would
give rise to an actio depositi directa.' ° The depositee was forbidden to
use the res,'5' but in the case of money it might be agreed that the
depositee could use it, thereby effectively transforming the depositum
into a mutuum at any time.
5 2
By the middle ages, the distinctions between the genres of real
contracts' 53 were fast eroding. Loans were extended in a variety of
forms, ranging from loans of money disguised as sales and
repurchases of goods, to sales of rents.'54 The transfer of movable
goods to a third party was said to be a "bailment" whether the goods
were being pledged, gratuitously lent for use, deposited for safe
keeping, delivered for transportation, or hired, so long as title did
not pass and the goods were to be returned (in their original form
or as modified by the bailee) to the bailor.'55 In modern times, the
terminology of lending has almost completely lost the Roman
" See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 129, at 188.
A depositum involving money is sometimes referred to as a depositum irregulare,
although this is not a Roman term. See BuCKLAND, TEXT-BOOK, supra note 129, at 469 n.13;
SOHM, supra note 133, at 377; ZIMMERMAN, supra note 129, at 215-16.
' See BUCKLAND, TEXT-BOOK, supra note 129, at 467;JOLOIVcZ & NICHOLAS, supra note
130, at 287.
"' See DE COLQUHOUN, supra note 139, § 1565, at 488; BUCKLAND, TEXT-BOOK, supra
note 129, at 467.
- SeeSOHM, supra note 133, at 377.
.5' See DE COLQUHOUN, supra note 139, § 1565, at 488; BuCKLAND, TEXT-BOOK, supra
note 129, at 467; WATSON, supra note 135, at 11; ZIMMERMAN, supra note 129, at 205.
152 See BuCKLAND, TEXT-BOOK, supra note 129, at 470; BUCKLAND, PRIVATE LAW, supra
note 131, at 276; ZIMMERMAN, supra note 129, at 216.
'" A "real" contract was one formed by the delivery of the subject matter of the contract
by one party thereto rather than by executory promises. SeeDE COLQUHOUN, supra note 139,
§ 1535, at 468.
"' See M.M. POSTAN, MEDIEVAL TRADE AND FINANCE 11-16 (1973). Usury having been
prohibited by the Catholic Church and vigorously attacked beginning in about the middle of
the twelfth century, see generally DavidJ. Gerber, Prometheus Bound: The High Middle Ages and the
Relationship Between Law and Economic Conduc 38 ST. Louis U. LJ. 673, 706 (1994), the
objective of many of these disguised loans was to conceal the charging of interest, see id. at 11.
' See 2 FREDERICK POLLACK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW, 169-70 (2d ed. 1898); ZIMMERMAN, supra note 129, at 204.
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distinctions . 56 Instead, commentators57 and courts5 have sought to
distinguish bailments from "sales," and have placed all transactions
which would have been covered by a mutuum under Roman law in
the latter category because title transferred.
But to the Romans, this would have made no sense. Although
loans of money or other fungible goods for consumption, loans of
goods (including fungible goods) for use, and deposits of goods
(including money) were distinguished by the location of ownership
of the res at Roman law, the location of ownership did not transform
the transaction into a sale. Roman contracts of sale were consensual
and based on mutual agreement, rather than premised on the
delivery of a res.15
Legal history always informs our understanding of modern
legal concepts, but the fact that a Roman mutuum transferred
ownership does not establish that modem law must treat a loan
agreement as a sale of funds. A mutuum was also gratuitous; a loan
"' See POLLACK & MAITLAND, supra note 155, at 170 n.1 ("To this day we Englishmen are
without words which neatly mark the distinction [between mutuum and commodatum]. We tend
books and half-crowns to borrowers we hope to see the same books again, but not the same
half-crowns; still in either case there is a loan.").
"' See, e.g., ARMISTEAD M. DOBIE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS 9-
11 (1914) ("since title to the goods in such cases [of mutuum] would immediately vest in the
recipient, such a transaction would in no sense be a bailment, but is a sale or exchange");
WILLIAM F. ELLjorr, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS 43 (1914) ("Under
the common law this [mutuum] would not be a bailment, but a sale."); EDWIN C. GODDARD,
OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS 9 (1928) (mutuum "is considered a sale
and not a bailment");JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTs 193 (2d ed.
1840) (in mutuum "the absolute property passes to the borrower, it being a loan for
consumption"); PHILIP T. VAN ZILE, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS 4
(1902) (mutuum "at common law, was considered to be a sale of the property").
... See, e.g., O'Keefe v. Equitable Trust Co., 103 F.2d 904, 906 (3d Cir. 1939); Rahilly v.
Wilson, 20 F. Cas. 179, 181 (C.C.D. Minn. 1873) (No. 11,532); Energy Coop., Inc. v. Permian
Corp. (In reEnergy Coop., Inc.), 94 B.R. 975, 979 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Provost v. United States, 60
CL Cl. 49 (1924), affd, 269 U.S. 443 (1926); De Jaramillo v. United States, 37 CL Cl. 208
(1902); In reEllis, 6 A.2d 602, 611-13 (Del. Super. Ct. & Orphans' CL 1939); New Domain Oil
& Gas Co. v. Hayes, 259 S.W. 715, 716 (Ky. 1924); State v. Karri, 149 P. 956, 958 (Mont. 1915);
Fosdick v. Greene, 27 Ohio St. 484, 488-89 (1875); Chase v. Washburn, 1 Ohio St. 244, 249
(1853).
The Louisiana Civil Code affirmatively codifies the distinction between loans for use or
commodatum and loans for consumption or mutuum with respect to ownership of the thing
lent. See, e.g., Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Mar, 916 F.2d 1040, 1045-46 (5th Cir. 1990). Compare
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2895 (West 1994), with LA. CIV. CODEANN. art. 2911 (West 1994). See
generallyAlan D. Ezkovich, Beware! Te Commodatum Lurks, 58 TUL L. REV. 342 (1983).
The consensual contract of sale was called emptio venditio and required that the parties
agree on both the object of the sale and the fixed price. SeeJOLOwIGZ & NICHOLAS, supra note
130, at 289.
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agreement almost invariably provides for interest. A mutuum was
intended to be between friends or neighbors; a loan agreement is
often between a professional lender and a borrower with no other
relationship. A mutuum was not a sale; yet the common law treats a
loan as one. In short, a loan as we know it is not a Roman mutuum.
The argument that it must result in transfer of ownership because
that was required for a mutuum is not persuasive.
B. Medium of Exchange
Money, it is argued, cannot be treated as other personalty
because money is not a commodity but is currency-that is, a
medium of exchange, constituting a measure of value for all other
property in our society.'" This special characteristic of money has
been used to justify the need to treat the possessor thereof as the
owner in all but limited circumstances.'6
" See, e.g., Richard v. American Union Bank, 170 N.E. 532, 535 (N.Y. 1930). See generally
FA MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECr OF MONEY 9-10, 24-25 (5th ed. 1992); JAMEs S. ROGERS, THE
EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES 187-88 (1995).
The U.C.C. has always treated money as something different from all other personalty.
Section 1-201(24) of the U.C.C. defines "money" as "a medium of exchange authorized or
adopted by a domestic or foreign government and includes a monetary unit of account
established by an intergovernmental organization or by agreement between two or more
nations." Money is explicitly excluded from the definition of "goods" in U.C.C. § 9-105(1) (h),
but is also excluded from the definition of "general intangibles" in U.C.C. § 9-106. Therefore,
although money is not excluded from the scope of Article 9, which (except as provided in
U.C.C. § 9-104 on excluded transactions, which does not exclude money) applies "to any
transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security interest in personal
property," U.C.C. § 9-102(1) (a), it is not treated as any other category of personal property,
nor can money be the subject of a "lease" pursuant to Article 2A of the U.C.C. A "lease" is
defined to be "a transfer of the right to possession and use of goods," U.C.C. § 2A-103(1) (j),
and the definition of "goods" explicitly excludes money, see U.C.C. § 2A-103(1) (h). Article 2
of the U.C.C., which is applicable to "transactions in goods," U.C.C. § 2-102, defines "goods"
to exclude "the money in which the price is to be paid," U.C.C. § 2-105(1), but may include
money within the definition of goods "when money is being treated as a commodity" as
opposed to "the medium of payment." U.C.C. § 2-105 cmt. 1. Thus Article 2 is applicable to
foreign exchange transactions, when foreign currency is the commodity being traded. See,
e.g., Saboundjian v. Bank Audi (USA), 556 N.Y.S.2d 258, 262 n.2 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
"' Lord Mansfield, Chief Justice of the King's Bench, in Miller v. Race, rejecting the
notion that inability to trace money was the reason a bona fide purchaser took title to a stolen
Bank of England note, stated, "The true reason is, upon account of the currency of it: it can
not be recovered after it has passed in currency." 97 Eng. Rep. 398, 401 (1758). Bank notes,
he observed, "are not goods, not securities, nor documents for debts, nor are so esteemed: but
are treated as money, as cash, in the ordinary course and transaction of business, by the
general consent of mankind; which gives them the credit and currency of money, to all intents
and purposes." Id.
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While money certainly does, at least in a particular geographic
region, constitute currency, that alone cannot justify the special
treatment afforded possession of money when money is loaned by a
true owner to a borrower. If a medium of exchange by its nature
always had to belong to its possessor, the law would not countenance
a separation between possession and ownership of money. Yet, as
already suggested, it clearly does.
For example, it is universally accepted that when possession of
money is transferred by an owner to a bailee, with directions that
the bailee should hold the money for safekeeping and return the
same money at a later date, title to the money remains with the
owner rather than transferring to the bailee. 62 A specific example
of this principle is the special account created by a bank for a
depositor. With respect to special accounts, as opposed to general
accounts, ownership of the deposited funds remains with the
depositor rather than passing to the bank, and the relationship
between the depositor and bank becomes that between and bailor
and bailee. 6' If the bailee misappropriates the funds or commingles
them with its own, the bailor may sue for conversion.'"
Similarly, when the money involved is unique coins or money in
a bag or package, or is otherwise readily identifiable from other
currency, the money is treated as a commodity and the usual rules
no longer apply.' Thus, an owner may recover such identifiable
'6 See, ag., Carlyon v. Fitzhenry, 15 P. 273, 275 (Ariz. 1887); Hargis v. Spencer, 71 S.W.2d
666, 669-70 (Ky. 1934); Caldwell v. Hall, 60 Miss. 330, 334 (1882); Knapp v. Knapp, 96 S.W.
295, 297 (Mo. CL App. 1906).
' See cases cited in note 83 supra.
1 See, e.g., Commercial Discount Co. v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 143
P.2d 484, 487 (Cal. Dist. Ci App. 1943); American Sur. Co. v. Bank of Dawson, 159 S.E. 736
(Ga. CL App. 1931); Sawyer v. Conner, 75 So. 131, 134 (Miss. 1917); Brunswick County v.
North Carolina Bank & Trust Co., 173 S.E. 327, 335-36 (N.C. 1934); Fokken v. State Bank &
Trust Co., 217 N.W. 512, 514 (S.D. 1928); Peltola v. Western Workman's Pub. Soc'y, 193 P.
691, 693 (Wash. 1920).
' The issue of whether money should be treated as something unique or as another
commodity or type of good is played out in other contexts. For example, although loans are
generally not governed by Article 2 of the U.C.C., if the money is being treated as a
commodity (such as foreign exchange), the transaction is deemed a sale of goods and is
subject to Article 2. See U.C.C. § 2-105 cmi 1 (1995) ("Goods is intended to cover the sale of
money when money is being treated as a commodity but not to include it when money is the
medium of payment."); see also, e.g., Compania Sud-Americana de Vapores, SA. v. IBJ
Schroder Bank & Trust Co., 785 F. Supp. 411, 431 n.19 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). Courts interpreting
statutes that apply to "sales of goods" or "commodities" differ over whether a loan of money is
covered. Compare United States v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 102 F. Supp. 645, 647 (D.
Minn. 1951) (loan of money is not lease, sale, or contract for sale of goods or a commodity
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money from the holder thereof," even if the holder is a bona fide
purchaser, because the purchaser acquires no more interest than
that held by his seller.6 7 As is true for misappropriation of a special
account, suit may be brought for conversion of such money,
although, generally, money is not specifically identifiable and thus
conversion does not lie. '68 If the mere fact that money constitutes a
medium of exchange were all that is necessary to mandate an
unalterable linkage between possession and ownership, these
cases-which certainly involve money-would perforce be decided
differently.
within meaning of Clayton Act), and Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169, 174 (Tex.
1980) (borrowing money is not an attempt to acquire a good or service within meaning of
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act), with United States v. Bryser, 954
F.2d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 1992) (theft of money constitutes theft of 'goods or chattels' within
meaning of first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 659); In re Midas Coin Co., 264 F. Supp. 193, 199
(E.D. Mo. 1967), affd sub nom. Zuke v. St. Johns Community Bank, 387 F.2d 118 (8th Cir.
1968) (coins of coin dealer were "goods" within meaning of U.C.C. § 9-105 rather than
"money"); Levin v. Dare, 203 B.R. 137, 145-46 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (currency is "tangible personal
property" within meaning of Indiana exemption statute); Villegas v. Transamerica Fin. Servs.,
Inc., 708 P.2d 781, 783 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (money is an "object" or "good" or "commodity"
within meaning of Arizona Consumer Fraud Act); Exotic Coins, Inc. v. Beacom, 699 P.2d 930,
935 (Colo. 1985) (en banc) (Colorado could regulate sellers of gold and silver coins, because
coins were regulated not as currency but as collectors' items); DeBiase v. Commercial Union
Ins. Co., 278 N.Y.S.2d 145, 149 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1967), aff'd, 286 N.Y.S.2d 502 (N.Y. App. Term.
1967) (coins in collection of coin collector not "money" within meaning of insurance policy
limitation on liability), and Thorne & Wilson, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 681 P.2d 1237,
1238-39 (Utah 1984) (dealer in gold and silver coins was selling "tangible personal property"
subject to state sales tax because coins were commodity). See generally James W. Paulsen,
Lenders and the Texas DTPA: A Step Back From the Brink 48 SMU L. REV. 487 (1995).
" See, e.g., Sharon v. Nunan, 63 Cal. 234 (1883); Skidmore v. Taylor, 29 Cal. 619, 622
(1866); Eddings v. Boner, 38 S.W. 1110, 1111 (Indian Terr. 1897); Hamilton v. Clark, 25 Mo.
App. 428,433 (1887); Graves v. Dudley, 20 N.Y. 76 (1859); Knapp v. Springmeier, 7 Ohio Dec.
Reprint 570 (1878); see also Williams Management Enters., Inc. v. Buonauro, 489 So.2d 160,
164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) ("When specific bills and coins are identifiable because of serial
numbers or special markings, or because they are located uncommingled at a special
exclusive place or contained within a [sic] identifiable container, the bills and coins, so
identifiable, can be replevied.") (dictum).
"' See, e.g., Naftzger v. American Numismatic Soc'y, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784, 788 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996). But see Portland v. Berry, 739 P.2d 1041, 1043-44 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (good faith
purchaser for value takes even identifiable currency free from claims of true owner). See
generally supra Part B.3.
' See, e.g., Hunnicutt v. Higginbotham, 35 So. 469, 470 (Ala. 1903); Moody v. Keener, 7
Port. 218, 231-32 (Ala. 1838); Bolton v. Souter, 872 P.2d 758, 761 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993); Royce
v. Oakes, 38 A. 371, 372 (RI. 1897). See generally supra Part B.2. This concept of identifiability
has been expanded from money contained in a "bag or chest," see Holiday v. Hicks, 78 Eng.
Rep. 878, 900 (1599), to any money "with identified or segregated sources from which money
has come or types of accounts into which money has been deposited," Lewis v. Fowler, 479
So.2d 725, 726 (Ala. 1985).
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C. Impact on Commerce
The argument has long been made that commercial
transactions could not function if the recipient of money had to
investigate the provenance of that money to ensure that it belonged
to the party from whom it was received, free and clear of claims of
others.'69 While this argument certainly has a degree of appeal, it
"o See, e.g., Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 297 F.2d 265, 266 (7th Cir. 1962) (it is "a
recognized public policy that money must be permitted to flow freely in our economy");
Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Long, 318 F. Supp. 156, 160 (W.D. Pa. 1970) ("it is absolutely
necessary for commerce and business to continue that one who receives money, cashier's
checks or money orders is not put on inquiry as to the source from which the funds have been
derived"); Tanner v. Lee, 49 S.E. 592, 593 (Ga. 1904) (allowing money to be reclaimed by the
true owner "would be utterly destructive of the quality of currency which has been attached by
law as an incident peculiar to money and negotiable paper, alone, of all other property");
Depew v. Robards, 17 Mo. 580, 582 (1853) (rule that owner of money and bills cannot recover
from bona fide holder "is founded on the necessity of sustaining the credit of that which is
used as the medium of exchange in commercial transactions"); Brown v. Perera, 176 N.Y.S.
215, 219 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1918) ("In this system of rules, which sprung into existence and has
been perpetuated for the sole purpose of facilitating trade and rendering commercial
transactions certain and secure, we may naturally except [sic] to find that the very corner
stone of the structure is the rule which guarantees the untrammeled transferability of
money."); Stephens v. Board of Education, 79 N.Y. 183, 187 (1879) ("It is absolutely necessary
for practical business transactions that the payee of money in due course of business shall not
be put upon inquiry at his peril as to the title of the payor.... It would introduce great
confusion into commercial dealings if the creditor who receives money in payment of a debt is
subject to the risk of accounting therefore to a third person who may be able to show that the
debtor obtained it from him by felony or fraud. The law wisely, from considerations of public
policy and convenience, and to give security and certainty to business transactions, adjudges
that the possession of money vests the title in the holder as to third persons dealing with him
and receiving it in due course of business."); Hatch v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 41 N.E. 403, 404
(N.Y. 1895) ("to permit, in every case of the payment of a debt, an inquiry as to the source
from which the debtor derived the money, and a recovery if shown to have been dishonestly
acquired, would disorganize all business operations, and entail an amount of risk and
uncertainty which no enterprise could bear"); see also Hanson v. Mead-Haskell Co., 100 P.2d
1117, 1119 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1940); Sanborn v. First Nat'l Bank, 90 S.W. 1033, 1034-
35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1905); Yoderv. Sylvania Say. Bank, No. L. 82-281, 1982 WL 6695, at *1 (Ohio
Ct. App. Dec. 23, 1982); Portland v. Berry, 739 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Or. Ct. App. 1987); cf. Shawv.
Railroad Co., 101 U.S. 557, 564 (1879) (rule applicable to bills of exchange or bank notes,
justified by "the interests of trade," not applicable to lost or stolen bill of lading which is "not a
representative of money"); Tucker v. New Hampshire Say. Bank, 58 N.H. 83 (1877)
(negotiability "is founded in the policy of sustaining the credit and circulation of negotiable
paper. Freedom and safety in the negotiation of such paper are a practical necessity.").
While the importance of negotiability has been challenged as it applies to negotiable
instruments, see, e.g., Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13
CREIGHTON L. REv. 441 (1979); Rogers, supra note 93; James Stephen Rogers, The Myth of
Negotiability, 31 B.C. L. REV. 265 (1990); AlbertJ. Rosenthal, Negotiability-Who Needs It?, 71
COLUM. L. REv. 375 (1971), the commercial need for negotiability of money has not been
questioned.
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does not justify a system that not only presumptively equates
possession of money with ownership, but makes a loan of money
without a transfer of ownership impossible.
In fact, the law does recognize situations in which a party other
than the possessor of money has a cognizable interest in it, even in a
commercial situation. For example, if a debtor grants a creditor a
security interest in debtor's money, that security interest is valid as
between the debtor and creditor upon attachment, even if the
debtor continues to have possession of the money.7 ° Of course, the
only means to perfect a security interest (making it valid against a
third party) in money as such, not constituting proceeds of another
type of collateral, is to possess it.17 ' But if the secured creditor takes
possession of the money to perfect its security interest, ownership of
the money remains with the debtor, despite the secured creditor's
possession thereof172 A third party, even one with no knowledge of
the debtor's interest, who extends credit to the creditor in reliance
on his possession of debtor's money, can get no claim to the funds
because, in this situation, ownership does not follow possession.
If the money is collateral only because it constitutes proceeds of
another type of collateral,17 the Uniform Commercial Code
The only requirements for enforceability of a security interest against the debtor, that
is "attachment," are set forth in the U.C.C.:
(a) the collateral is in the possession of the secured party pursuant to
agreement,... of the debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a
description of the collateral...
(b) value has been given; and
(c) the debtor has rights in the collateral.
U.C.C. § 9-203 (1995); see, e.g., In re 4-R Management, Inc., 208 B.R. 232, 235-36 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 1997).
"' See U.C.C. § 9-304(1); see also, e.g., Henry Lee Co. v. Tolz, 157 F.3d 1290, 1292 (11th
Cir. 1998); In re LDM Dev. Corp., 211 B.R. 348, 352-53 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1997); 4-R
Management, 208 B.R at 245; In re Barr, 180 B.R. 156, 160 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1995); In re
Corner Pockets of the Southwest, Inc., 85 B.R. 559, 563 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1988); Norton v.
Associated Grocers of Maine, Inc. (In rePeabody), 51 B.R. 157, 158 (Bankr. D. Me. 1985).
"n Thus it is consistently found that retainers paid by a client to a lawyer prior to
bankruptcy that are not earned upon receipt constitute property of the bankrupt's estate,
although subject to the lawyer's security interest perfected by possession. See, e.g., In re GOCO
Realty Fund I, 151 B.R. 241, 251 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1993); In reViscount Furniture Corp., 133
B.R 360, 367 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1991); In re Kinderhaus Corp., 58 B.R. 94, 97 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1986); cf In re McDonald Bros. Constr., Inc., 114 B.R. 989, 1002 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990)
("advance payment" retainer was intended to pass to attorney at time of payment and did not
become property of bankrupt's estate).
'" "Proceeds" is defined to include 'whatever is received upon the sale, exchange,
collection or other disposition of collateral or proceeds." U.C.C. § 9-306(1). Proceeds in the
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provides that the secured creditor continues to have a security
interest in those proceeds even in the possession of the debtor if
they are "identifiable."' 74 That security interest also continues to be
perfected to the extent that the security interest in the original
collateral was perfected if a filed financing statement covers the
original collateral (or the original collateral was investment
property) and the proceeds are "identifiable cash proceeds."'75 This
security interest is valid against third parties, despite the difficulty of
ascertaining that the nonpossessor has any interest in the funds.
In the context of secured financing, therefore, the separation
of possession of money from legally enforceable interests therein
actually facilitates commerce rather than undermining it. Without
the ability to obtain security interests in cash proceeds in the hands
of a debtor, lenders would be virtually unwilling to finance inventory
(which is sold for cash or on account) or accounts receivable (which
by their nature turn into cash upon collection) because they would
lose their collateral in the ordinary course of business. And debtors
would be unable to utilize their cash assets not constituting
proceeds as security if the very act necessary to perfect a security
interest therein (delivery to the secured party) divested them of
ownership of the money. Commercial transactions thrive despite
the fact that money in these circumstances is subject to the claims of
someone not in possession of it.
Even beyond the evidence provided by the law of secured
transactions, it is not likely that our commercial system would be
unable to function effectively if true claims of ownership could be
asserted against those in possession of money. Although discussing
the issue in the context of negotiable investment securities,
Professor Rogers has made several cogent arguments against what
he calls "the conventional wisdom that negotiability is essential to
marketability.,
176
First, he points out that physical paper subject to negotiation by
delivery is gradually giving way to electronic commerce and the
form of money are "cash proceeds." Id.
"' See id. § 9-306(2).
'7 See id. § 9-306(3) (b), (c); see also, e.g., Eagle Pac. Ins. Co. v. Christensen Motor Yacht
Corp., 934 P.2d 715, 719 (Wash. CL App. 1997); H.B. London & Co. v. Wiles, 695 So.2d 876,
878 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1997).
6 James Steven Rogers, Negotiability, Property, and Identity, 12 CARDozo L. REv. 471, 479
(1990) [hereinafter Rogers, Negotiability].
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recording of financial relationships by computer entry. 7 While this
development has been more accelerated for the securities markets
than for money, the volume of cashless credit or debit transactions
continues to rise at a phenomenal rate, 78 and it is not at all
inconceivable that cash in the form we now know it will disappear,
as have treasury securities in bearer form. When all money
transactions occur not in the form of currency but in the form of
debits and credits of computer accounts (which can easily record
any competing claims to credits), negotiability has little
significance." 9
Second, he notes that protecting bona fide purchasers for value
of negotiable paper does not necessarily facilitate the operation of
the marketplace, because the rule harms true owners who are less
willing to place their paper at risk.18 If true owners do not carry
cash because of the risks connected with negotiability, the rule
hinders commercial transactions rather than promoting them.
Third, Rogers notes that "[a]ny instrument that can be
transferred by mere delivery is an instrument that can be transferred
without any paper trail,"'81 making enforcement of criminal and tax
laws more difficult. Indeed, the federal government has statutorily
limited the rule of negotiability of money by creating tracing rules
to follow cash into the hands of third parties.182 Yet there is no
177 Rogers, Negotiability, supra note 176, at 479-80.
17 A recent study by Mentis Corporation indicated that consumer credit card payments
will increase from 25% of all United States consumer payments made in 1997 to nearly one-
third of such payments by 2000. According to the study, credit card transactions are
increasing at a rate of 15% per year, and debit card transactions are exploding at an annual
growth rate of 46%. The study found that debit card payments generally replace those
previously made with checks and cash; only 6% of debit card purchases replace credit card
purchases. See PR NEWSWIRE (Sept. 16, 1998) (available in NEXIS-LEXIS, News Library, PR
Newswire File).
"n Cf Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond Negotiability: A New Model for Transfer and Pledge of
Interests in Securities Controlled by Intermediaries, 12 CARDOzO L. REV. 305 (1990) (rejecting
application of property law concepts such as tracing, first-in-time and bona fide purchase to
transfers of interests in fungible bulks of securities controlled by intermediaries).
' The simple example he uses relates to cash: "I never carry very much cash in the seat
of my pants precisely because I know that if I lose it, it's gone." Rogers, Negotiability, supra note
176, at 480. In the absence of an alternative means of purchasing goods and services (such as
a check, or debit or credit card), less money in the pants (or purse) means less economic
activity. In this way negotiability, which Rogers equates with "vulnerability to theft," makes
commerce more risky. Id.
... Rogers, Negotiability, supra note 176, at 480.
"" See Part III.E. infra.
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evidence that the commercial markets are functioning less
efficiently as a result.
Fourth, although there is no empirical study of the practice,
"people do buy things even though they are not legally protected
against adverse claims. " " Most goods purchased in good faith are
not stolen or subject to a security interest in a third party. Even if
there is a defect in the chain of title, the chances of the true owner
having the inclination and the wherewithal to trace his or her goods
are remote. Therefore, people simply engage in their ordinary
commercial transactions without too much concern about
competing claims to the goods they purchase. Similarly, most funds
involved in commercial transactions are not subject to the claim of
one not in possession of them. There is no reason to believe that
commercial actors would search for a new medium of exchange if
true owners who could trace their ownership interest were able to
retrieve the money to which they had a claim. People do not
currently decline to accept cash merely because there is a possibility
that some of it might be counterfeit.' 84 The risk would simply be
factored into the market, or people would be more selective about
those with whom they do business so that they would be more likely
to have a remedy against the party who transferred to them the
tainted money in the event their rights to the money itself were
defeated."
Finally, even if one believes that commerce requires that a bona
fide holder of money who acquires it without notice of any
deficiency in the title of the transferor and who gives value take free
of all claims of a true owner, this principle does notjusify treating
the borrower of money (who has complete knowledge of the source
of the funds and its own obligation to return them or their
equivalent to the true owner) as the owner thereof. The
negotiability principle is not needed to protect the party who
borrows directly from a lender, any more than it is needed to
"3 Rogers, Negotiability, supra note 176, at 481.
1' Cf. Bankhaus Hermann Lampe KG v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 466 F.
Supp. 1133, 1145 n.26 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (imposing loss on good faith possessor of improperly
issued certificate "accords with the imposition of loss upon a person who in good faith comes
into possession of counterfeit currency").
1' Rogers uses the example of the market in art and antiques, where extremely
expensive items trade frequently and are often stolen and subject to return to the true owner.
Although purchasers may do some investigation of the title to the artwork, they generally rely
on the reputation and solvency of their dealer. See Rogers, Negotiability, supra note 176, at 482.
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protect a thief or person who converts funds of another who knows
of the superior interest of the true owner of money.186
D. Intent of the Parties
When one party transfers property to another, whether that
transfer is one of title to the transferred res or of mere possession is
generally determined by the intent of the parties.' Thus, one is not
deemed to have relinquished ownership of one's property unless
there is evidence that one intended such alienation.le
"' When a thief or converter is not required to return money, it is not because the
money is negotiable, but because the money is no longer identifiable. See supra Parts II.B.2. &
l.B.3.
Grant Gilmore supported this point indirectly when he reflected on the decision of the
drafters of Article 9 to allow assignments of intangible collateral free of the underlying
contract defenses between assignor and obligor. See U.C.C. § 9-318(4) (1995). Gilmore
noted:
The basic flaw in our analysis was our failure to perceive that the twentieth-century
financing assignee was not in the least like the stranger who, one hundred and fifty
years earlier, had bought goods, commercial paper, and other property in an open
market without being able to find out about the prior history of whatever he
bought. The financing assignee, who serves a useful function in providing working-
capital loans, is not an ignorant stranger. He is in a position to find out-and,
before putting up his money, does find out-all there is to know about the
operations of his borrowers. He has a close and continuing relationship with them.
He can, if he chooses, require the strictest accounting from them. He does not
need to be insulated, as a matter of law, from the risks of the transactions in which
they engage. Because he can investigate, supervise, and control, he should be
encouraged to do so and penalized if he has not done so.
Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of a
Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605, 626-27 (1981).
While a borrower may not have the same degree of control over a potential lender as a
financing assignee has over its assignor, borrowers are no more "ignorant stranger[s]" who
need protection from the claims of their lenders and their lenders' creditors. See id.
'" See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas (In re Fuel Oil Supply &
Terminaling, Inc.), 72 B.R. 752, 758 (S.D. Tex. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 837 F.2d 224 (5th
Cir. 1988); Goldstein v. Aleet Leasing Assocs. II (In re Spangler), 56 B.R. 990, 992 (D. Md.
1986); In re Taylor, 130 B.R 849, 853 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1991); D.M. Ferry & Co. v. Forquer,
202 P. 193, 194 (Mont. 1921);Johnson v. Loewen, 272 N.W. 217, 218 (Neb. 1937); Estate of
Gritzan, 523 A.2d 776, 778 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
" See generally Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE Lj.
1057, 1057 (1954) ("The initial common law position was that equities of ownership are to be
protected at all costs: an owner may never be deprived of his property rights without his
consent."). I do not deal here with the good faith purchaser for value without notice of a
competing claim to property. See supra Part II.C. The commercial factors that have supported
giving such a purchaser greater rights in certain property than its transferor have no bearing
on a transaction between a single transferor and a single transferee dealing directly with one
another.
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Such evidence may be provided by the express language of the
parties' agreement. If a contract is designated a "sale agreement"
rather than a "lease," it can be assumed that the parties intended a
transfer of ownership of the property subject to the agreement.
Operative language that states that one party transfers and the other
takes "all right, title and interest in and to" certain property would
also provide direct evidence of the parties' intent that tite was
transferred. Alternatively, language that states that a party is
"leasing" or "renting" property to another, or that the transferee
"agrees to hold for the benefit of the transferor" and to return the
property at a specified date or upon satisfaction of certain
conditions, or that the transferor conveys the property "for security
purposes only" or grants a lien on or security interest in property,
would all suggest that ownership is not intended to be alienated.
If the parties' intent is not so clearly stated, it may be
discernible from the substance of the transaction. For example,
when the transferor provides the transferee complete control over
the transferred property, with no requirement that it be returned,
the transaction will be deemed a sale even if not so characterized by
the parties. 89 The substance of the transaction, rather than the
language used by the parties, is seen as providing indirect or
circumstantial evidence of the parties' intent.
In some cases, the parties' expressed intent will not be honored
because it conflicts with the indirect evidence. Thus, even when the
parties characterize a transfer of property as a "lease," if the
consideration being paid by the transferee is an obligation for the
term of the lease and is not subject to termination by the transferee
and the full economic life of the property is being transferred in
some way,' 90 the transfer will be deemed a sale with the supposed
.. Indeed, for commercial law purposes such a transaction will be deemed a sale even
when the transferor purports to retain title until the purchase price is fully paid. See U.G.C.
§ 2-401 (1) (1995) ("Any retention or reservation by the seller of the title (property) in goods
shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a security interest.").
The security interest arising as a result of retention of title is treated like other security
interests under Article 9, although for other purposes of state law title may indeed remain
with the seller. In this situation, the demands of commercial practice may modify the intent
of the parties with respect to title, but do not transform what is intended to be a sale into a
lease.
"0 Section 1-201(37) of the U.C.C. provides in the definition of "security interest" that:
a transaction creates a security interest [and is thus a sale rather than a lease of
property] if the consideration the lessee is to pay the lessor for the right to
possession and use of the goods is an obligation for the term of the lease not
314 [Vol. 16
2000] The Lease of Money in Bankruptcy 315
lessor (now recharacterized as a seller) retaining a security interest
to secure the obligation to pay the lease payments (purchase
price)."' A loan is generally not expressly called either a sale of
money or a lease thereof by the parties, yet as we have seen, it is
uniformly characterized to result in the transfer of ownership of the
money loaned."2  As one possible justification for this
characterization, it might be argued that such a transfer is consistent
with the intent of the parties. Because the parties seldom expressly
state in a loan agreement that they are transferring "title to" or
"ownership of' the loaned funds,9 ' the intent of the parties must be
discerned from other aspects of the transaction. To what factors
should one look in trying to determine whether ownership of the
funds has transferred?
If one were applying, by analogy, the factors distinguishing a
lease from a secured sale of goods in the definition of "security
interest" under section 1-201(37) of the Uniform Commercial
Code,'94 a loan does not obviously require characterization as a sale.
The definition states that a transaction is a secured sale if the
subject to termination by the lessee, and
(a) the original term of the lease is equal to or greater than the remaining
economic life of the goods,
(b) the lessee is bound to renew the lease for the remaining economic life of
the goods or is bound to become the owner of the goods,
(c) the lessee has an option to renew the lease for the remaining economic
life of the goods for no additional consideration or nominal additional
consideration upon compliance with the lease agreement, or
(d) the lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for no
additional consideration or nominal additional consideration upon
compliance with the lease agreement.
'1 See, e.g., Western Enters., Inc. v. Arctic Office Machines, Inc., 667 P.2d 1232, 1234
(Alaska 1983).
' See supra Part lI.B.1.
A typical loan agreement speaks in terms of an agreement by the lender to "make a
loan," "make advances," "lend," or "make available" a specified principal amount, and an
obligation on the part of the borrower to "repay the unpaid principal amount" of such loan or
advances on the specified date. See, e.g., AM.JuR. LEGALFORIS2D § 38:272 etseq. (1996).
' Use of U.G.C. § 1-201(37) factors is, of course, not a perfect analogy. The language
added to this definition in 1987 concurrently with the adoption of Article 2A was, in fact,
designed to eliminate any search for the true 'intent' of the parties and instead analyze
economic factors that would objectively indicate that ownership of goods had or had not been
transferred. See U.C.G. § 1-201(37) Official Comment ("All of these tests [in the second
paragraph of the definition] focus on economics, not the intent of the parties."). While
economic analysis is somewhat more difficult for an asset like money that does not depreciate,
the analogy can still be helpful.
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obligation of the "lessee" to pay the "lessor" for possession and use
of the goods is "not subject to termination by the lessee" "for the
term of the lease" and one or more of four additional tests is met.
95
Many loans, if not most, are prepayable at the option of the
borrower; 6 the obligation of the "lessee" to pay interest to the
"lessor" is therefore subject to termination by the "lessee" at any
time during the term of the loan and the first requirement for a
secured sale is not met. The remaining four tests would be equally
problematic, even if a loan is not prepayable at the borrower's
option. These tests focus on whether the full economic life of the
leased property is being transferred to the lessee. Money has no
finite economic life. Even if specific bills or coins wear out, they
may be replaced for new ones. Money does not depreciate. Our
currency is backed by the full faith and credit of the United States
government; until there is no such government, or its credit loses
substance, no transfer of money for a definite term will exhaust the
economic life of the funds transferred.19 7 Therefore, none of these
factors would militate in favor of characterizing a loan as a sale of
funds, without regard to its term.
195 See supra note 190.
'% As a general matter, a borrower has no right to prepay a loan unless the contract so
provides or the lender consents. See, e.g., C.C. Port, Ltd. v. Davis-Penn Mortgage Co., 61 F.3d
288, 289 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying Texas law); Ex parte Brannon, 683 So.2d 994, 996 (Ala.
1996); Wyckoffv. Anthony, 90 N.Y. 442, 448 (1882); Sound Stage Studios, Inc. v. Life Investors
Ins. Co., No. 88-204-11, 1988 WL 138827, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1988). However the
common law rule has been reversed by case law and by statute in certain circumstances. See,
e.g., Mahoney v. Furches, 468 A.2d 458, 461 (Pa. 1983); AlA. CODE § 5-19-4(c) (Supp. 1999);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 697.06 (West Supp. 2000); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 108(4) (e), (5) (d), (5-a) (6)
(McKinney Supp. 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2.4 (1999).
"7 The fourth test in paragraph (d) of the second paragraph of U.C.C. § 1-201(37) looks
to whether the lessee "has an option to become the owner of the goods for no additional
consideration or nominal additional consideration upon compliance with the lease
agreement." The consideration referred to must be the consideration paid during the term
of the "lease," which equates.to interest and mandatory prepayments under a loan agreement.
Although it is possible that one could characterize the final repayment of the unpaid principal
amount of a loan as consideration paid by the borrower to become the "owner" of the money
lent, such final repayment will almost never be "nominal." In the case of a balloon loan
(when no prepayments have been made during the term of the loan), it will be equal to the
full amount originally borrowed. And the borrower is given no "option" to acquire ownership
of the borrowed funds; either the borrower has such ownership from the inception of the
relationship because the loan agreement transfers title, or the money is deemed leased and
there is no end-of-term option.
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Although some of the factors itemized in the third paragraph
of section 1-201 (37)198 may be present in the case of a loan, 9  none
of these factors compels recharacterization of a lease of goods into a
secured sale; they should not, therefore, have any bearing on
whether ownership of loaned money vests in the transferee.
Perhaps it could be argued that in the absence of any expressed
intent with respect to tile to the borrowed funds, it should be
presumed that a transfer of ownership was intended because the
recipient of the funds is given the ability to treat the funds as an
owner would (i.e., the borrower may do with them as it likes). This
sort of autonomy over property is one of the classic indicia of
ownership.20
' The third paragraph in U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1995) states:
A transaction does not create a security interest merely because it provides that
(a) the present value of the consideration the lessee is obligated to pay the
lessor for the right to possession and use of the goods is substantially equal to
or is greater than the fair market value of the goods at the time the lease is
entered into,
(b) the lessee assumes risk of loss of the goods, or agrees to pay taxes,
insurance, filing, recording, or registration fees, or service or maintenance
costs with respect to the goods,
(c) the lessee has an option to renew the lease or to become the owner of the
goods,
(d) the lessee has an option to renew the lease for a fixed rent that is equal to
or greater than the reasonably predictable fair market rent for the use of the
goods for the term of the renewal at the time the option is to be performed, or
(e) the lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for a fixed
price that is equal to or greater than the reasonably predictable fair market
value of the goods at the time the option is to be performed.
1 With respect to clause (a), the consideration paid by a borrower will be substantially
equal to the fair market value of the money at the time the loan agreement is entered into;
any other pricing would make a lender non-competitive in the marketplace.
A borrower will assume the risk of any loss of money, and will pay any taxes, insurance,
filing, recording or registration fees, or other costs with respect to the loan, as itemized in
clause (b).
Although a loan agreement will not mention "ownership" of the money, it may be
subject to extension or renewal, as mentioned in clause (c), and if it is, the pricing will again
be the reasonably predictable fair market value interest rate at the time of renewal, as
suggested by clause (d).
The borrower will never be deemed to have an "option" to become the owner of the
borrowed funds as under clause (e); all amounts paid to the lender in respect of the funds
(with the exception of optional prepayment fees) will be required by the loan agreement. See
U.G.C. § 1-201(37).
' See, eg., Yonadi v. Commissioner, 21 F.3d 1292, 1297 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Control of
property is no doubt an important indicia of ownership."); Sexton v. Graham, 4 N.W. 1090,
1096 (Iowa 1880) ("In case of a general bank deposit it is understood that the bank will use it
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But, in fact, lenders generally do not provide such autonomy to
borrowers. Loans are usually made for specified purposes-to buy a
house, to purchase a car, to finance the purchase of inventory, to
pay off debt, to pay tuition-and the use of proceeds is likely to be
specified in the loan agreement."' Given the restrictions on the use
of the transferred property, perhaps a loan looks more like a lease
than a sale of the money. Although one can have control over
property without ownership, as when the owner of property has
delegated day-to-day management to an agent, general partner, or
professional manager, ownership of property generally carries with
it the unrestricted right to control.
On the other hand, at the point when the money is actually
used for the specified purpose (i.e., paid to the seller of the home,
car, or inventory; to the lender of the earlier debt; or to the
educational institution), it has transferred to a good-faith holder for
value and both lender and borrower must have intended that such
holder take free of any claim of the lender. At least by this time,
title to the money must have transferred from lender to borrower
and from borrower to a third party. But this does not necessarily
mean that the parties intended title to the money to transfer earlier,
when the money is still in the hands of the borrower. Courts have
recognized that a transaction originally structured as a bailment of
money can turn into a loan.20 2 There is no reason a lease of money
could not turn into a sale of money at the moment funds are
applied by the borrower, if that were the intent of the parties.
But is that the intent of the parties? I have already suggested
that, in the context of the most common loan of funds made by the
deposit of money into a general account with a bank, the
in its own way" and therefore the depositors lose title to money immediately upon deposit.);
Bonnett v. Farmers' & Growers' Shipping Ass'n, 181 P. 634, 636 (Kan. 1919) ("where grain is
delivered to a warehouseman under an agreement that he may make such disposal of it as he
sees fit.., it is a contract of sale").
' If a lender does not impose any restrictions on use of proceeds or specifies that the
borrower may use the funds "for any legal purpose" or "for general corporate purposes,"
which is functionally equivalent to imposing no restrictions at all the lender has not retained
autonomy over the funds and could be presumed to have intended to transfer such autonomy
(and with it ownership of the funds) to the borrower. But, as suggested infra, if a lender's
ownership of funds in the hands of a borrower were legally recognized if (and only if) the
lender carefully specified the acceptable uses for such funds, all loan agreements would
include such a provision.
See, e.g., Hargis v. Spencer, 71 S.W.2d 666, 670 (Ky. 1934); Caldwell v. Hall, 60 Miss.
330, 334 (1882).
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unsophisticated understanding of the depositor would likely be that
the money in the bank "belonged" (in the state law property sense)
to the depositor, although the bank would surely know that the
"deposit" was merely a claim by the depositor against the bank (i.e.,
a liability of the bank) and that the bank itself owned the deposited
funds until they are withdrawn.0 3  The intent of the more
sophisticated party to a lending transaction is shaped by its
understanding of the legal precepts governing that transaction.
Given the consistent and long-standing legal treatment of a loan as a
"sale" of money (in the sense of transferring ownership thereof) at
the moment the loan is made, these parties naturally expect that
this will be the consequence of their transaction. The borrowed
cash is immediately recorded as an asset of the borrower, and the
obligation to repay the lender is shown as a matching liability on the
debtor's books. The lender no longer shows the lent funds as its
own asset, but instead shows a promissory note from the borrower
evidencing its obligation to repay the loan as an asset.
However, just because these expectations are shaped by the
legal regime governing them, it makes no sense to justify the legal
regime by the intent of the parties. Nor is it likely, in this "chicken-
or-the-egg" scenario, that the intent of the parties is really driving
the legal characterization. If it were, every lender would simply
insert a provision in its loan agreement stating that all funds lent will
remain the property of the lender. As in the case of the secured sale
disguised as a lease, this so-called "loan" would likely still be deemed
to transfer ownership of the money, without regard to the intention
of the parties.
E. Tracing
The argument is made that ownership must transfer with
possession of money because "money has no earmark" and
therefore one generally cannot trace money into the hands of
another.2°4
" See supra at notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
"0' See, e.g., Wiseman v. Richardson, 118 P.2d 605, 608 (Ran. 1941); Huston v. Exchange
Bank, 376 N.W.2d 624, 627 (Iowa 1985) (quoting Hansen v. Roush, 116 N.W. 1061 (Iowa
1908)); Sutherland v. St. Lawrence County, 91 N.Y.S. 962, 965-966 (N.Y. App. Div. 1905);
Knapp v. Springmeier, 7 Ohio Dec. Rep. 570 (1878); National Indem. Co. v. Spring Branch
State Bank, 348 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tex. 1961); see also Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Long, 318 F.
Supp. 156, 160 (W.D. Pa. 1970) ("It is generally impossible or impractical to discover the
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Of course, this argument is technically incorrect with respect to
paper currency. All bills have a distinct serial number that is
intended to, and does, permit tracing when needed. °" In that
respect, currency is really no different from stock certificates or
registered bonds, other than the quantity available in society. If one
wished, one could trace a bill from printing to destruction.
Those who raise the specter of lack of earmark are not arguing
that money cannot be traced, but that the burden of doing so in a
society with so much money in circulation is not tolerable.
Therefore, we should not only not require such tracing, but should
positively preclude it.
Putting aside the technical feasibility of tracing, and
recognizing that most loans are made not by a lender passing a
suitcase of bills to a borrower, but by crediting the borrower's
account with the loaned amount which has no identifying marks,
the difficulties inherent in tracing money should still not lead
ineluctably to the conclusion that the recipient of a loan becomes
the owner of the funds. Money is not the only fungible property
subject to transfer from one party to another, and, with respect to
other property, the law has developed stratagems for maintaining
source of money, and for this reason one who receives money in good faith for valuable
consideration prevails over the victim."); Stephens v. Board of Educ., 79 N.Y. 183 (1879)
("When the identity of the money is lost, the ability to follow it ceases."). See generally F.A.
MANN. THE LEGAL ASPEcr OF MoNEY 9-10, 11-12 (5th ed. 1992) (describing "earmark"
doctrine and suggesting that it "is today of little practical significance"). Sometimes this
concept is somewhat carelessly expressed as "money is fungible," see, e.g., Estate of Newman v.
Commissioner, 934 F.2d 426, 431 (2d Cir. 1991); Balcor Real Estate Holdings, Inc. v.
Walentas-Phoenix Corp., No. 93C3065, 1996 WL 254286, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 1996);
Williams Management Enters., Inc. v. Buonauro, 489 So.2d 160, 164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986);
State v. Endres, 741 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987), although "fungibility" really deals
not with the ability to trace but instead describes items of property of a kind or quality such
that one may be substituted for another in meeting an obligation, for example, the obligor
has no right to particular items of such property, see, e.g., United States v. BCCI Holdings
(Luxembourg), SA., 941 F. Supp. 180, 185 (D.D.C. 1996); In re Purnel, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 667,
675 (Cal. CL App. 1997). Goods that are not capable of precise tracing will invariably be
fungible, but fungible goods are not necessarily impossible to trace.
m See, e.g., Langella v. United States, No. 95-2322, 1995 WL 732755, at **2 (2d Cir. Dec.
8, 1995) (unpublished); United States v. Simon, No. 94-10372, 1995 WL 306829, at **1 n.1
(9th Cir. April 13, 1995) (unpublished); United States v. Ritchie, 35 F.3d 1477, 1479 (10th
Cir. 1994); United States v. Dudley, 941 F.2d 260, 262 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v.
L'Allier, 838 F.2d 234, 236 n.1 (7th Cir. 1988) (unpublished); United States v. Roach, 321
F.2d 1, 3 (3d Cir. 1963); United States v. Pryor, 652 F. Supp. 1353, 1358 & n.3 (D. Me. 1987),
affd, 960 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992); People v. Jackson, 329 P.2d 329, 331 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1958).
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property rights in the nonpossessor of fungible property through
the doctrine of confusion of goods.
Fungible goods, such as grain, oil, gas, or farm animals, can be
commingled through wrongful or negligent conduct, by mistake or
accident, or by the intent of the owners. When goods are
commingled with the mutual consent of the owners, such that it is
impossible to distinguish the particular goods owned by each, the
general rule is that the owners become tenants in common of the
entire mass in proportion to their respective contributions to that
mass.26 This common law rule with respect to confusion of goods in
the hands of warehousemen is now codified in section 7-207 of the
Uniform Commercial Code.0 7
"* See, e.g., Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. ANRW. Coal Dev. Co., 105 F.3d 417,423 (8th Cir.
1997); Reeves v. Reeves, 92 So. 551 (Ala. 1922); Willard v. Cox, 63 So. 781, 782 (Ala. Ct. App.
1913); Arnold v. Producers' Fruit Co., 61 P. 283, 285 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1900);
Drudge v. Leiter, 49 N.E. 34, 37 (Ind. App. 1898); In re Thompson, 145 N.W. 76, 79-80 (Iowa
1914); Inglebright v. Hammond, 19 Ohio 337, 343-44 (1850); Montgomery v. United States
Nat'l Bank, 349 P.2d 464, 469 (Or. 1960); Ayre v. Hixson, 98 P. 515, 519 (Or. 1908); Manti
City Say. Bank v. Peterson, 86 P. 414, 415-16 (Utah 1906). Cf Intermingled Cotton Cases, 92
U.S. 651, 653 (1875) (stating, with respect to funds realized upon sale of cotton seized from
various Mississippi growers by Northern troops during Civil War, that "[e]ach owner of
property intermingled with other property of the same kind and value, and stored in a
common mass, becomes the owner as tenant in common of an interest in the mass
proportionate to his contribution"). See generally 1 AM.JUR. 2D Accession and Confusion § 14, at
455 (1994) ("When goods of the same kind owned by different persons are, with the mutual
consent of the owners, mixed and intermingled so that the portions or shares of the various
owners are indistinguishable, the owners become tenants in common of the mixture, each
having an interest in common in proportion to his respective share.").
Although this rule developed as a matter of equity, it was also codified for grain
warehouses. Under the common law rule (based on the Roman mutuum), the transfer of a
fungible good like grain to a warehouseman with the expectation that the identical property
would never be redelivered results in a transfer of ownership to the grain warehouseman and
the farmers would be relegated to a claim against the warehouseman for the value of the
grain. See, e.g., Rahilly v. Wilson, 20 F. Cas. 179, 181 (C.C.D. Minn. 1873). Some state
legislatures and courts rejected the common law rule and provided that the deposit of grain
with a warehouseman would be treated as a bailment, despite the fungible nature of the grain.
See, e.g., Zuber v. Minshall, 256 P. 806 (Kan. 1927); Ledyard v. Hibbard, 12 N.W. 637 (Mich.
1882); Hall v. Pillsbury, 44 N.W. 673 (Minn. 1890); National Exch. Bank v. Wilder, 24 N.W.
699, 701 (Minn. 1885);James v. Plank, 26 N.E. 1107, 1109 (Ohio 1891); Bretz v. Diehle, 11 A.
893 (Penn. 1888). See generaUyJ.C. Knowlton, The American Mutuum, 1 MICH. LJ. 341 (1893);
RAUSHENBUSH, supra note 85, at 237-44; Comment, On the Title to Grain in Public Warehouses, 6
AMi. L. REv. 450 (1872).
2r" Under U.C.C. § 7-207(2) (1995), "[flungible goods so commingled are owned in
common by the persons entitled thereto and the warehouseman is severally liable to each
owner for that owner's share." See also, e.g., Preston v. United States, 696 F.2d 528, 535 (7th
Cir. 1982) (applying Wisconsin law); In reWoods Farmers Coop. Elevator Co., 107 B.R. 678,
684 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1989); Farmers Rice Milling Co. v. Hawkins (In re Bearhouse, Inc.), 84
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The same rule is applicable to investment securities held by a
securities intermediary under section 8-503(b) of the Uniform
Commercial Code. Each person holding a property interest with
respect to a financial asset identified on the books of the securities
intermediary (such as a bank or broker who routinely maintains
securities accounts for others) is deemed to have "a pro rata
property interest in all interests in that financial asset held by the
securities intermediary."
2 0
A similar doctrine governs perfected security interests in goods
that are commingled with other goods in which a separate security
interest has been granted. Under section 9-315 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, if the goods in which there are multiple security
interests become so commingled as part of a product or mass that
their separate identity is lost, the security interests "rank equally
according to the ratio that the cost of the goods to which each
interest originally attached bears to the cost of the total product or
mass."29
The confusion of goods doctrine has been used even with
respect to commingled money. In Boaz v. Ferrell,21° a county tax
collector came into possession of both state and county tax
collections. He commingled them in a single account and then
embezzled an amount equal to the taxes due the state while paying
over the rest to the county. The court held that dismissal of an
action by the surety (which was subrogated to the rights of the state)
against the county was improper. Both state and county owned both
the embezzled funds and those transmitted to the county according
to their proportionate share of the original deposit, and the surety
therefore had the right to recover the state's share of the funds paid
to the county.
211
B.R. 552, 564 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1988); In rejamestown Farmers Elevator, Inc., 49 B.R. 661,
663 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985). A warehouseman is given express authorization to commingle
different lots of fungible goods. See U.C.C. § 7-207(l); see also, e.g., Bank of New York v.
Amoco Oil Co., 35 F.3d 643, 655 (2d Cir. 1994); cf Maritime Petroleum Corp. v.Jersey City,
63 A.2d 262, 256-66 (N.J. 1949) (discussing predecessor Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act).
See generally Rogers, Negotiability, supra note 176, at 485-86.
U.C.C. § 8-503(b) (a) (added by 1994 revisions).
Id. § 9-315(2); see also, e.g., Peoples State Bank v. San Juan Packers, Inc. (In re San Juan
Packers, Inc.), 696 F.2d 707, 710-11 (9th Cir. 1983); Traders Nat'l Bank v. Brown, No. 86-283-
II, 1987 WL 12049, at *6-7 (Tenn. Ct. App.July 10, 1987).
2,0 152 S.W. 200 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
"' It is not clear how much the court was relying on the doctrine of confusion of goods
and how much on trust law. The court noted, "in the hands of any depositary the taxes
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Although Boaz is unusual in applying the confusion of goods
rule to money, courts have employed other means to uphold
ownership claims to fungible cash by parties not in possession of it.
Trust law provides many examples of equitable tracing techniques.
When trust funds are deposited with a trustee and that trustee
wrongfully commingles the funds with his own, thereby creating an
indistinguishable mass, the inability to distinguish the trust funds
from the others should arguably lead to the conclusion that there is
no longer an identifiable trust res, and the beneficiary of the trust
should be relegated to a personal claim against the trustee. But the
law of trusts rejects this conclusion and gives the beneficiary a
constructive trust on the commingled property for an amount equal
to the original value of the trust property.2 If the trust property is
commingled not with the trustee's property, but with that of other
trust beneficiaries, each beneficiary may enforce a constructive trust
and share proportionately in the commingled mass, despite the
inability to identify specific trust property.2 13
Similarly, trust funds transferred out of a trust account and into
the hands of a third party should lose their trust status if money
cannot be traced. Instead, trust law allows the beneficiary to assert a
claim to the funds wherever they may be found as long as the funds
may be specifically traced into the hands of the holder and are not
in the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value. 4 If trust funds are
constituted joint or trust funds, which, having become confused without fault of the cestuis que
trust or real owners would be duly apportioned between such owners by courts of equity." Id.
at 202 (emphasis supplied). The cases cited in support of this principle are a mixture of trust
cases and cases involving confusion of goods. See id,
"2 See, e.g., In reDameron, 155 F.3d 718, 724 (4th Cir. 1998); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins.
Co. v. Universal Ins. Co., 838 F.2d 612, 619 (1st Cir. 1988); Karageris v. Karageris, 302 P.2d
850, 852-53 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956); In re Ford v. Bank of Hartford, 63 S.W. 2d 967, 969-70
(Ky. 1933); Bennett v. Glacier Gen. Assurance Co., 857 P.2d 683, 685 (Mont. 1993). See
generally RESrATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 209 (1937); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2
cmt. h (1959).
211 See, e.g., Goldberg v. New Jersey Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection, 932 F.2d 273,
281 (3d Cir. 1991); County of Oakland v. Vista Disposal, Inc., 900 F. Supp. 879, 891-92 (E.D.
Mich. 1995); In reEstate of Reece, 470 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sur. Ct. 1983); cf In re Columbia Gas Sys.
Inc., 997 F.2d 1039, 1061 (3d Cir. 1993); In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 486 F.2d 519, 524-25
(3d Cir. 1973) (trust funds commingled both with other trust funds and general funds of
trustee). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 202 cmt n (1959); RESTATEMENT
OF RESTruTION § 213 (1937).
"' See, e.g., United States v. NBD Bank, NA, 922 F. Supp. 1235, 1244-45 (E.D. Mich.
1996); Haiti v. Crown Charters, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 839, 843 (S.D. Fla. 1987); Alioto v. United
States, 593 F. Supp. 1402, 1410-12 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Andrew v. State Bank of New Hampton,
217 N.W. 250, 253 (Iowa 1928); Hill v. Flemming, 107 S.W. 764, 766 (Ky. 1908); Lane County
2000] 323
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commingled with the trustee's own funds and disbursements are
then made from the account that cannot be traced or recovered,
under the lowest intermediate balance rule (LIBR) the
disbursements are deemed to have come from nontrust property
until such property is entirely depleted before the trustee will be
deemed to have transferred any trust property.21 As a result, the
beneficiary may assert a claim to the money remaining in the
commingled account after any disbursements (up to the amount of
the trust funds) but has no claim to any subsequent deposits of
nontrust funds.
216
Statutes may also provide mechanisms for tracing the funds in
which a nonpossessor has property rights even into a commingled
mass of funds. The rules on proceeds under the Uniform
Commercial Code were, in part, designed for that purpose. A
secured creditor with a security interest in cash proceeds of other
collateral does not lose its security interest merely because the
debtor deposits that cash in a bank account where it is commingled
with cash not subject to the security interest. Indeed, so long as the
cash proceeds are "identifiable," the security interest continues in
the cash proceeds indefinitely.217 Because the Uniform Commercial
Code does not provide a means of identifying cash proceeds, courts
have applied the equitable tracing rules discussed above to conclude
Escrow Serv., Inc. v. Smith, 560 P.2d 608, 615 (Or. 1977) (en banc). See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 284, 288-89 (1959).
21 See, e.g., Dameron, 155 F.3d at 724; Columbia, 997 F.2d at 1061; Connecticut Gen. Life, 838
F.2d at 619; NBD Bank, 922 F. Supp. at 1243-44; Kepler v. Woods (In re Larson), 206 B.R. 945,
947 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1997); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 142 B.R. 633, 637
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); Bennett v. Glacier Gen. Assur. Co., 857 P.2d 683, 686 (Mont. 1993). See
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 202 cmt. j (1959); RESTATEMENT OF
RESTITUION § 212 cmt a (1937).
"6 If a subsequent deposit were made with the intent to make restitution for the
depleted trust funds, the beneficiary may claim the deposit as well. See, e.g., Columbia, 997 F.2d
at 1067 n.1 (Nygaard, J., concurring and dissenting); Kupetz v. United States (In re California
Trade Technical Schs., Inc.), 923 F.2d 641, 646-47 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1991); Alioto, 593 F. Supp. at
1411 (N.D. Cal. 1984). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 202 cmt. m (1959);
RESTATEMENT OF REsTIUTON § 212 cmt. c (1937).
..7 U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1995) provides, in part, "[e]xcept where this Article otherwise
provides, a security interest.., continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections
received by the debtor." The concept of 'identifiable' proceeds also appears in U.C.C. § 9-114
(dealing with priority between a consignor and a secured creditor of the consignee) and in
U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (covering conflicting security interests in inventory).
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that cash proceeds are identifiable to the extent that they remain in
the commingled account under LIBR.2 s
If bankruptcy occurs, the Uniform Commercial Code provides
a special tracing rule under which a secured creditor is deemed to
have a perfected security interest even in commingled deposit
accounts of the debtor into which cash proceeds have been placed,
but this is limited to the amount of cash proceeds received by the
debtor within ten days prior to the bankruptcy case, with certain
deductions."9
... See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Bank One, NA, 85 F.3d 131, 138-39 (4th Cir. 1996); Harley-
Davidson Motor Co. v. Bank of New England-Old Colony, NA., 897 F.2d 611, 620 (1st Cir.
1990); Security State Bank v. Firstar Bank Milwaukee, NA, 965 F. Supp. 1237, 1244-46 (N.D.
Iowa 1997); In re Intermountain Porta Storage, Inc., 74 B.R. 1011, 1016 (D. Colo. 1987);
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank, 358 F. Supp. 317, 325-27 (E.D. Mo. 1973);
Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Millard Aviation, Inc. (In re Turner), 13 B.R. 15, 22 (Bankr. D. Neb.
1981); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 37, 44-45 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993); C. 0. Funk & Sons, Inc. v. Sullivan Equip., Inc., 431 N.E.2d 370, 372 (Ill. 1982); C & H
Farm Serv. Co. v. Farmers Sav. Bank, 449 N.W.2d 866, 877 (Iowa 1989); Bombardier Capital,
Inc. v. Key Bank, 639 A.2d 1065, 1067 (Me. 1994); Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Flowers Mobile
Homes Sales, Inc., 217 S.E.2d 108, 111 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975); General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Norstar Bank, NA, 532 N.Y.S.2d 685, 687 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988). See generally Richard
L. Barnes, Tracing Commingled Proceeds: The Metamorphosis of Equity Principles into U.C. C. Doctrine,
51 U. Prrr. L. REv. 281 (1990); William H. Henning, Article Nine's Treatment of Commingled Cash
Proceeds in Non-Insolvency Cases, 35 ARK. L. REV. 191 (1981); Dale A. Oesterle, Deficiencies of the
Rest itutionary Right to Trace Misappropriated Property in Equity and in U.C.C. § 9-306, 68 CORNELL
L. REV. 172 (1983); Debora L. Threedy, Commingled Cash Proceeds and the Limits of Identity: The
Misinterpretation of U.C.C. Section 9-306,23 U.C.C. L.J. 352 (1991).
"' U.C.C. § 9-306(4) (d) gives the secured creditor a perfected security interest "in all
cash and deposit accounts of the debtor in which proceeds have been commingled with other
funds, but... limited to an amount not greater than the amount of any cash proceeds
received by the debtor within ten days before the institution of the insolvency proceedings less
the sum of (I) the payments to the secured party on account of cash proceeds received by the
debtor during such period and (II) the cash proceeds received by the debtor during such
period to which the secured party is entitled under paragraphs (a) through (c) of this
subsection (4)." See also, e.g., UnitedJersey Bank/Central, NA v. Collated Products Corp. (In
re Collated Products Corp.), 121 B.R. 195, 205-06 (D. Del. 1990), affd, 937 F.2d 596 (3d Cir.
1991) (unpublished); First Nat'l Bank v. Martin, 48 B.R. 317, 320-21 (N.D. Tex. 1985); In re
Litamar, Inc., 157 B.R. 828, 832 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993); In re Mark Twain Marine Indus.,
115 B.R. 948, 952-54 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990); Charter First Mortgage, Inc. v. Oregon Bank (In
re Charter First Mortgage, Inc.), 56 B.R. 838, 848-51 (Bankr. D. Or. 1985); In re Datair Sys.
Corp., 42 B.R. 241, 245 (Bankr. N.D ll. 1984); Campbell v. SBA (In rejameson's Foods, Inc.),
35 B.R. 433,437 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1983).
The drafters of the revised version of Article 9 intentionally omitted the substance of
U.C.C. § 9-306(4). See U.C.C. § 9-315 cmt. 8 (1998). For critiques of U.C.C. § 9-306(4), see
Kristen D. Balloun, Comment, Right of Secured Party to Recover Proceeds Commingled in Debtor's
Bank Account, 28 KAN. L. REV. 325 (1980); David G. Carlson, Commingled Bank Accounts in
Bankruptcy, 28 U.C.C. LJ. 238 (1996); Peter Dillon & Alvin C. Harrell, Lonely and
Misunderstood. The Saga of U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d)(ii), 60 OKLA. Bj. 1343 (1989); Gerald T. Dunne,
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The secured creditor's priority with respect to nonmonetary
assets may also be dependent on its ability to trace money to the
acquisition of those assets. A security interest constitutes a
"purchase money security interest," entitled to the priority granted
by section 9-312(3) and (4) of the UCC," ° only if the secured
creditor "gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the
use of collateral if such value is in fact so used."22' The definition
requires tracing the proceeds of the loan directly to the acquisition
of the collateral.222
Tracing may be an issue in bankruptcy for parties other than
secured creditors. For example, a seller who has a statutory right of
reclamation 22' does not lose that right merely because the goods it
sold are fungible and are commingled with similar goods in the
hands of the debtor. All that is required of a seller under these
circumstances is that the seller trace the goods from its own
possession into an identifiable mass in the hands of the debtor and
show that the mass contains goods of like kind. 4
Commingled Proceeds-Clarification, Please, 104 BANKING LJ. 3 (1987); Carl F. Gillombardo, Jr.,
The Treatment of Uniform Commercial Code Proceeds in Bankruptcy: A Proposed Redraft of Section 9-
306, 38 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1969); Robert H. Skilton, The Secured Party's Rights in a Debtor's Bank
Account under Section 9-306(4)(d) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1978 S. ILL. U. Lj. 60.
20 U.C.C. § 9-312(3) affords priority to a perfected purchase money security interest in
inventory over a prior perfected security interest in inventory if certain conditions are met.
Purchase money security interests in all other types of collateral are given priority over
conflicting security interests in the same collateral "if the purchase money security interest is
perfected at the time the debtor receives possession of the collateral or within ten days
thereafter." Id. § 9-312(4).
' Id. § 9-107(b).
See, e.g., Matthews v. Transamerica Fin. Servs. (In re Matthews), 724 F.2d 798, 800 (9th
Cir. 1984); Township of Stambaugh v. Ah-Ne-Pee Dimensional Hardwood, Inc., 841 F. Supp.
803, 808 (W.D. Mich. 1993); United States v. Ballard, 645 F. Supp. 788, 791 (D. Mont. 1986);
ITr Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 528 N.E.2d 1149, 1154 (Ind. Ct. App.
1988); Northwestern Nat'l Bank Southwest v. Lectro Sys., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 678, 680 (Minn.
1977); North Platte State Bank v. Production Credit Ass'n, 200 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Neb. 1972).
Under U.C.C. § 2-702(2), a seller of goods on credit may reclaim the goods "upon
demand made within ten days after the receipt" if the seller discovers that the buyer has
received the goods while insolvent. The ten day limitation does not apply where the seller has
received a written misrepresentation as to the buyer's solvency within three months prior to
delivery of the goods.
This state statutory reclamation right is modified in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C.
§ 546(c) to require a written demand before 10 days after the buyer's receipt of the goods (or
20 days if the bankruptcy filing has intervened), and to permit the court to deny reclamation
if the court grants the seller a priority administrative expense claim or a security interest to
secure its claim for payment.
2"4 See, e.g., Conoco, Inc. v. Braniff, Inc. (In re Braniff, Inc.), 113 B.R. 745, 753-54 (Bankr.
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A debtor in bankruptcy may also have the need to trace. In the
same way that a secured creditor may have to trace loan proceeds to
establish its entitlement to a purchase money security interest,2 5 the
debtor may have to trace the same proceeds to establish that the
security interest held by that creditor is subject to avoidance under
§ 522(f) (1) (B) of the Code.226 Certain exemptions, both those
provided by the Code17 and those provided under state law,228
exempt not only particular categories of payments but also other
property "traceable" to such payments. Even when the statutory
exemption makes no reference to tracing, some exemptions have
been interpreted to include amounts in a commingled bank
account to the extent that the balance can be traced to exempt
funds. 9 In these cases, the debtor may trace the exempt cash,
despite its lack of "earmark," to claim the exemption.23 9
M.D. Fla. 1990); In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 74 B.R. 656, 660-61 (Bankr. W.D.
Penn. 1987); Eight)-Eight Oil Co. v. Charter Crude Oil Co. (In re Charter Co.), 54 B.R 91, 93
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985).
2 See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1) (B) (allowing the debtor to avoid the fixing of a lien to the
extent that it impairs an exemption if the lien is "a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money
security interest" in specified collateral).
' Under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (11), a debtor may exempt his "right to receive, or property
that is traceable to" certain compensatory payments, including some payments for wrongful
death of a person of whom the debtor was a dependent, payments for loss of future earnings
of the debtor or a person of whom the debtor was a dependent, certain personal bodily injury
payments, and certain payments under a life insurance contract insuring the life of a person
of whom the debtor was a dependent. Other exemptions provided by the Code do not
include a concept of proceeds. See also, eg., Makoroffv. Panza (In re Panza), 219 B.R. 95, 97
(Bankr. W.D. Penn. 1998) (exemption for debtor's right to receive disability benefits in 11
U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(C) did not include funds already received and deposited in a savings
account). But see In re Frazier, 116 B.R. 675, 678 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1990) (finding funds in
commingled bank account exempt to the extent traceable to disability benefits exempt under
II U.S.C. § 522(d) (10)).
... See, e.g., CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 703.140(b) (11) (West Supp. 2000); CAL. Civ. PROC.
CODE § 1801(k) (West Supp. 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-54-102(1)(q) (West 1997);
GA. CODEANN. § 44-13-100(a) (11) (Harrison 1998); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-1001(h)
(West Supp. 1999); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4422(14) (West Supp. 1999); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 550.37(20) (West Supp. 2000); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513.430(11) (West Supp. 2000); N.Y.
DEBT. & ClRED. LAW § 282(3) (McKinney 1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-03.1(4) (Supp.
1999); OR. REv. STAT. § 23.160() (j) (Supp. 1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-41-30(11) (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-111(2) (Supp. 1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 2740(19) (Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 34-29(d)(1) (Michie 1996); W.VA. CODE § 38-10-
4(k) (Supp. 1999); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 15.18(3)(i) (2) (West Supp. 1999).
223 See, e.g., Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413, 416-17 (1973); Porter v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 370 U.S. 159, 162 (1962); In re Benedict, 88 B.R. 390,393 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1988); Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 521 P.2d 441, 450 (Cal. 1974); Matthews v. Lewis, 617
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Statutory tracing rules exist outside the context of secured
transactions and bankruptcy. Statutes providing for forfeiture of
proceeds from illegal activity often require the government to show
that the seized property can be traced to the wrongful conduct.23" '
Conviction under certain substantive criminal statutes may also
require tracing funds to prove an element of the offense." 2 Yet the
fact that money has been commingled in a bank account with other
funds unrelated to the criminal activity has not prevented tracing
for purposes of these statutes using the equitable tracing techniques
already discussed.23s
S.W.2d 43, 46 (Ky. 1981); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Falcone, 327 A.2d 699, 701
(NJ. Super. 1974); Colton v. Martell, 359 N.Y.S.2d 632, 633 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1974); First Nat'l
Master Charge v. Gilardi, 324 N.E.2d 576, 578 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975). But see In re Szuets, 22
B.R. 805, 807 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982); Bernardini v. Central Nat'l Bank, 290 S.E.2d 863, 864-
65 (Va. 1982).
See, e.g., In re Hickox, 215 B.R1 257, 260 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997); In reMoore, 214 B.R.
628, 631-32 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1997); In re Green, 178 B.R. 533, 536-37 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995);
In reBenedict, 88 B.R. 390, 393 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988).
.. See e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981 (a) (1) (A) (1994) (making property subject to civil forfeiture if
it is "involved in a transaction or attempted transaction in violation of [money laundering
statutes], or [is] traceable to such property"); id. § 982(a) (1) (providing that any person guilty
of money laundering offense shall "forfeit... any property, real or personal, involved in such
offense, or any property traceable to such property"); id. § 1467(a) (2) (requiring any person
convicted of an offense involving obscene material to forfeit "any property, real or personal,
constituting or traceable to gross profits or other proceeds obtained from such offense"); 21
U.S.C. § 853(a) (1) (1994) (providing that any person convicted of drug offense punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year "shall forfeit.., any property constituting, or derived
from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such
violation"); id. § 881(a) (6) (Supp. IV 1998) ("All moneys... furnished or intended to be
furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance or listed chemical... ,all
proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys ... used or intended to be used to
facilitate any violation" shall be subject to civil forfeiture.).
. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (1994) (makes criminals knowingly "conduct[ing] or
attempt[ing] to conduct.., a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of
specified unlawful activity" with unlawful intent); id. § 1957(a) (makong it a crime to
"knowingly engage[ ] or attempt[ ] to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived
property that is of a value greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful
activity").
2 See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969, 976-77 (4th Cir. 1994) (18 U.S.C. § 957);
United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154, 1159 (2d Cir. 1986) (21 U.S.C.
§ 881 (a) (6)); United States v.Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 840 (7th Cir. 1991) (18 U.S.C. § 1956);
United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 34 F. Supp. 2d 107, 116-17 (D.R.I. 1999) (18
U.S.C. § 981). But see United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1085-87 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding
property purchased with funds from commingled account was not "traceable to" proceeds of
money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 982(a) (1) and could be pursued only under substitute
assets provision of 18 U.S.C. § 982(b) (1)).
To make its task easier when even common law tracing techniques fail to capture the
assets sought by forfeiture, the government has added provisions to several forfeiture statutes
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In all of these circumstances, parties are able-indeed, in some
circumstances, required-to trace funds into a fungible mass in the
possession of another. Therefore, the difficulties of tracing with
respect to this fungible asset cannot alone justify treating borrowed
funds in the hands of the debtor as necessarily being owned by the
debtor rather than the lender who transferred them there.
IV. LOAN As LEASE OF MONEY
Having concluded that the various justifications for
automatically transferring ownership of money with the loan thereof
cannot withstand scrutiny, the next question is whether the
alternative can work. In other words, are there legal rules in place
that would afford lenders equivalent rights to those given other
lessors of personal property that do not undermine the values that
have been proposed as the justification for linking possession of
loaned funds with their ownership?
If a loan of money were treated in the same way as a lease of
other personal property, the first consequence would be that a loan
agreement would be treated as a lease agreement. Even before any
loans are made under the loan agreement, the contractual
arrangement between the lender and the debtor would be
equivalent to that of any lessor and lessee who signed a binding
contractual arrangement with respect to the lease of property prior
to the delivery of actual possession of the res.m
allowing the pursuit of unrelated substituted property having a value equal to the untraceable
"guilty" assets. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 853(p); 18 U.S.C. §§ 982(b)(1) (incorporating 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(p) (Supp. IV 1998)), 984, 1467(n), 1963(m) (1994); see also, e.g., United States v. United
States Currency Deposited in Account No. 1115000763247, 176 F.3d 941, 945-46 (7th Cir.
1999) (18 U.S.C. § 984); United States v. Sokolow, No. Crim. 93-394, 1995 WL 113079, at *2
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 1995), affd, 91 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 1996) (21 U.S.C. § 854(p), as incorporated
in 18 U.S.C. § 982(b) (1)); United States v. All Funds Presently on Deposit, 832 F. Supp. 542,
557-59 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (18 U.S.C. § 984).
' A "lease agreement" under U.C.C. § 2A-103(k) (1995) is "the bargain, with respect to
the lease, of the lessor and the lessee in fact.... " A "lease" means "a transfer of the right to
possession and use of goods for a term in return for consideration." Id. § 2A-103(j). The right
to possession and use of goods "just like the right to borrow money" can transfer before actual
possession is obtained by the lessee. Thus a loan agreement, containing a binding
commitment to deliver funds to the borrower, transfers the right to use the funds even before
any borrowing is made and, by analogy to Article 2A of the U.C.C., could be characterized as a
lease agreement.
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Once a loan was made, title to the loaned funds would remain
in the lender when the money was transferred to the borrower. 3 '
The fact that the borrower would have the right to alienate the
funds should not affect the characterization of the transaction as a
lease; although most leases preclude any sale or other disposition of
the leased property by the lessee, the parties can contractually alter
this understanding. 2 By transferring leased funds to a third
party,27 the borrower would, in essence, be purchasing the funds
from the lender and simultaneously selling them.'s An option to
purchase leased property (and thereafter transfer it to a third party)
at any time during the lease term does not retroactively transform a
lease into a sale.' 9
See, e.g., Alco Capital Resource, Inc. v., Picture It, Inc., No. 94-4127, 1995 WL 501931,
at **4 (10th Cir.July 28, 1995) (unpublished); In reMiller Vein Coal Co., 3 F. Supp. 607, 608
(W.D. Pa. 1933); Van Dorn Retail Management, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 902 P.2d 383,
388 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); Smull v. Delaney, 25 N.Y.S.2d 387, 39S-94 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941);
Modem Handling Equip., Inc. v. Director, 17 N.J. Tax 270, 278 (NJ. Tax Ct. 1998); Kindig v.
Wertz, 176 A. 769, 770 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1935).
See, e.g., Traction Cos. v. Collectors of Internal Revenue, 223 F. 984, 985-86 & n.1 (6th
Cir. 1915); ef. Long v. Hammond, 145 P. 527, 528 (Cal. 1914); Mohawk Drilling Co. v. Wolf,
262 P.2d 892, 893 (Okla. 1953); Klundt v. Bachtold, 188 P. 924, 926 (Wash. 1920) (finding no
lease provision authorizing sale by lessee).
2'7 This transfer could, of course, be made simultaneously with the borrowing. For
example, some loans take the form of deposits of loan proceeds to a "zero balance" account
on which the debtor writes checks; the lender advances funds under the loan agreement in an
amount just sufficient to permit the checks to be honored. In such a structure, the
characterization of the lender/debtor transaction can become an issue in bankruptcy with
respect to the loaned funds themselves only if the lender advances funds by depositing them
into the account, but before the checks are honored the bankruptcy stay intervenes. Of
course, the characterization of the loan agreement as a lease would continue to have serious
implications for bankruptcy purposes. SeeinfraPartV.
m One could analogize such a transfer to a sale of collateral subject to a security interest
with the consent of the secured lender. Under U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1995), "a security interest
continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof unless the
disposition was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise." The
transferee takes free of the security interest only if the secured party authorized the
disposition free and clear of the security interest. See id. § 9-306 cmt. 3; see also PEB
Commentary No. 3 (1990). In the context of a secured transaction, the secured party
generally relinquishes its security interest in the collateral itself in exchange for a security
interest in the proceeds of the disposition, which may be applied to the secured obligation,
remain in the possession of the debtor, or be used to acquire additional collateral. Rather
than exchanging its interest in the loaned funds for an interest in whatever the borrower
acquired with such funds, the lender would be authorizing the disposition of the loaned funds
free of the lender's ownership interest in exchange for a claim against the borrower for the
value thereof.
'" U.C.C. § 1-201(37) has provided in the third paragraph thereof since its amendment
in 1987 that a transaction purporting to be a lease is not in fact a sale "merely because it
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If the loaned funds were maintained in a separate account
before their use by the borrower, the lender's property could be
readily identified at any time. But what if the funds were not kept in
a separate account but instead were commingled with the
borrower's other funds?24° Again, owners of fungible property
intentionally commingled with that of another have long been able
to claim a proportionate share of the commingled mass under the
doctrine of confusion of goods.241 The same principle could allow
the lender of $1 million to a borrower, who then places the funds in
an account with $2 million of its own funds, to claim one-third of
the resulting mass.
Once disbursements are made from the commingled account,
equitable tracing principles would take effect. Using as an example
the commingled account with its $3 million balance, of which $1
million came from the lender and the remaining $2 million from
the borrower's own funds, under LIBR all withdrawals would be
deemed to come from the borrower's own funds (rather than the
lender's funds), as long as the borrower had its own funds in the
account.242 Subsequent deposits to the account of the borrower's
own funds would not increase the lender's interest in the
commingled mass in the absence of evidence that the deposit was
intended to accrue to the benefit of the lender.243 So long as the
balance in the account never dropped below $1 million, the lender
would always own $1 million of the funds in the account. If the
balance dropped below $1 million, that lower balance would
become the "lowest intermediate balance" and the lender's property
interest in the commingled account would drop accordingly,
without regard to subsequent deposits.
provides that *** (c) the lessee has an option... to become the owner of the goods." Even
before its amendment U.C.C. § 1-201(37) specified that "the inclusion of an option to
purchase did not itself make the lease one intended for security." U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1978);
see also, e.g., In re Marhoefer Packing Co., 674 F.2d 1139, 1143-44 (7th Cir. 1982); Ford Motor
Credit Co. v. Sims, 743 P.2d 1012, 1014-15 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987).
20 This commingling problem would be present even if the loan agreement
contemplated deposit of loan proceeds into the borrower's operating account (in which non-
borrowed funds are also deposited) simultaneously with the presentation of checks drawn on
the account by the borrower to pay its obligations. So long as the account includes any
amounts not constituting loan proceeds, it is commingled as a matter of law and tracing
becomes an issue despite the coincidence of the loan amount and the amount of the check.
... See supra notes 206-11 and accompanying text.
21 See supra note 215.
24 Seesupranote 216.
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There is no reason to believe that treating loans as leases would
in any way undermine the concerns that underlie the current
presumption that ownership passes with possession of the loaned
funds. First, as previously suggested, there is historical precedent
for the transfer of possession of funds without a transfer of
ownership pursuant to a depositum, which could be transferred into a
mutuum (loan for consumption) upon use of the funds by the
borrower.2 44 Even if such a characterization did not fit into historical
labels, there is no reason to allow the labels of Roman law to remain
immutable. Mutuum was, after all, a gratuitous loan between family
or friends; it was never intended to govern rights and liabilities in
business transactions in a modem commercial age.
Treating loaned funds in the possession of the borrower as
belonging to the lender would in no way be inconsistent with
recognizing that money is a medium of exchange. As noted supra,
money can be legally transferred without the transfer of ownership
by depositing it in a special account at a bank or by entrusting it to a
bailee.245 Indeed, once it is deposited in the borrower's account, it is
no longer even money but becomes a claim against the bank. 46
When bank credits are increasingly treated as a medium of
exchange in our society, the need to protect money as a medium of
exchange is correspondingly diminished.
Because any third party taking the borrowed funds for value
from the borrower would obtain good titie, free of any claim of the
lender, treating a loan as a lease of money would not undermine
commercial transactions in the leased funds. The recipient of funds
from the borrower would be under no obligation to ascertain
whether the funds originated in a loan or in the borrower's own
operations.247  Money (to the extent that money remains a
meaningful currency in the marketplace) would remain completely
negotiable; commerce would continue to flourish as it now does.
One might argue that commerce could be adversely affected by
the proposed treatment because third parties who previously had a
claim to the borrowed funds equal in priority to that of the lender
would lose that claim entirely, because the funds would belong to
the lender rather than the borrower. As a result, these third parties
" See supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
W See supra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
'17 See supra text accompanying note 169.
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would be unwilling to do business with a borrower. But creditors
have long shown their willingness to deal with debtors who have
prior claims to portions of their property, including claims of
personal property lessors248 and claims of secured parties with
security interests in property and its proceeds.249  Recognizing the
lender's claim to the leased funds would in no way create a problem
of "ostensible ownership" or "secret lien" 25° when third parties are
unable to ascertain whether there is a prior competing claim to
property in the possession of the debtor. All loans are reflected on
the financial statements of the borrower to the same extent as other
leases of property. It would be imprudent of a competing creditor
to extend credit to the borrower without looking at its balance
sheet.2s
If the legal system allowed lenders to maintain their ownership
interest in loaned funds, that would certainly become the intent of
the parties to a loan. Parties' expectations are shaped by the
relevant legal regime; as rules change, so do their intended
objectives. If the parties desired a different legal result, such as a
transfer of ownership of the funds, i.e., a sale of the funds, they
could so stipulate.
Concerns about the fungibility of money would be addressed by
utilization of the accepted equitable tracing principles. Money
commingled in a single account would be deemed to belong to each
owner in proportion to his respective deposit into the mass if no
withdrawals have been made. Otherwise, the loaned money would
2 3 Under U.C.C. § 2A-307(1) (1995), except in the case of certain statutory or common
law liens for materials or services, a secured party with a security interest in leased property
granted by the lessee "takes subject to the lease contract," meaning that such interest is
subordinate to the ownership interest of the lessor.
"' U.C.C. § 9-201 makes a security agreement "effective according to its terms between
the parties, against purchasers of the collateral and against creditors" exceptwhere the U.C.C.
otherwise provides. As a result, as a general matter, a secured creditor has priority with
respect to its collateral to an unsecured creditor. See, e.g, Knox v. Phoenix Leasing Inc., 35
Cal. Rptr. 2d 141, 144 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Bank of Stockton v. Diamond Walnut Growers,
Inc., 244 Cal. Rptr. 744, 749 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. United
Penn Bank, 524 A.2d 958, 960 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); Teton Int'l v. First Nat'l Bank, 718
S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
' See, e.g., United States v. Ocean Elecs. Corp. (In reOcean Elecs. Corp.), 22 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 1270, 1273 (S.D. Cal. 1977); Michaels v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In reMichaels), 156 B.R.
584, 589 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1993); In re Mill Concepts Corp., 123 B.R. 938, 943 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1991); First Sav. Bank v. Barclays Bank, S.A., 618 A.2d 134,138-39 (D.C. 1992).
" Although individual borrowers may not have financial statements, a credit report or
bank reference would serve the same function of giving notice to subsequent creditors.
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be given the benefit of the presumption afforded by LIBR, and only
until the borrower's own funds had been completely depleted from
the commingled mass would the loaned funds be diminished.
There is ample existing precedent for utilization of such equitable
doctrines, and their extension to loaned funds would create no
great change in the structure of the law.
V. LEASED MONEY IN BANKRUPTCY
Even if the common law rule were changed to recognize an
ownership interest in the lender of funds, how would the treatment
of loans in bankruptcy change if borrowers no longer owned the
money they borrowed but instead merely had a leasehold interest in
it? Some changes would be minor, but others would be quite
dramatic for the debtor, for the lending institution, and for the
other creditors.
When the debtor filed for bankruptcy protection, the debtor
would continue to have an interest-the value of which would be
determined by the equitable tracing principles outlined above-in
the proceeds of the loan in its possession (a leasehold interest
rather than an ownership interest). That interest would become
property of the estate pursuant to Code § 541.2 As such, it would
be protected by the automatic stay described in § 362 from the
enforcement of any prepetition judgment, any act to obtain
possession of the proceeds or to exercise control over them, and any
act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against them.253 In
addition, the debtor would be protected by the stay against any
action or proceeding to recover the loan proceeds or to enforce any
other prepetition claim orjudgment with respect to the loan.254
Notwithstanding the inability of the lender to enforce the loan
agreement against the debtor, the trustee would continue to have
the right to enjoy the benefits of the agreement, using the loaned
money in the ordinary course of its business in the same way a
trustee can continue to use any leased property under § 363(c) (1)
of the Code.' 5 However, because the lender would have a legally
2 See supra note 6.
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2), (3), (4) (describing the scope of the stay with respect to
property of the estate).
Seeid.§362(a)(1), (2), (5), (6), (7).
25 See supra note 10.
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protectible property interest in the loaned funds in the hands of the
debtor (which it does not have under current law because title to
the funds vests in the borrower), the loaned funds would constitute
"cash collateral" within the meaning of the Code.ss Therefore, the
trustee could use the funds only if either the lender consented or
the court, after notice and a hearing, authorized the use.257 The
lender could seek to condition the debtor's use of the funds on the
provision of adequate protection of the lender's interest in the
funds in the form of cash payments or other relief.258 Adequate
protection could also be sought in connection with the motion to
lift the stay to permit enforcement of the loan agreement."s
The loan agreement, as a lease of money, would be subject to
the options afforded the trustee in bankruptcy by § 365 of the Code
to assume, assume and assign, or reject any lease.2' °  The trustee
would have until confirmation of a plan to decide on its course of
action in a case under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13,261 but would have to
See 11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (defining cash collateral to include "cash... in which the estate
and an entity other than the estate have an interest).
2' See id. § 363(c)(2).
See id. § 363(e). Illustrative types of adequate protection are itemized in § 361. In this
context, adequate protection becomes more problematic than in the usual case, because use
of the borrowed funds by the debtor decreases the value of the "cash collateral" by an equal
amount. Therefore, the "indubitable equivalent" of the decline in value occasioned by the
use would be property having an equal value to the cash spent. It is unlikely that the debtor
would need to use the borrowed funds if the debtor had its own funds in an equal amount
available to provide adequate protection to the lender. Therefore, the debtor would likely use
the adequate protection hearing as a means of monetizing illiquid unencumbered assets by
providing the lender a security interest in such assets to secure its obligation to return the
leased funds being used.
Of course, the assets used to provide adequate protection would, under the existing
legal structure, be available to satisfy the claims of other creditors on a pari passu basis with
the lender. Therefore, as is true for other lessors, the lender would be given the benefit of
the value of its property as of the filing date, whether in the form of the property itself or
substitute assets, before other creditors would have any claim on property of the debtor.
. See id. § 362(d) (1) (directing the court to grant relief from the stay upon request of a
party in interest and after notice and a hearing "for cause, including the lack of adequate
protection of an interest in property of such party in interest). A lender would be unlikely to
obtain relief from the stay under § 362(d) (2). Although the debtor would have no equity in
the loaned funds, the trustee would likely argue that the funds were "necessary to an effective
reorganization." Id
See supra text accompanying notes 21-46. Section 365 (c) (2) implicitly recognizes that
a loan agreement constitutes an executory contract or unexpired lease by explicitly excluding
assumption or assignment of such a contract. The theoretical treatment of loans that I am
positing would require deletion of this prohibition to treat leases of money consistently with
leases of other personal property.
-' See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d) (2) (applicable to leases of personal property).
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decide within sixty days after the order for relief in a chapter 7 case
in order to assume or assume and assign. 62 In a chapter 11 case,
unless the loan were to a consumer primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes, the trustee would be required to perform all
obligations of the debtor under the loan agreement arising from or
after sixty days after the order for relief until the loan agreement
was assumed or rejected, unless the court ordered otherwise. 63
If the trustee wished to assume the loan agreement, the trustee
would have to cure (or provide adequate assurance of prompt cure
of) all defaults, provide compensation for actual pecuniary losses,
and provide adequate assurance of future performance."' For a
loan agreement, this would probably entail an immediate payment
of past-due interest and principal, as well as potential liens securing
future performance. All obligations under the loan agreement
would become administrative expense claims, as do claims under all
other assumed leases.2
If the trustee wished to assign the loan agreement (perhaps
because the agreed interest rate was lower than the current market
rate for comparable loans), it could do so without regard to any
contractual restriction on assignment in the loan agreement, so
long as it met the requirements for assumption of the loan
agreement and in addition provided adequate assurance of future
performance by the assignee. 6
Alternatively, it could reject the loan agreement (or allow it to
be rejected as a matter of law),267 in which event the lender would
have a claim for "breach" of the agreement deemed to have arisen
prepetition." Although the Code does not so state, it is assumed
that rejection of a lease of personal property by the debtor/lessee
requires the immediate surrender of the leased property.6 9
Therefore, upon rejection of the loan agreement, the debtor would
26 See id. § 365(d)(1); see also supra text accompanying notes 15-18.
... See 1 U.S.C. § 365(d) (10).
'" See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
Seell U.S.C. § 507(a) (1); supra note 28.
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(f); see also supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
.. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1) (providing in a chapter 7 case that any unexpired lease of
personal property of the debtor that is not assumed or rejected by the trustee within 60 days
after the order for relief (or within such additional time as the court allows) is deemed
rejected).
' See id. § 365(g) (1); see also supra text accompanying note 34.
" See supra text accompanying notes 42-46.
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be obliged to return the leased funds in its possession or their
equivalent from a fungible mass as determined by equitable tracing
techniques. To the extent that the funds were no longer in the
possession of the borrower because they had been transferred to a
third party and the lender had therefore relinquished ownership of
the funds in exchange for a claim against the borrower (i.e., the
lender had "sold" the funds to the borrower on credit), the lender
would have an ordinary unsecured prepetition claim against the
debtor subject to discharge,just as a lender now does.
VI. A BETTER SYSTEM, ORJUST A DIFFERENT ONE?
To this point I have examined the differing treatments of leases
of money and leases of other personal property under the Code,
identified the source of those differences in the common law of
property, discussed the possible justifications for the common law
distinction, and suggested that none of these justifications withstand
careful scrutiny. I have also described how loans would be treated
under the Code were they afforded treatment consistent with that of
other leases of personal property. But the question remains
whether such consistency-which would certainly be different in
many respects from our current treatment of loans in
bankruptcy-would contribute to a better bankruptcy system in any
way, or simply a different one.
When I refer to a "better bankruptcy system" I am of course
using a value-laden term. Better for whom? Better when judged by
what standards? Although one can identify many values underlying
our bankruptcy system, 27 the most frequently mentioned are the
twin pillars of equality of treatment of similarly-situated creditors
2 71
' Elizabeth Warren identifies four principal goals in her essay Bankruptcy Poliymakingin
an Imperfect World, those being "(1) to enhance the value of the failing debtor; (2) to distribute
value according to multiple normative principles; (3) to internalize the costs of the business
failure to the parties dealing with the debtor; and (4) to create reliance on private
monitoring." 92 MICH. L. REv. 336, 344 (1993).
2" See, e.g., Sigmon v. Royal Cake Co. (In re Cybermech, Inc.), 13 F.3d 818, 823 (4th Cir.
1994); Danning v. Bozek (In re Bullion Reserve), 836 F.2d 1214, 1217 (9th Cir. 1988); S.I.
Acquisition, Inc. v. Eastway Delivery Serv., Inc. (In re S.I. Acquisition, Inc.), 817 F.2d 1142,
1153 (5th Cir. 1987); St. Francis Physician Network, Inc. v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. (In re
St. Francis Physician Network, Inc.), 213 B.R. 710, 714 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997); Christians v.
Gage Travel, Inc. (In re Hytan), Bankr. No. 4-95-1093, 1995 WL 684881, at *3 (Bankr. D.
Minn. Nov. 15, 1995); Christians v. American Express Travel Related Servs. (In re Djerf), 188
B.R. 586, 588 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995); In re Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg,
Manley, Myerson & Casey, 160 B.R. 882, 894 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993); In re Diplomat Elecs.
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and rehabilitation of debtors.272 Amending the Code to treat the
lender of funds to the debtor as the owner of those funds, with all
the rights given any other lessee with respect to the loan agreement
(lease) and the underlying leased funds, could be justified only if
the change promoted (or at least did not undermine) these values.
I believe it would.
I have already established that lenders of money do not enjoy
equality of treatment with lessors of other personal property. This
violates the equality principle only if such lenders and lessors are
similarly situated. The similarities between a loan and a lease of
other personal property far outweigh the differences. In each case,
an owner of an asset universally considered personal property as a
matter of state law273 agrees to transfer possession or use17 of that
asset for a specified term. During that term, the borrower must
generally make periodic payments for use of the borrowed asset
(characterized as "rent" in the usual lease, and "interest" in the loan
agreement) .27' At the end of the lease term, the borrower must
return the leased property or its equivalent. In all these respects,
leases of money and leases of other personal property share basic
characteristics.
Of course, the underlying property subject to lease is
different-money versus some other type of property. But various
Corp., 82 B.R. 688, 691 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).
" See, e.g., NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984); Brown v. Shell Canada
Ltd. (In re Tennessee Chemical Co.), 112 F.3d 234, 238 (6th Cir. 1997); In re Bonner Mall
Partnership (Bonner Mall Partnership v. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co.), 2 F.3d 899, 916 (9th
Cir. 1993); Robinson v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 918 F.2d 579, 589 (6th Cir. 1990); Saravia
v. 1736 18th Street, N.W., L.P., 844 F.2d 823, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Exquisito Servs., Inc. v.
United States (In re Exquisito Servs., Inc.), 823 F.2d 151, 153 (5th Cir. 1987); St. Francis
Physician, 213 B.R. at 714.
27 Seesupranote 75.
.. To the extent that loans are generally made by book entry of credits rather than the
delivery of currency, a loan cannot be seen as delivery of physical possession of anything.
Rather, pursuant to the loan agreement the lender agrees to provide the borrower with use of
credit, an intangible asset. Many statutes defining 'money' as personal property differ over
whether it should be characterized as a tangible or intangible asset. Compare CAL. CiV. PROC.
CODE § 481.225 (West Supp. 2000), and FLA. STAT. ANN. § 198.01 (10) (West 1999) (tangible),
with GA. CODEANN. § 48-1-2(13) (1998), andNEB. REV. STAT. § 77-105 (1996) (intangible).
2 The functional equivalence of interest to rent has been noted in other contexts. See,
e.g., MichaelJ. McIntyre, An Inquiry into the Special Status of Interest Payments, 1981 DUKE LJ. 765
(characterizing interest as a type of rental payment "an amount paid for the use of borrowed
money" and proposing that the use of loan proceeds, established by tracing, should
determine the tax treatment of interest expense in the same way the character of leased
property determines the tax treatment of rental expenses in respect thereof).
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leases have different underlying property. A lease of livestock is
different from a lease of household furniture. A lease of an
automobile is different from a lease of construction equipment.
Those differences are factual, but not legal. Money is certainly
more akin to other personal property than personal property is to
real property, yet the Code treats leases of real and personal
property far more similarly than it does loans and other leases of
personal property.
Nevertheless, there are legal distinctions. Money is fungible,
but so are other types of leased property, like oil, gas, grain, and
276
securities. 6 Money is a medium of exchange, but so is other leased
property, like coins in a coin collection or foreign currency.277 The
parties to a lease of money contemplate that the actual funds loaned
will not be the ones returned, but this is also true of some leases of
depreciating equipment, under which the parties establish a
mechanism for replacing worn out, missing, or destroyed leased
property with replacements having the same characteristics and
value.27 8 The parties to a loan agreement do not label their
transaction as a lease. But true leases need not be labeled as such by
the parties;279 the substance of the transaction determines its legal
characterization rather than terminology.280
2," See supra Part III.E.
r" See supra Part III.B.
For example, leases of airframes and engines customarily permit a lessee/airline to
replace the original lease engines with substitutes of comparable value, utility and condition.
This provision allows the lessee/airline to use the leased engines on any airframe in its fleet
without having to replace the leased engine on the leased airframe after every maintenance
procedure. It also permits the lease to continue without change if a leased engine is
destroyed in a crash, lost or damaged beyond repair, or reaches the end of its useful life. The
replacement engine is conveyed by the lessee to the lessor an thereupon becomes subject to
the terms of the lease as if it were an original leased engine. This mechanism does not compel
recharacterization of the original transaction between the parties as a sale of the engine. See,
e.g., Sunstream Jet Express, Inc. v. International Air Serv. Co., 734 F.2d 1258, 1264 (7th Cir.
1984); First Sec. Bank, NA. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 136, 144 (D. Mass.
1999); Air Transport Int'l L.L.C. v. Aerolease Fin. Group, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 118, 120 (D.
Conn. 1998); In rePan Am Corp. 124 B.R. 960, 972-973 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 130 B.R 409
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); F/S Airlease II, Inc. v. Air Florida, Inc. (In reAir Florida, Inc.), 44 B.R. 798,
804 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984).
r" See, e.g., In re Wilcox, 201 B.R. 334, 336-37 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996); Zimmerman v.
Industrial Comm'n, 127 P. 878,881-82 (Colo. 1942).
2" See, e.g., Liona Corp. v. PCH Assocs. (In re PCH Assocs.), 804 F.2d 193, 197 (2d Cir.
1986); Marriott Family Restaurants, Inc. v. Lunan Family Restaurants (In re Lunan Family
Restaurants), 194 B.R. 429,450 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996); Hotel Syracuse, Inc. v. City of Syracuse
Indus. Dev. Agency (In re Hotel Syracuse, Inc.), 155 B.R. 824, 838 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1993); In
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But, it may be argued, the parties to a loan intend that the
borrower own the funds,"' and treating a loan as a sale is historically
justified.282 But neither the Code nor state law truly treats a loan of
money as a sale; a lender is not entitled to take a purchase money
security interest in the "sold" funds,83 nor may a lender seek to
reclaim the funds pursuant to § 546(c) of the Code and U.C.C. § 2-
702 (2).28 In essence, the current bankruptcy system recharacterizes
a loan of money as a purchase of those funds for a purchase price
equal to the principal amount of the loan, but does not give the
lender the rights of other sellers of personal property to the debtor,
and allows the debtor to satisfy the lender's claim for the "purchase
price" with the "little tiny Bankruptcy Dollars"'8s typically used to pay
all claims upon a bankruptcy distribution.
A loan is thus sui generis, treated in a fashion unique among
transactions in property under the Code. If there are competing
bankruptcy values underlying this disparate treatment, they are
difficult to discern. Certainly one cannot argue that the service
provided by lenders is less valuable to society at large and to debtors
in particular than the lease of other personal property. Indeed,
access to money is generally far more valuable to a debtor than the
reMCorp Fin., Inc., 122 B.R. 49, 52-53 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1990).
2 See supra Part III.D.
See supra Part lI.A
A "purchase money security interest" includes a security interest "taken or retained by
the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price." U.C.C. § 9-107(a). This is
contrasted with the security interest taken by "a person who by making advances or incurring
an obligation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral,"
that is, a lender providing money to acquire non-monetary collateral. See id. § 9-107(b).
See 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (making the trustee's avoiding powers subject to the statutory
or common law rights of a "seller of goods" to reclaim such goods if the debtor received the
goods while insolvent, subject to certain limitations); U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (serving as one of the
statutory rights of reclamation to which § 546(c) refers and also providing rights to a seller of
"goods on credit."). As discussed, supra note 160, "money" is included in the definition of
"goods" for purposes of Article 2 of the U.C.C. only when it is a "commodity" rather than the
"medium of exchange."
'0 The term was used by Professor Jay Lawrence Westbrook in his article A Functional
Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REv. 227, 253 (1989). See, e.g., Texaco Inc. v.
Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 136 B.R. 658, 663 (M.D. La. 1992); Simione v.
Nationsbank, NA (In re Simione), 229 B.R. 329, 333 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1999); In re Riodizio,
Inc., 204 B.R. 417, 425 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine,
Underberg, Manley, Myerson & Casey, 160 B.R. 882, 893 & n.25 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993); In re
Child World, Inc., 147 B.R. 847, 850 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); Cohen v. Drexel Burnham
Lambert Group, Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.), 138 B.R. 687, 705 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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ability to lease goods, because goods can be acquired with the
borrowed funds while generally lenders will not provide funds
against the debtor's leasehold interest in goods.
As an economic matter, lenders of money are able to adjust to
their treatment by pricing the risk of bankruptcy into their
transactions. But lenders of money are not unique in this respect; a
lessor of other personal property could do the same if bankruptcy
precluded a lessor from recovering leased property in the possession
of a debtor. And if the Code recognized the property rights of a
lessor of money and provided such a lessor the same treatment as
that given other lessors of personal property, perhaps the cost of
funds to all borrowers would decrease, facilitating commerce and
promoting economic growth.
286
All this suggests that lenders of money and lessors of other
personal property are indeed similarly situated, and treating them
consistently under the Code would promote the goal of treating
such creditors equally. But would such treatment undermine the
goal of promoting rehabilitation of debtors? I would argue that it
does not do so in an impermissible fashion.
First, if the debtor has already borrowed the full amount
available under a loan agreement and has deployed the funds in its
business by transferring them to a third party for value, the lender's
position would be no different from that it holds under the Code.
The lender would have a claim for the value of the leased funds,
which would be satisfied as all claims are through distributions from
the estate. That position is exactly the same as a lessor of personal
property if the property subject to the lease has been sold by the
debtor and is not traceable, or has been destroyed or rendered
useless. The debtor has no further benefit from the loan or lease,
and the needs of the debtor for rehabilitation are not implicated.
Indeed, the debtor will reject the lease of personal property and
would reject the loan agreement were it necessary to do so.287
'" Bank losses from bankruptcy filings rose from $1.75 billion to $11.32 billion from
1989 to 1996. SeeDarrell Dunham, Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction, 67 UMKC L. REV. 229,229 n.1
(1998) (quoting Sougata Mukherjee, Goingfor Broke: The Bankruptcy Game, Am. Bus. J. 34, 35
(1997)).
Section 365(c)(2) of the Code precludes the trustee from assuming or assigning any
.contract to make a loan, or extend other debt financing or financial accommodations, to or
for the benefit of the debtor." Although § 365(e)(1) generally makes unenforceable any
provisions in executory contracts or leases allowing termination or modification of such
contracts or leases after commencement of a case based solely on the insolvency or financial
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But what if borrowed funds remain in the debtor's possession,
or the loan agreement provides for future advances after the date of
the bankruptcy filing, or both circumstances exist? Currently a
debtor may not draw down further funds under the loan
agreement,2s8 but is able to retain all previously-borrowed funds at
the cost of paying the lender's claim for the principal amount
thereof plus interest accrued and unpaid prior to the date of filing
at the steep discount generally present in bankruptcy distributions.
The approach suggested in this Article would permit the debtor to
make further drawings and retain any borrowed funds it holds only
if it chooses to assume the loan agreement, and would compel the
debtor to return the funds in its possession if it chooses to reject.
There is no doubt that the debtor would prefer to be able to
purchase the loaned funds at the price of a prebankruptcy claim for
an equal amount. A debtor would also prefer to purchase leased
personal property at that price, if the Code permitted the debtor to
do so. But if the debtor needs the leased personal property in
connection with its rehabilitation, the Code provides a legal
mechanism for the debtor to retain it, even in the face of objections
from the lessor, through assumption of the lease. There is a cost to
assumption in the sense that cure payments and on-going rental
obligations become administrative expenses and therefore are not
generally paid at a discount. However, the debtor will not choose to
assume unless the benefits derived from assumption outweigh the
associated costs. Therefore, the goal of rehabilitation is furthered
by the ability to assume unexpired leases.
Similarly, if the Code mandated the same treatment for
unexpired leases of money, the goal of rehabilitation would be
protected by the ability of the debtor to assume the loan agreement.
Indeed, despite the cost of assumption, the debtor might be better
off assuming an existing loan agreement that provides for future
advances at prebankruptcy pricing than negotiating for a new one,
because its negotiating leverage with respect to terms is significantly
condition of the debtor or the commencement of the case, this provision is not applicable to
contracts to make a loan or extend other debt financing or financial accommodations. See 11
U.S.C. § 365 (e) (2) (B).
= Both the House and Senate Reports accompanying the bills that became the Code in
1978 emphasized that Section 365(c)(2) was intended to protect a lender from being
compelled to extend new credit to a bankrupt borrower. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 58-59
(1978), repinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. 5787, 5844-45; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 348 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. 5963, 6304.
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diminished when it is in bankruptcy and has an urgent need of
funds.
The treatment of loans that I am proposing would certainly be
different from that to which we are accustomed. But it would also
rectify a long history of discriminatory treatment towards lenders,
whose relationship with the debtor is in all ways comparable to
other creditors who convey to the debtor the right to use their
property for a limited term at a set price. Consistency, in the
context of creditors' rights in bankruptcy, is not "the hobgoblin of
little minds" 89 but is a fundamental goal of the statutory scheme."' 0
If we do not have consistent treatment of like creditors, we do not
have a bankruptcy system that is fundamentally fair. If we do not
have a bankruptcy system that is fundamentally fair, we should not
have a system at all.
Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self-Reliance.
See supra note 271.
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